2024
Gow, L. (n.d.). Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View. The Philosophical Quarterly. doi:10.1093/pq/pqad075DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad075
2023
Gow, L. (2023). Intentionality as intentional inexistence. INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 66(8), 1371-1385. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2021.1923563DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2021.1923563
Gow, L. (2023). Beyond adverbialism: A new non-relational theory of perceptual experience. MIND & LANGUAGE, 38(1), 2-19. doi:10.1111/mila.12396DOI: 10.1111/mila.12396
2021
Gow, L. (2021). Empty Space, Silence, and Absence. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 51(7), 496-507. doi:10.1017/can.2022.9DOI: 10.1017/can.2022.9
Gow, L. (2021). Are sensory experiences contingently representational? A critical notice of David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience. MIND & LANGUAGE, 36(4), 627-635. doi:10.1111/mila.12376DOI: 10.1111/mila.12376
Gow, L. (2021). Perceptual Experience and Physicalism. In Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception (pp. 127-146). Oxford University PressOxford. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0007DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0007
Gow, L. (n.d.). A new theory of absence experience. European Journal of Philosophy. doi:10.1111/ejop.12577DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12577
2019
Gow, L. (2019). Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experiences are Transparent. European Journal of Philosophy, 27(02), 412-425. doi:10.1111/ejop.12427DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12427
2018
Gow, L. (2018). Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism. Ratio, 31(S1), 35-50. doi:10.1111/rati.12175DOI: 10.1111/rati.12175
2017
Gow, L. (2017). Colour hallucination: A new problem for externalist representationalism. Analysis, 77(4), 695-704. doi:10.1093/analys/anx122DOI: 10.1093/analys/anx122
2016
Gow, L. (2016). The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency. The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(265), 723-744. doi:10.1093/pq/pqw018DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqw018
2014
