Royal Institute of Philosophy Stapledon Colloquium 2017-18: Dr Ryan Byerly (University of Sheffield) - "Others-Centerdness as a Moral Ideal"
3:00pm - 5:00pm /
Wednesday 12th March 0008
Type: Seminar /
Category: Department
- Professor Thomas Schramme - Department of Philosophy, University of LIverpool
- Suitable for: All Welcome
- Admission: Free
- Book now
Add this event to my calendar
Click on "Create a calendar file" and your browser will download a .ics file for this event.
Microsoft Outlook: Download the file, double-click it to open it in Outlook, then click on "Save & Close" to save it to your calendar. If that doesn't work go into Outlook, click on the File tab, then on Open & Export, then Open Calendar. Select your .ics file then click on "Save & Close".
Google Calendar: download the file, then go into your calendar. On the left where it says "Other calendars" click on the arrow icon and then click on Import calendar. Click on Browse and select the .ics file, then click on Import.
Apple Calendar: The file may open automatically with an option to save it to your calendar. If not, download the file, then you can either drag it to Calendar or import the file by going to File >Import > Import and choosing the .ics file.
Dr Ryan Byerly (University of Sheffield) - "Others-Centerdness as a Moral Ideal"
In this paper, I offer a definition of the character trait of others-centeredness, discuss the relationship of others-centeredness to other phenomena discussed in contemporary virtue theory and contemporary psychology, and identify resources for defending the value of others-centeredness from multiple normative perspectives. According to the proposed definition, others-centeredness is a tendency to treat those interests that would be impacted by one’s potential acts as providing greater reason for action given that they are others’ than given that they are one’s own. So understood, others-centeredness shares certain features in common with traits identified with humility, generosity, or love by contemporary virtue theorists, and it also resembles hypo-egoic, communal, and self-sacrificial constructs that have been the subject of psychological study. Yet, it is not identical to any of these phenomena. Moreover, a provisional case for its positive value can be made using resources available to adherents of consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethical approaches to normative ethics. As such, it promises to be a fruitful object of interdisciplinary study.
In this paper, I offer a definition of the character trait of others-centeredness, discuss the relationship of others-centeredness to other phenomena discussed in contemporary virtue theory and contemporary psychology, and identify resources for defending the value of others-centeredness from multiple normative perspectives. According to the proposed definition, others-centeredness is a tendency to treat those interests that would be impacted by one’s potential acts as providing greater reason for action given that they are others’ than given that they are one’s own. So understood, others-centeredness shares certain features in common with traits identified with humility, generosity, or love by contemporary virtue theorists, and it also resembles hypo-egoic, communal, and self-sacrificial constructs that have been the subject of psychological study. Yet, it is not identical to any of these phenomena. Moreover, a provisional case for its positive value can be made using resources available to adherents of consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethical approaches to normative ethics. As such, it promises to be a fruitful object of interdisciplinary study.