Royal Institute of Philosophy Stapledon Colloquium 2017-18 - Professor Lisa Bortolotti: "Delusions and three myths of irrational belief"
3:00pm - 5:00pm /
Monday 29th January 2018
Type: Seminar /
Category: Department
- Professor Thomas Schramme - Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool
- Suitable for: All welcome
- Admission: Free
- Book now
Add this event to my calendar
Click on "Create a calendar file" and your browser will download a .ics file for this event.
Microsoft Outlook: Download the file, double-click it to open it in Outlook, then click on "Save & Close" to save it to your calendar. If that doesn't work go into Outlook, click on the File tab, then on Open & Export, then Open Calendar. Select your .ics file then click on "Save & Close".
Google Calendar: download the file, then go into your calendar. On the left where it says "Other calendars" click on the arrow icon and then click on Import calendar. Click on Browse and select the .ics file, then click on Import.
Apple Calendar: The file may open automatically with an option to save it to your calendar. If not, download the file, then you can either drag it to Calendar or import the file by going to File >Import > Import and choosing the .ics file.
Professor Lisa Bortolotti, MA (London), BPhil (Oxon), PhD (ANU)
University of Birmingham
"Delusions and three myths of irrational belief
How has the focus on clinical delusions influenced the recent philosophical literature? I argue that in order to account for the nature of delusions, philosophers have revisited several issues that are central to their study of the mind. In the process, a few myths have been dispelled. First, a belief does not need to be rational to be understood and contribute to the process of explaining and predicting a person's behaviour. Second, a belief does not need to be rational to have a positive impact to a person's well being, success, or even knowledge. Third, irrational beliefs are not an exception in a largely rational background of rational belief. On the contrary, people have many beliefs that violate norms of rationality, and clinically significant delusions have a place on that spectrum. Finally, I discuss how the importance of detail in the analysis of delusions has forced philosophers to leave their armchairs and collaborate with cognitive scientists and clinicians to get a more realistic picture of what irrationality is like 'in the wild'.
Now the time has come to pass on this acquired wisdom, as everyone can benefit from the lessons learnt. Each dispelled myth can contribute to reducing the stigma associated with mental health issues in general, and psychotic symptoms in particular.
University of Birmingham
"Delusions and three myths of irrational belief
How has the focus on clinical delusions influenced the recent philosophical literature? I argue that in order to account for the nature of delusions, philosophers have revisited several issues that are central to their study of the mind. In the process, a few myths have been dispelled. First, a belief does not need to be rational to be understood and contribute to the process of explaining and predicting a person's behaviour. Second, a belief does not need to be rational to have a positive impact to a person's well being, success, or even knowledge. Third, irrational beliefs are not an exception in a largely rational background of rational belief. On the contrary, people have many beliefs that violate norms of rationality, and clinically significant delusions have a place on that spectrum. Finally, I discuss how the importance of detail in the analysis of delusions has forced philosophers to leave their armchairs and collaborate with cognitive scientists and clinicians to get a more realistic picture of what irrationality is like 'in the wild'.
Now the time has come to pass on this acquired wisdom, as everyone can benefit from the lessons learnt. Each dispelled myth can contribute to reducing the stigma associated with mental health issues in general, and psychotic symptoms in particular.