Dr Louise Hanson (Cambridge University) on meta-aesthetics
5:00pm - 6:30pm /
Friday 6th May 2016
Type: Lecture /
Category: Department
- Department of Philosophy/School of the Arts
- Suitable for: All
- Admission: Free admission
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"Realism in Ethics and Aesthetics"
A growing number of philosophers are sympathetic to a position known as robust moral realism. This is the view, roughly, that there are moral facts, and that these facts hold independently of what anybody thinks about them. On robust moral realism (RMR), slavery’s wrongness, for example, doesn’t consist in our disapproval of it - slavery would be wrong even if everybody thought it was right, and even if there were no people.
While RMR is an increasingly popular position in metaethics, most people are less sympathetic to its counterpart in aesthetics. In fact, it is hard to find anyone who accepts robust aesthetic realism. Robust aesthetic realism would be the view that there are aesthetic facts, and that these facts hold independently of what anybody thinks about them. On robust aesthetic realism (RAR), the beauty of Venice doesn’t consist in our admiration of it - Venice would be beautiful even if everybody thought it was ugly, and even if there were no people.
Why is there this disparity? Are there good reasons to be a robust moral realist that don’t also count as good reasons to be a robust aesthetic realist? In this paper I consider what I take to be the three main arguments for robust moral realism, and ask whether their counterparts in aesthetics are less plausible. I argue that the considerations in favor of RMR also tell in favor of RAR."
All are welcome to attend this event.
A growing number of philosophers are sympathetic to a position known as robust moral realism. This is the view, roughly, that there are moral facts, and that these facts hold independently of what anybody thinks about them. On robust moral realism (RMR), slavery’s wrongness, for example, doesn’t consist in our disapproval of it - slavery would be wrong even if everybody thought it was right, and even if there were no people.
While RMR is an increasingly popular position in metaethics, most people are less sympathetic to its counterpart in aesthetics. In fact, it is hard to find anyone who accepts robust aesthetic realism. Robust aesthetic realism would be the view that there are aesthetic facts, and that these facts hold independently of what anybody thinks about them. On robust aesthetic realism (RAR), the beauty of Venice doesn’t consist in our admiration of it - Venice would be beautiful even if everybody thought it was ugly, and even if there were no people.
Why is there this disparity? Are there good reasons to be a robust moral realist that don’t also count as good reasons to be a robust aesthetic realist? In this paper I consider what I take to be the three main arguments for robust moral realism, and ask whether their counterparts in aesthetics are less plausible. I argue that the considerations in favor of RMR also tell in favor of RAR."
All are welcome to attend this event.