Dr Louise Hanson (Cambridge University) on meta-aesthetics. Friday 22nd April 5pm. Harold Wilson room (2nd floor guild).
5:00pm - 6:00pm /
Friday 22nd April 2016
Type: Lecture /
Category: Department
- Dr Attila Tanyi
- Admission: Free admission, all welcome.
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This Wednesday at 5pm in the Rendall Building seminar room 3 we will be hosting Sophie Allen from Oxford University. She is speaking on 'Interfering with interference: necessity, causation and natural law'. The talk is open to all: UGS, PGS & Staff.
"A brick being thrown causes the window to break, but surely it didn’t have to do so; something might have interfered with the causal process and prevented that particular effect from occurring. This is the argument from interference and it is used to challenge claims that causes must bring about their effects as a matter of necessity of some strength or other. This paper will investigate three applications of the argument from interference and discuss how none of them can be successful without begging the question against the respective views they are intended to oppose. The key problem in each case is that the objection requires a conception of properties which the opposing view would be unlikely (and unwise) to countenance. The result is that different accounts of the strength of causal necessity lack a significant, direct argument against opposing views, leaving at least four internally consistent accounts of the necessity of causal relations. I will then explore what we should say when faced with a metaphysical stalemate of this kind."
"A brick being thrown causes the window to break, but surely it didn’t have to do so; something might have interfered with the causal process and prevented that particular effect from occurring. This is the argument from interference and it is used to challenge claims that causes must bring about their effects as a matter of necessity of some strength or other. This paper will investigate three applications of the argument from interference and discuss how none of them can be successful without begging the question against the respective views they are intended to oppose. The key problem in each case is that the objection requires a conception of properties which the opposing view would be unlikely (and unwise) to countenance. The result is that different accounts of the strength of causal necessity lack a significant, direct argument against opposing views, leaving at least four internally consistent accounts of the necessity of causal relations. I will then explore what we should say when faced with a metaphysical stalemate of this kind."