Elite purges, institutions and consolidation of power in dictatorships
3:30pm - 5:00pm /
Thursday 28th April 2022
Type: Seminar /
Category: Research
- Dr Luca Bernardi
- Admission: This is a free event. Please register via the Eventbrite link provided for the Zoom Link
- Book now
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Jun Goka Sudduth (University of Strathclyde)
Abstract: Do nominally democratic institutions such as political parties and legislatures reduce a dictator’s incentives and abilities to purge rival elites within the regime? This paper argues that the effectiveness of “democratic” institutions in diminishing the likelihood that a dictator eliminates rival elites crucially depends on whether the targets of purges are civilian elites such as party officials or military officers. I claim that through political institutions diminish the likelihood of military purges by enabling military officers to make credible threats of staging a coup, they are less likely to influence a dictator’s incentives and abilities to purge civilian elites. By applying matching methods and using an original dataset of purges of civilian elites and military officers in dictatorships from 1980 to 2010, I show that pre-existing institutions such as parties and legislatures prevent leaders from purging military officers but do not affect the probability of purges of civilian elites. The findings imply that the role of power-sharing institutions in deterring a dictator’s opportunism is not as effective as the literature previously has maintained.
Bio: Jun Koga Sudduth is a senior lecturer of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde. She received her Ph.D. in political science from Emory University. Her research focuses on political violence, comparative authoritarianism, leader survival, and the linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy. She is currently working on a book manuscript that seeks to understand why some leaders successfully consolidate power by repeatedly eliminating rival elites from the regime while others do not, using newly collected data on elite purges between 1980 and 2010. She has published articles in the Comparative Political Studies, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, and elsewhere. Her research has been funded by the British Academy/Leverhulme, the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, and the Research Council of Norway. Her personal homepage is available at: Jun Goka Sudduth
Abstract: Do nominally democratic institutions such as political parties and legislatures reduce a dictator’s incentives and abilities to purge rival elites within the regime? This paper argues that the effectiveness of “democratic” institutions in diminishing the likelihood that a dictator eliminates rival elites crucially depends on whether the targets of purges are civilian elites such as party officials or military officers. I claim that through political institutions diminish the likelihood of military purges by enabling military officers to make credible threats of staging a coup, they are less likely to influence a dictator’s incentives and abilities to purge civilian elites. By applying matching methods and using an original dataset of purges of civilian elites and military officers in dictatorships from 1980 to 2010, I show that pre-existing institutions such as parties and legislatures prevent leaders from purging military officers but do not affect the probability of purges of civilian elites. The findings imply that the role of power-sharing institutions in deterring a dictator’s opportunism is not as effective as the literature previously has maintained.
Bio: Jun Koga Sudduth is a senior lecturer of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde. She received her Ph.D. in political science from Emory University. Her research focuses on political violence, comparative authoritarianism, leader survival, and the linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy. She is currently working on a book manuscript that seeks to understand why some leaders successfully consolidate power by repeatedly eliminating rival elites from the regime while others do not, using newly collected data on elite purges between 1980 and 2010. She has published articles in the Comparative Political Studies, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, and elsewhere. Her research has been funded by the British Academy/Leverhulme, the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, and the Research Council of Norway. Her personal homepage is available at: Jun Goka Sudduth