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**Dreaming of Leaving the Nest?
Immigration Status and the Living
Arrangements of DACAmended**

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Dreaming of Leaving the Nest? Immigration Status and the Living Arrangements of DACAmented

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Abstract

This study investigates the effects of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) on the living arrangements and housing behavior of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. Using an event-study approach and difference-in-differences (DID) estimates, we compare immigrants above and below eligibility cutoffs and demonstrate that after the adoption of the policy in June 2012, DACA-eligible immigrants were less likely to live with their parents or in multigenerational households (-11%) and more likely to live independently (+15.5%). We also reveal that DACA-eligible immigrants were less likely to live in the same house (+2%) and more likely to move out of ethnic enclaves (-3%). Lower rental costs (-4.5%) may have facilitated this transition into adulthood and the observed trends in living arrangements. DACA also led to a decline in marriage rates among DACA-eligible individuals, while we found no evidence of significant effects on cohabitation, divorce, and intermarriage. We also found no evidence of a clear impact on fertility.

JEL CODES: J1, J23, J24, R2

Keywords: Immigration Status, DACA, Living Arrangements, Rental Markets

1 Introduction

The share of Americans living in multigenerational family households increased by 30% over the last 20 years from 42.4 million in 2000 to 64 million in 2016 (Taylor et al., 2011; Cohn and Passel, 2018). One of the main factors behind the rise in multigenerational living is the growth of the foreign-born population. Immigrants are more likely than native born citizens to reside with extended family in the same household. Among the foreign-born, 34.2% lived in an extended family arrangement in 2019, while among the native born, this figure was 19.2%. The rise in multigenerational living has been driven by young adults. While only 13% of individuals aged 25-29 were living in a multigenerational household in 1980, this number rose to approximately 32% in 2019.¹

Previous research suggests that while cultural preferences and economic constraints contribute to explaining these differences in living arrangements, the challenges with international migration and immigrant status may play an important role in shaping the family structures and housing behavior of immigrants (Van Hook and Glick, 2007; Chavez, 1990). In fact, Hall et al. (2019) discuss how undocumented immigrants are less likely than other groups to live independently. Legal restrictions may leave young undocumented immigrants unable to complete important transitions, leaving them in a “developmental limbo” (Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013; Gonzales, 2015).

The economic and social precariousness associated with immigration status can significantly shape family experiences and living arrangements (Van Hook and Glick, 2007) and affect the propensity to actively engage outside ethnic enclaves (Hall et al., 2019). Furthermore, the threat of being deported, lack of documents and credit history, and lower outside options may reduce undocumented immigrants’ bargaining power in the housing market, limit their mobility, and their ability to live independently (Hall et al., 2019). Thus, changes to immigration policy may have significant effects on the living arrangements and housing

¹See also <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/05/a-record-64-million-americans-live-in-multigenerational-households/>.

behavior of immigrants. We analyze the effects of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on the living arrangements of undocumented immigrant youth.

DACA was approved in June 2012 by President Obama and provided temporary work authorization and deferral from deportation for undocumented, high-school-educated immigrants. With an executive memorandum, President Obama approved the most important immigration reform since the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. While DACA does not provide a path to citizenship, DACA-recipient individuals are allowed to work and are provided with temporary reprieve from deportation.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study considering the impact DACA may have had on the living arrangements of the young undocumented immigrants, known as “dreamers.” We rely on discontinuities in the DACA eligibility program and identify the effects of DACA on living arrangements and housing market outcomes using an event-study approach and difference-in-difference (DID) estimates. Specifically, we restricted the analysis to high-school graduates aged between 18 and 38 and consider non-citizens who were above and below the age of 16 when they entered the United States; those who were above and below the age of 30 on June 15, 2012; and those who entered the US before and after 2007. Furthermore, we non-parametrically control for DACA eligibility criteria by including fixed effects for an individual’s age, education, and age on arrival in the U.S.

The data were drawn from the American Community Survey. We find that DACA-eligible immigrants were more likely to live on their own (-15.5%), less likely to live in a multigenerational household (-11%), were less likely to live in the same house as the previous year, and were living in Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) with a lower share of co-ethnics (-8%). If anything, DACA-eligible immigrants were also less likely to be married after DACA was approved. While we find no clear evidence of an effect on the likelihood of marrying a US citizen, there is, if anything, some evidence of a decline in the likelihood of endogamous marriages. At the same time, we find no evidence of significant effects on divorce, cohabitation, and fertility. Although DID estimates suggest some decline also on

these outcomes.

Previous studies also documented the extent of discrimination that racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities face in housing markets (Combes et al., 2018; Edelman et al., 2017). Audit studies have revealed that agents and rental housing providers show fewer available homes and apartments to minorities than equally qualified whites (Page, 1995). These forms of discrimination affect search costs and limit the set of housing options for minorities (Hanson et al., 2016, 2011; Yinger, 1986). If undocumented immigrants face more search frictions and have less bargaining power when searching for an accommodation, immigration policy may have significant effects on their housing market outcomes. Higher rents may deter young undocumented individuals from leaving their parents' home, constraining their geographical mobility, and contributing to delaying their transition into adulthood. Undocumented immigrants have been shown to face higher costs in the housing market Christopher (2020). Higher rental costs may be one of the factors impeding young immigrants to move out of their parents' house and live independently. We find that the program increased the ability of DACA recipients to obtain better conditions and lower costs in the housing market. After the introduction of the DACA in 2012, DACA-eligible immigrants paid lower rents (-4.5%). The results hold for the inclusion of housing characteristics, and we find that, in general, everything else being equal, DACA -recipients were more likely to live in larger houses or apartments. Our estimates provide a lower bound (in absolute value) on the intent-to-treat effect of DACA on living arrangements, marital outcome and rental housing costs. Given the US Census estimates 40% of non-citizens are authorized (Acosta et al., 2014), our estimated effects will be smaller (in absolute value) than the intent-to-treat effects of DACA. In addition, not all DACA-eligible individuals applied and received DACA status. The Migration Policy Institute estimates that there were 1,326,000 DACA-eligible individuals in 2017. However, as of January 2018, only 682,750 individuals obtained DACA status.² Based on these estimates, the program participation rate is 52%, suggesting that the treatment on the

²See <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca-profile>

treated effects could be twice as large as the intent-to-treat effects.

This study relates to three different strands of the literature. First, we relate to the set of studies analyzing the effects of immigration policy on the economic and social integration of undocumented immigrants, particularly to recent studies analyzing the effects of DACA (Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2016, 2017; Pope, 2016; Kuka et al., 2020; Venkataramani et al., 2017; Giuntella and Lonsky, 2020; Patler et al., 2019; Gunadi, 2020; Hsin and Ortega, 2018). Second, our work contributes to the handful of studies analyzing the role of immigration status in shaping the transition to adulthood and the living arrangements of young undocumented immigrants (Hall et al., 2019; Van Hook and Glick, 2007). Finally, we relate to the literature on ethnic and racial discrimination in the housing market (Page, 1995). In particular, our analysis of the effects of DACA on rental costs relates to recent work by Christopher (2020) documenting the higher price paid by undocumented renters in the U.S. and demonstrating that sanctuary city policies reduced the housing costs of undocumented renters.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the institutional details and previous work on the effects of DACA, the living arrangements of undocumented immigrants, and the effects of immigration on housing markets. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical specification. The main results are discussed in section 4. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in section 5.

2 Background

2.1 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)

On June 15, 2012, President Barack Obama announced the DACA. In an executive memorandum, the President announced the largest change in immigration policy since the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, 1986). The program aimed to provide the possibility for the approximately 1.7 million qualifying unauthorized immigrants to apply for a two-year

renewable reprieve from deportation. The program would provide eligible applicants work authorization and a temporary social security number, but not a path to citizenship. The first applications were accepted two months after the announcement on August 15, 2012.

To be eligible, applicants have to meet the following seven criteria: (1) no lawful status as of June 15, 2012, (2) under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012, (3) entered the U.S. before reaching their 16th birthday, (4) continuously residing in the U.S. from June 15, 2007, (5) physically present in the U.S. on June 15, 2012, and at the time of applying for DACA, (6) currently in school, with high school diploma (or GED), or honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States, and (7) no convictions for felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors. In addition, applicants must be 15 years or older and are required to pay a processing fee of 495 dollars. DACA applicants must provide evidence that they were living in the U.S. at the prescribed times, proof of education, and confirmation of their identities. They also have to pass a background check, fingerprinting, and other checks that consider their identifying biological features. Applicants do not need legal representation. Officials can revoke DACA protection if individuals pose a threat to public safety or national security. Approximately 1,500 people have had their deferral canceled due to a crime or gang-related activity or an admission to such activity. This is less than 0.2% of the total number of people accepted into the program (source: Immigration and Customs Enforcement).

The main benefits of DACA are the deferral of deportation and the working permit. The provision of a temporary social security number allows successful applicants to open a bank account, build a credit history, and in most states, to obtain a driver's license. Social security numbers allowed DACA recipients to build credit and access forms of financing on vehicles and home mortgages. While the program does not grant access to federal welfare programs or federal student aid per se, successful applicants are eligible for Earned Income Tax Credit. Furthermore, in some states, DACA-eligible immigrants were granted access to state-funded Medicaid programs (i.e., California, New York, Minnesota, Massachusetts, D.C., Illinois,

Oregon, Washington). In September 2017, the Trump administration announced the phasing out of the DACA program. In June 2020, the Supreme Court affirmed that the reasoning given for the rescission was arbitrary. On January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden reinstated the DACA with an executive order

2.2 Previous work

2.2.1 The Effects of DACA on Labor Market, Health, and Human Capital

Our research adds to the recent set of studies analyzing the effects of DACA. These studies have analyzed the impact of DACA on labor market outcomes, human capital, health, fertility, and crime. [Pope \(2016\)](#) finds that DACA significantly improved the labor market opportunities of undocumented immigrants. DACA has also been shown to have reduced the likelihood of a life in poverty ([Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2016](#)) and to promote GDP growth ([Ortega et al., 2018](#)). [Hsin and Ortega \(2018\)](#) and [Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman \(2016\)](#) suggest that DACA may have incentivized work over educational investments, although this effect is importantly mediated by how easily college accommodate working students. At the same time, [Kuka et al. \(2020\)](#) find that DACA significantly increased high school attendance and high school graduation rates. There is also increasing evidence that DACA improved mental health ([Venkataramani et al., 2017](#); [Giuntella and Lonsky, 2020](#); [Hainmueller et al., 2017](#); [Patler et al., 2019](#); [Giuntella et al., 2021](#)) and birth outcomes ([Hamilton et al., 2021](#)), reduced teenage fertility ([Kuka et al., 2019](#)), and crime ([Gunadi, 2020](#)).

However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of DACA on the living arrangements of undocumented youth, on their mobility, and their housing market outcomes.

2.2.2 The Living Arrangements of Undocumented Immigrants

We also directly relate to the literature analyzing the living arrangements of immigrants. It is a well-known fact that Hispanics are more likely to reside with extended family than non-Hispanic whites (([Van Hook and Glick, 2007](#); [Chavez, 1990](#))). These differences hold even after accounting for demographic and socioeconomic differences. Several studies have attempted to explain these patterns in the living arrangements of Hispanics, highlighting both the role of cultural preferences for co-residence as well as socioeconomic and demographic constraints. [Van Hook and Glick \(2007\)](#) demonstrate that high levels of co-residence among recently arrived Mexican immigrants are a departure from the traditional family arrangements prevalent in Mexico, suggesting that they are more likely to reflect challenges associated with international migration and, for many, the uncertainty surrounding immigrant legal status.

There are nearly five million undocumented immigrants under the age of 30 in the U.S. ([Fortuny et al., 2007](#); [Zong et al., 2015](#); [Passel and D’Vera Cohn, 2011](#)). However, there is still little understanding of how changes to legal status affect young people’s transition into adulthood. Previous studies have documented the positive emotional consequences of transitioning out of undocumented status for immigrant young adults ([Patler and Pirtle, 2018](#)). However, less is known about the mechanisms through which changes in legal status may affect young immigrants’ well-being and their transition into adulthood ([Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013](#)). [Hall et al. \(2019\)](#) report how undocumented immigrants are significantly less likely to live in simple arrangements than documented immigrants, highlighting the importance of legal and structural forces in shaping living arrangements of undocumented immigrants. These patterns can, in turn, have long-term effects on the life course of young immigrants, affecting their transition to adulthood, and thus their well-being and economic success.

2.2.3 Immigration and Housing Markets

Finally, our work relates to the literature analyzing the housing market behavior of immigrants as well as the impact of immigration on housing markets. Although public and academic debate has largely focused on the effect of immigration on labor market outcomes, only a few studies have investigated the impact of immigration on housing markets. [Saiz \(2007\)](#) examines the impact of immigration on house prices and rents in the U.S. and find that a 1% increase in the share of immigrants in a city was associated with a 3% increase in average price and a 1% increase in rents. A positive relationship between immigration and prices has also been observed in Switzerland ([Degen and Fischer, 2017](#)) and Spain ([Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013](#)), with effects comparable in magnitude to those observed in the U.S. Other studies have found smaller effects in Canada ([Akbari and Aydede, 2012](#)) and New Zealand ([Stillman and Maré, 2008](#)). In contrast, [Sá \(2015\)](#) finds negative effects on house prices in the UK and suggests that these are explained by the mobility response of the native population driving housing demand down. While there is now a rich set of studies analyzing the impact of immigration on housing markets, little is known about how immigration status affects the housing behavior of immigrants. With the exception of recent study by [Christopher \(2020\)](#) examining the impact of sanctuary cities on rental costs, we are not aware of other research examining how immigration policy affects housing demand among immigrants. By exploring the effect of DACA, we focus specifically on young undocumented immigrants.

The role of immigration status in housing markets is understudied. Undocumented immigrants who fear the threat of deportation pay higher prices in the rental market ([Christopher, 2020](#)). We contribute to this concurrent study by examining a different policy specifically targeting the “Dreamers” population. Furthermore, our study focuses more on the living arrangements and transition into adulthood of undocumented immigrant youth ([Hall et al., 2019](#)). Finally, in our setting, we can exploit the discontinuities in the eligibility criteria of the DACA program, allowing us to construct a counterfactual and identify the effects of the program on rental housing costs using an event-study approach.

3 Data

To analyze the effects of DACA on housing costs, we use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) (2005–2019), the largest household survey administered by the U.S. Census Bureau . We cover the period 2005-2019 as 2005 was the first year in which the ACS collected data on a full one-percent sample of the U.S. population and 2019 is the last year for which the survey data are available. Designed as a replacement for the long form of the decennial census, ACS contains a detailed set of standard socio-demographic characteristics, labor market outcomes (e.g., employment, labor force participation, annual income), and relevant information on respondents’ home ownership, rental prices, and home characteristics.

The ACS contains information on U.S. citizenship status, number of years spent in the U.S., quarter of birth, and educational attainment, which can be used to determine respondents’ DACA eligibility status. There is no information on whether an individual had criminal convictions or whether the respondent had been honorably discharged from the military.

The U.S. Census Bureau uses a near universe of housing addresses from its Master Address File as the sample frame from which it draws a systematic sample of addresses each month. The ACS is then mailed to the selected addresses. Non-respondents are contacted one month later for a computer-assisted telephone interview. After that, one third of non-respondents who still remain are contacted in person to complete the ACS one month after the telephone survey attempt (Pope, 2016). For these reasons, unauthorized immigrants are as likely to be selected into the sample as authorized immigrants or natives.

For the analysis of living arrangements of young undocumented immigrants, we define the following variables: (1) *extended family arrangements*, including grand-parents (three-generation and “skip” generation, i.e., households with no co-resident parent generation), adult siblings, or other relatives, (2) *living with parents*, (3) *living in 3-gen household*, (4) *non-family arrangements* identifies individuals living only with non-relatives, (5) *simple arrangements*, which captures households composed of partners and their own children, and

(6) *single-parent households*.

We use information on marital status to examine the effects of DACA on marriage, cohabitation, and divorce. We then defined the dichotomic variables for marrying a U.S. citizen and marrying a first-generation immigrant from their country of origin. The ACS also includes information on fertility in the previous year for all women aged 15 to 50.

To examine the impact of DACA on the mobility of DACA-eligible immigrants, we exploit information on whether the respondent relocated compared to the previous year. To investigate the effects of the program on the likelihood of living in an ethnic enclave, we construct a variable measuring the share of immigrants from the same ethnic group living in the same PUMA as well as an indicator for whether the respondent was living in a PUMA with a share of immigrants from the same country above the median.

Finally, the ACS includes information on monthly rent for all renter-occupied units, the number of rooms in a household’s residence, an indicator for homeownership, and information on the cost of monthly property insurance. We explore these data to examine the impact of the DACA program on the housing market behavior of DACA-eligible immigrants.

4 Empirical Specification

We define DACA-eligible individual as follows: (1) were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012, (2) have lived in the U.S. since June 15, 2007, (3) entered the U.S. before reaching their 16th birthday, (4) have at least a high school degree (or equivalent), (5) were born outside the U.S. and its territories, and (6) are not U.S. citizens.

We follow previous literature analyzing the effects of DACA on labor market outcomes and human capital ([Pope, 2016](#); [Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2017](#)) and compare DACA-eligible with DACA-ineligible individuals, before and after the implementation of the reform.

In the ACS, our main estimation sample comprises all non-citizens aged 18–38 with at least a high school degree (or equivalent). We then compare non-citizens who were above

and below the age of 16 when they entered the United States; those who were above and below the age of 30 on June 15, 2012; and those who entered the US before and after 2007.

As nearly 40% of the non-citizen sample in the ACS data are authorized immigrants (Baker and Rytina, 2014), the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of DACA will be approximately 1.6 times larger than the estimates from our DID estimation. As of August 2018, 699,350 individuals obtained DACA status. The Migration Policy Institute estimates there were 1,326,000 DACA-eligible individuals in 2017. Thus, the program participation rate in 2018 was approximately 52%, suggesting that the treatment on the treated effects was significantly larger than the ITT effects.

Formally, we estimate the following equation using a linear probability model:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Post_{it} + \beta_2 Elig_{it} + \beta_3 Post_{it}Elig_{it} + \beta_4 X_{it} + \beta_5 Z + it + \Lambda_t + \Theta_c + \Theta_c * t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where Y refers to the outcome of interest of individual in year (e.g., living arrangements, marital and fertility behavior, mobility, rental costs, etc.), $Post$ is a binary variable equal to one if the survey took place the adoption of the DACA program, and $Elig$ is a dummy equal to one if the individual is DACA-eligible when the survey is administered. The coefficient of interest (β_3) measures the ITT effect of DACA. The regression also controls for an individual's socio-demographic characteristics (X_{it}), year fixed effects (Λ_t), area (county, state, or region) fixed effects (Θ_c), and state- or region-specific time trends ($\Theta_c * t$). We non-parametrically control for DACA eligibility criteria by including fixed effects for an individual's age, education, and age on arrival in the U.S. These controls are important as our outcomes may be directly affected by correlates of age, education, and time spent in the U.S. This flexible set of controls allows us to account for unobservable characteristics that may be correlated with the determinants of eligibility status as well as with the outcomes under investigation. Furthermore, it ensures that our findings are not driven by any one of the eligibility criteria alone.

5 Results

5.1 The Effects of DACA on Living Arrangements

We start our analysis by documenting the effects of DACA on living arrangements. Figure 1 documents a sharp decline in the share of DACA-eligible immigrants living in an extended family arrangement. There is no evidence of a pre-trend in the difference between eligible and non-eligible immigrants before 2012. However, since 2013, there has been a stark decline in the likelihood of DACA-eligible individuals living in an extended family arrangement. By 2015, DACA-eligible immigrants were approximately 3 percentage points less likely to live in extended family arrangements, and by 2019, the difference increased to approximately 4 percentage points. The trend is even more marked when examining the impact of DACA on the likelihood of DACA-eligible immigrants reporting living with their parents. By 2015, DACA-eligible immigrants were 4 percentage points less likely to live with their parents, and by 2019, the difference with non-eligible immigrants had increased to 8 percentage points. Similarly, there is a decline in the share of DACA-eligible immigrants living in 3-generational households. These patterns are mirrored by the increase in the share of non-family arrangement households. There is also an increase in simple arrangement households, while we find no evidence of a change in the share of single-parent households.

The effects on living arrangements are sizable and summarized in the DID results in Table A.1. After 2012, DACA-eligible immigrants were 1.6 percentage points more likely to live in an extended family arrangement (column 1, Panel A, +6% with respect to the mean) and 2 percentage points more likely to live with their parents (column 2, Panel A, +15.5% with respect to the mean). DACA-eligible immigrants were also 1 percentage point less likely to live in a 3-generation household (column 3, Panel A, -12.5%); 1.4 percentage point more likely to live in non-family arrangements (column 4, Panel A, +6.6%), and 0.7 percentage points more likely to live in simple arrangement households (column 5, Panel A, +1.6%). Column 6 confirms the lack of any significant effect on single parenthood. The

effects are overall similar among men (Panel B) and women (Panel C). However, interestingly the overall effect on the likelihood of simple arrangement households is driven by women who are 0.9 percentage points more likely to live in simple arrangements if DACA-eligible after 2012.

Taken together, these findings suggest that DACA had substantial effects on the living arrangements of undocumented youth who were eligible for the program with a significant decline in their likelihood of living in extended family arrangements or with their parents, and an increase in the likelihood of living independently with non-family members or alone.

5.2 The Effects of DACA on Marital Behavior and Fertility

The change in living arrangements may also reflect the impact of DACA on marital behavior and fertility. For this reason, we investigate the effects of DACA on the likelihood of being married, cohabiting, or divorced. Furthermore, we explore whether the program had any effect on intermarriage as previous studies have indicated that immigration policy can have substantial effects on immigrant marriage patterns and their likelihood of marrying a U.S. citizen ([Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2020](#)).

Overall, DACA-eligible immigrants were less likely to marry (Figure 2). There is some evidence of a mild decline in cohabitation patterns immediately after the approval of DACA, suggesting that this trend may have contributed to the subsequent decline observed in marriages among DACA-eligible individuals. We find no evidence of significant effects on divorce and no evidence of significant changes in intermarriage patterns. While one may expect that DACA reduced the legal benefits associated with intermarriage, it is worth noting this is still a temporary program with non-negligible uncertainty regarding its destiny. Interestingly, however, we find some evidence of a decline in the likelihood of marrying first-generation immigrants from their own country, which may be consistent with the effects of DACA on living arrangements and the movement away of the ethnic enclaves.

DID estimates on marital behavior are reported in Table A.3. DACA-eligible immigrants

were 1 percentage point less likely to be married than their non-eligible counterparts (column 1). These effects are largely driven by men (Panel B).

The DID estimates suggest a reduction in cohabitation (-14%) and an increase in divorce, both largely driven by women. Interestingly, we overall we find no evidence of a change in intermarriage rates, and Panel B shows that men were significantly less likely to intermarry. This result suggests that the decline in legal returns to intermarriage may have reduce the propensity of men to marry a U.S. citizen. However, column 5 also shows that DACA-eligible immigrants are less likely to marry endogamously.

The program may also have a significant impact on fertility decisions. [Kuka et al. \(2019\)](#) explored the impact of DACA on teen pregnancy, finding evidence of a 1.6 percentage points decline in the average likelihood of having a teenage birth. Here, we expand the analysis to older women. We find no evidence of any significant effect when examining the event-study analysis (Figure 3). However, Table A.5 shows that when pooling the effect of DACA in the DID analysis, we find some evidence that DACA-eligible women were less likely to report a birth in the past year after 2012 (-1.6 percentage points, or -10% with respect to the mean; see column 2). These effects, albeit not precisely estimated, are larger when focusing on non-married women (-2.3 percentage points, or -18%; see column 3).

5.3 The Effects of DACA on Mobility

Interestingly, we show that DACA had significant effects on the likelihood of DACA-eligible immigrants changing their residence with respect to the previous year (Figure 4). While the decline starts immediately after the approval of DACA, it only becomes statistically significant in 2015 (-3% with respect to the mean of the dependent variable), falling substantially in the following years (-10% with respect to the mean in 2019). The DID estimates suggest that DACA-eligible immigrants after the approval of DACA were 1.5 percentage points less likely to reside in the same house. With respect to the mean (69.9), this corresponds to a 2% increase.

Figure 4 also illustrates that DACA-recipient became gradually less likely to live in an ethnic enclave. After the introduction of the program, on average, immigrants were living in commuting zones with a lower share of co-ethnic immigrants (-8% with respect to the average share of immigrants in the area, column 1, Table A.7). Similarly, they were 1.5 percentage point less likely to live in commuting zones with a share of immigrants of their own country above the median. The effects are again larger among women (Panel C) than among men (Panel B).

5.4 The Effects of DACA on Housing Rental Prices

One of the channels through which the DACA program may have increased the share of young undocumented immigrants leaving the parental home and going to live independently, and in a different neighborhood is the housing market. As previously mentioned, undocumented immigrants face higher rental costs than legal immigrants and U.S. citizens. Temporary authorization may reduce search costs in the housing market and increase the ability of young undocumented immigrants to obtain better terms.

Figure 5 illustrates the effect of DACA on housing rental prices. There is no evidence of significant differences in the rental prices faced by DACA-eligible and non-eligible undocumented immigrants before 2012. This supports the underlying assumption of parallel pre-trends between treated and non-treated undocumented immigrants before DACA. However, with the approval of the program, DACA-eligible immigrants experienced a significant decline in housing rental prices. Between 2012 and 2019, they paid 25-55 dollars less per month, a reduction of 1.5-3%. Furthermore, DACA-eligible immigrants were, if anything, living in larger apartments. There is instead no evidence of a significant effect on home ownership, but some evidence that, everything else equal, DACA-eligible immigrants were paying lower monthly property insurance.

To gauge the magnitude of the overall average effect of DACA on rents since its approval, our main DID estimates are reported in Table A.9. We show that on average DACA eligibility

increased the average gross monthly rent by 51\$ (column 1), a 2.6% reduction (column 2). The effect was slightly larger among men than women. Among men, DACA reduced the monthly rent by 62\$, a 3% reduction (column 1, Panel A), while the reduction was equivalent to 49\$ or 2.4% among women (column 1-2, Panel B). All these estimates include controls for the number of rooms. However, column 3 shows that DACA-eligible immigrants moved to slightly larger apartments (+2.5%). There is, however, no evidence of any effect on home ownership, but interestingly, there is evidence of a significant decline in the monthly property insurance fees (-18.5%).

Overall, we believe these results are consistent with the hypothesis that DACA increases the bargaining power of DACA-eligible immigrants in the housing rental market. The reduction in rental costs made it more affordable for many eligible immigrants to live independently, contributing to explaining the impact of DACA on living arrangements.

5.5 Robustness Checks

We conducted several robustness checks to our baseline specification. First, in Tables A.2–A.10, we restrict the analysis to individuals born in Mexico, Central America, or South America, who comprise the vast majority of DACA applicants.³ While some of the point estimates are slightly smaller and less precisely estimated, the results on Hispanics largely confirm the decline in the likelihood of living with parents and the increase in that of reporting living independently (Table A.2). Similarly, we confirm the negative effects on marriage, cohabitation, divorce, and endogamous marriage (Table A.4). The DID results on fertility (Table A.6) is larger and more precisely estimated, suggesting a significant decline in non-marital fertility (-4.1 percentage points, -32% with respect to the mean of the dependent variable). However, the results on mobility and on the likelihood of living in an ethnic enclave are substantially unchanged (Table A.8). Interestingly, we also find larger effects on the monthly rent, which declines by 4.4% among Hispanics, and on the monthly property

³As of September 2017, Mexicans alone comprised 79.4% of the applicants. https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/daca_population_data.pdf

insurance, which declined by 20% (see Table A.10).

Second, Tables A.11–A.15 replicate our main results using the residual method proposed by Passel and D’Vera Cohn (2011) and Borjas (2017) to identify undocumented immigrants. Overall, the findings are very similar to those reported in the main analysis, although some coefficients are less precisely estimated owing to the smaller sample size imposed by the residual method.

Third, Tables A.16–A.20 document the robustness of our results to different definitions of the post-implementation period. In particular, we excluded the period from the Obama executive order to the end of 2012 from the treatment, as most applications came were only approved in 2013. Overall, we obtain very similar findings.

In addition, we calculated p-values using permutation tests (Figures A.1–A.5). We report the histograms of placebo estimates on our main outcomes. The vertical solid line in red represents our DID estimate. The p-values obtained with the permutation tests are reported in dashed-dotted lines (p-value<0.01); in dashed lines (p-value<0.05); in dotted lines (p-value < 0.01). For most outcomes that were significant in our main DID estimates, the permutation tests yield p-value less than 0.05. However, some coefficients are less precisely estimated: the effect on the likelihood of living with the parents is less precisely estimated (p-value=0.068); the effect on marriage (p-value=0.069); the effect on the likelihood of residing in the same house as 12 months earlier (p-value=0.097).

We tested for the presence of systematic pre-trends in our outcomes in Table A.21. For most outcomes, we failed to reject the null hypotheses of no systematic differences between DACA-eligible and non-eligible immigrants before 2012. For two outcomes out of the 23 analyzed, we find marginally significant pre-trends. In particular, there is some evidence of a positive coefficient on the likelihood of living in non-family arrangements before DACA (p-value=0.072). Yet, Figure 1 suggests a marked change in the slope after DACA-approval with a large effect a few years after the approval. We also find evidence of a significant positive difference between DACA-eligible and non-eligible immigrants before 2012 in the likelihood

of marrying within the group ($p\text{-value} < 0.05$). This is mostly driven by the positive coefficient on 2008 (see Figure 4) which appears as an outlier in an otherwise flat pre-trend.

Finally, in Tables A.22–A.25, we report the results obtained using a probit model for the dichotomous variables used in our baseline estimates. These results confirm our main findings. However, interestingly, we find evidence that there is evidence of a significant reduction in intermarriage, which is consistent with reduced returns from marriage because of the temporary authorization provided by the DACA program.

6 Conclusion

Multigenerational households have been on the rise since the early 1980s (Cohn and Passel, 2018). Immigrants and minorities are significantly more likely than white U.S.-born citizens to live in extended family arrangements. The challenges associated with international migration, immigration status, and discrimination in housing markets have been shown to play a crucial role in shaping the living arrangements of immigrants in the U.S.

We studied the impact of temporary work authorization and deferral from deportation provided by the DACA program on the living arrangements of undocumented immigrants and their housing behavior. We demonstrate that DACA-recipient immigrants were more likely to live independently, less likely to marry, more likely to change residence, less likely to live outside an ethnic enclave, and to be married with a first-generation immigrant. We also find that on average, they paid lower rents than non-DACA-recipient unauthorized immigrants. Lower rental costs together with the previously documented evidence on the effects of DACA on labor market participation may have contributed to explain the effects on living arrangements and mobility of DACA-eligible immigrants.

Immigration status, the associated fear of deportation, and the lack of documents can affect the transition to adulthood of young undocumented immigrants, inhibiting their ability to participate in adult activities and become independent, with the risk of remaining in a

developmental limbo ([Gonzales, 2015](#)). The precariousness and instability associated with undocumented status can have long-lasting effects on the economic integration of young undocumented immigrants and their well-being. Overall, our evidence suggests that policies enabling young undocumented immigrants to work, establish a credit history, and temporary relief from the constant fear of deportation may help them acquire independence and further integrate into the host economy. Future research should explore the medium-and long-run implications of immigration policies on young immigrants.

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
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
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Figure 1: Event Study – DACA & Living Arrangements




Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure 2: Event Study – DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy




Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure 3: Event Study – DACA & Fertility




Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure 4: Event Study – DACA & Residing in Ethnic Enclaves



Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 is individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.


Figure 5: Event Study – DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance



Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimation Eq. (1) with the variable $Elig_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The dependent variables: *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.


Appendix

Figure A.1: Permutation Test – DACA & Living Arrangements




Notes - The figure shows results from permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc. (90th perc., respectively); vertical dashed line represents 5th perc. (95th perc., respectively); vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. (99th perc., respectively). The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.2: Permutation Test – DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy




Notes - The figure shows results from permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc.; vertical dashed line represents 5th perc.; vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.3: Permutation Test – DACA & Fertility




Notes - The figure shows results from permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc.; vertical dashed line represents 5th perc.; vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.4: Permutation Test – DACA & Residing in Ethnic Enclaves



Notes - The figure shows results from permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc.; vertical dashed line represents 5th perc.; vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.5: Permutation Test – DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance



Notes - The figure shows results from permutation test comparing the estimated effect of DACA to placebo estimates from 1,000 samples, in which eight years are randomly assigned as “treated” while the remaining seven years comprise the pre-period. The distribution of placebo estimates is depicted. Vertical dotted line represents 10th perc. (90th perc., respectively); vertical dashed line represents 5th perc. (95th perc., respectively); vertical dash-dotted line represents 1st perc. (99th perc., respectively). The actual DID estimate is represented by the vertical red line. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table A.1: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Living Arrangements

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PANEL A: ALL	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.010*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.083*** (0.006)	0.116*** (0.007)	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.083*** (0.007)	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)
After DACA	0.026*** (0.007)	0.074*** (0.005)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.043*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.001)
Observations	786,420	786,420	741,718	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.220	0.270	0.056	0.284	0.571	0.112
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.129	0.082	0.210	0.432	0.024
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.335	0.274	0.407	0.495	0.153
PANEL B: MEN	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.010*** (0.003)	0.012** (0.006)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.098*** (0.006)	0.128*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.106*** (0.007)	0.014*** (0.005)	-0.003** (0.001)
After DACA	0.032*** (0.005)	0.115*** (0.004)	-0.024*** (0.003)	0.044*** (0.006)	-0.035*** (0.004)	-0.050*** (0.001)
Observations	391,449	391,449	363,964	391,449	391,449	391,449
R-squared	0.229	0.268	0.046	0.279	0.552	0.029
Mean of dep. var.	0.279	0.140	0.073	0.267	0.377	0.008
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.448	0.347	0.261	0.442	0.485	0.089
PANEL C: WOMEN	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)
DACA-Eligible	0.065*** (0.009)	0.102*** (0.008)	0.020*** (0.006)	-0.057*** (0.009)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.003)
After DACA	0.026** (0.011)	0.039*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.003)	0.029*** (0.008)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	394,971	394,971	377,754	394,971	394,971	394,971
R-squared	0.212	0.276	0.065	0.273	0.587	0.156
Mean of dep. var.	0.254	0.118	0.090	0.154	0.486	0.040
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.435	0.323	0.286	0.361	0.500	0.196

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.2: DACA & Living Arrangements – Born in Mexico, Central America, or South America (Both Sexes)

	(1) Extended Family Arr.	(2) Living with Parents	(3) Living in 3-Gen. Hh	(4) Non-Family Arr.	(5) Simple Arr. Hh	(6) Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	0.006** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.069*** (0.005)	0.108*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.006)	-0.071*** (0.006)	0.011*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
After DACA	0.042*** (0.007)	0.078*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.003)	0.033*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.003)	-0.019*** (0.001)
Observations	732,254	732,254	693,219	732,254	732,254	732,254
R-squared	0.206	0.253	0.056	0.300	0.563	0.110
Mean of dep. var.	0.247	0.109	0.081	0.208	0.453	0.0244
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.431	0.311	0.272	0.406	0.498	0.154

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals born in Mexico, Central America, or South America. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.3: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PANEL A: ALL	Married	Cohabiting	Divorced	US Citizen Spouse	Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.056*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.002)	0.088*** (0.005)
After DACA	0.034*** (0.004)	-0.040*** (0.001)	-0.098*** (0.001)	0.011* (0.006)	0.028*** (0.006)
Observations	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.226	0.012	0.024	0.067	0.174
Mean of dep. var.	0.467	0.034	0.029	0.213	0.348
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.499	0.181	0.167	0.410	0.476
PANEL B: MEN	Married	Cohabiting	Divorced	US Citizen Spouse	Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.007** (0.002)
DACA-Eligible	0.083*** (0.006)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.003)	0.110*** (0.007)
After DACA	0.057*** (0.005)	0.062*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.001)	0.125*** (0.005)	0.042*** (0.007)
Observations	391,449	391,449	391,449	391,449	391,449
R-squared	0.220	0.012	0.024	0.075	0.186
Mean of dep. var.	0.402	0.029	0.026	0.178	0.300
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.490	0.169	0.158	0.382	0.458
PANEL C: WOMEN	Married	Cohabiting	Divorced	US Citizen Spouse	Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.004)
DACA-Eligible	0.032*** (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.004)	0.068*** (0.004)
After DACA	0.041*** (0.005)	-0.118*** (0.002)	-0.162*** (0.002)	-0.045*** (0.007)	0.017** (0.007)
Observations	394,971	394,971	394,971	394,971	394,971
R-squared	0.221	0.013	0.026	0.059	0.158
Mean of dep. var.	0.532	0.0385	0.032	0.248	0.396
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.499	0.192	0.175	0.432	0.489

Notes - *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.4: DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy – Born in Mexico, Central America, or South America (Both Sexes)

	(1) Married	(2) Cohabiting	(3) Divorced	(4) US Citizen Spouse	(5) Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.099*** (0.006)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.004)	0.116*** (0.007)
After DACA	0.015*** (0.004)	-0.039*** (0.001)	-0.104*** (0.001)	0.005 (0.005)	0.014** (0.006)
Observations	732,254	732,254	732,254	732,254	732,254
R-squared	0.213	0.013	0.024	0.065	0.162
Mean of dep. var.	0.490	0.034	0.030	0.218	0.368
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.500	0.182	0.170	0.413	0.482

Notes - *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals born in Mexico, Central America, or South America. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.5: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Fertility (Women)

	(1) Child Last Year	(2) Child Last Year (Married)	(3) Child Last Year (Non-Married)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.009*** (0.002)
DACA-Eligible	0.016*** (0.004)	0.026** (0.012)	0.010*** (0.003)
After DACA	-0.098*** (0.003)	0.164*** (0.007)	-0.378*** (0.006)
Observations	394,226	209,632	184,594
R-squared	0.013	0.014	0.024
Mean of dep. var.	0.105	0.152	0.051
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.306	0.359	0.219

Notes - *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.6: DACA & Fertility – Born in Mexico, Central America, or South America (Women)

	(1) Child Last Year	(2) Child Last Year (Married)	(3) Child Last Year (Non-Married)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.010*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.029*** (0.006)	0.025* (0.013)	0.015*** (0.004)
After DACA	-0.123*** (0.003)	0.152*** (0.007)	-0.415*** (0.006)
Observations	367,875	204,441	163,434
R-squared	0.012	0.014	0.024
Mean of dep. var.	0.107	0.151	0.053
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.310	0.358	0.224

Notes - *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals born in Mexico, Central America, or South America. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.7: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Residing in Ethnic Enclaves

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PANEL A: ALL	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.457*** (0.073)	-0.015** (0.006)
DACA-Eligible	0.128*** (0.005)	0.317** (0.147)	0.019*** (0.004)
After DACA	-0.091*** (0.006)	-0.080 (0.111)	-0.014 (0.009)
Observations	785,846	785,846	785,846
R-squared	0.086	0.294	0.182
Mean of dep. var.	0.699	5.181	0.487
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.459	6.597	0.500
PANEL B: MEN	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.367*** (0.108)	-0.011 (0.008)
DACA-Eligible	0.135*** (0.005)	0.293* (0.151)	0.024*** (0.004)
After DACA	-0.104*** (0.008)	0.494*** (0.136)	-0.025 (0.017)
Observations	391,152	391,152	391,152
R-squared	0.088	0.292	0.182
Mean of dep. var.	0.690	5.135	0.479
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.463	6.526	0.500
PANEL C: WOMEN	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.554*** (0.054)	-0.019*** (0.006)
DACA-Eligible	0.120*** (0.007)	0.349** (0.146)	0.013* (0.007)
After DACA	-0.075*** (0.008)	-0.593*** (0.188)	-0.011 (0.010)
Observations	394,694	394,694	394,694
R-squared	0.087	0.298	0.183
Mean of dep. var.	0.708	5.226	0.496
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.455	6.667	0.500

Notes - *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further controls for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.8: DACA & Ethnic Enclaves – Born in Mexico, Central America, or South America (Both Sexes)

	(1) Same House	(2) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(3) Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.711*** (0.136)	-0.013 (0.009)
DACA-Eligible	0.625 (0.005)	0.031*** (0.538)	0.132*** (0.008)
After DACA	-0.080*** (0.006)	-0.081 (0.136)	-0.030** (0.012)
Observations	731,773	731,773	731,773
R-squared	0.091	0.300	0.184
Mean of dep. var.	0.696	5.254	0.488
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.460	6.605	0.500

Notes - *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals born in Mexico, Central America, or South America. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further controls for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.9: Difference-in-Differences – DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PANEL A: ALL	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-51.49** (19.27)	-0.026** (0.010)	0.091*** (0.021)	-0.020 (0.012)	-5.953*** (1.698)	-0.185*** (0.027)
DACA-Eligible	35.42*** (6.428)	0.024*** (0.007)	-0.074*** (0.025)	0.081*** (0.009)	3.053** (1.260)	0.124*** (0.037)
After DACA	639.3*** (28.36)	0.583*** (0.020)	-0.405*** (0.030)	-0.185*** (0.006)	20.47*** (4.905)	-0.359*** (0.115)
Observations	191,831	191,831	191,831	270,044	74,648	74,648
R-squared	0.480	0.477	0.138	0.182	0.198	0.279
Mean of dep. var.	1,215	6.986	3.715	0.276	68.34	3.587
Std. dev. of dep. var.	617.6	0.486	1.560	0.447	68.54	1.545
PANEL B: MEN	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-62.91*** (21.60)	-0.036*** (0.011)	0.102*** (0.032)	-0.025* (0.014)	-6.066*** (1.912)	-0.165*** (0.051)
DACA-Eligible	40.48*** (10.82)	0.024** (0.011)	-0.011 (0.045)	0.089*** (0.012)	3.095 (2.822)	0.116 (0.072)
After DACA	218.0*** (30.98)	0.351*** (0.021)	-0.376*** (0.063)	-0.205*** (0.018)	63.96*** (7.737)	1.159*** (0.139)
Observations	117,185	117,185	117,185	165,391	45,972	45,972
R-squared	0.504	0.515	0.125	0.190	0.199	0.275
Mean of dep. var.	1,231	6.999	3.673	0.278	67.85	3.613
Std. dev. of dep. var.	628.2	0.483	1.554	0.448	66.57	1.507
PANEL C: WOMEN	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-38.95** (17.01)	-0.017 (0.012)	0.064** (0.029)	-0.014 (0.012)	-5.555 (3.404)	-0.199*** (0.051)
DACA-Eligible	27.52*** (9.209)	0.023** (0.009)	-0.118*** (0.034)	0.075*** (0.010)	3.336 (2.997)	0.133* (0.067)
After DACA	1,074.8*** (68.12)	0.826*** (0.045)	-0.408*** (0.086)	-0.153*** (0.014)	-15.48* (7.755)	-1.316*** (0.178)
Observations	74,646	74,646	74,646	104,653	28,676	28,676
R-squared	0.448	0.427	0.163	0.181	0.209	0.293
Mean of dep. var.	1,189	6.966	3.780	0.274	69.13	3.546
Std. dev. of dep. var.	599.7	0.489	1.569	0.446	71.59	1.605

Notes - *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.10: DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance – Born in Mexico, Central America, or South America (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-77.60*** (23.95)	-0.044*** (0.009)	0.123*** (0.024)	-0.022 (0.014)	-5.490** (2.079)	-0.202*** (0.034)
DACA-Eligible	47.87*** (8.512)	0.033*** (0.009)	-0.097*** (0.028)	0.100*** (0.008)	1.202 (1.366)	0.106*** (0.037)
After DACA	642.4*** (29.42)	0.583*** (0.020)	-0.422*** (0.031)	-0.188*** (0.006)	20.06*** (4.938)	-0.353*** (0.122)
Observations	183,652	183,652	183,652	258,499	71,509	71,509
R-squared	0.483	0.482	0.140	0.184	0.200	0.284
Mean of dep. var.	1,215	6.987	3.711	0.277	68.15	3.584
Std. dev. of dep. var.	619.2	0.485	1.558	0.447	68.36	1.547

Notes - *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further restricted to individuals born in Mexico, Central America, or South America. The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.11: DACA & Living Arrangements – Residual Method (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.008*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.077*** (0.007)	0.106*** (0.008)	0.016*** (0.003)	-0.078*** (0.007)	0.007* (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.002)
After DACA	0.033*** (0.006)	0.084*** (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.033*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.001)
Observations	717,733	717,733	675,307	717,733	717,733	717,733
R-squared	0.201	0.264	0.050	0.310	0.573	0.108
Mean of dep. var.	0.231	0.098	0.071	0.221	0.455	0.023
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.422	0.297	0.256	0.415	0.498	0.150

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.12: DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy – Residual Method (Both Sexes)

	(1) Married	(2) Cohabiting	(3) Divorced	(4) US Citizen Spouse	(5) Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.053*** (0.006)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.003)	0.079*** (0.006)
After DACA	0.003 (0.004)	-0.043*** (0.002)	-0.083*** (0.001)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)
Observations	717,733	717,733	717,733	717,733	717,733
R-squared	0.227	0.013	0.023	0.069	0.171
Mean of dep. var.	0.487	0.035	0.027	0.221	0.363
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.500	0.183	0.162	0.415	0.481

Notes - *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.13: DACA & Fertility – Residual Method (Women)

	(1) Child Last Year	(2) Child Last Year (Married)	(3) Child Last Year (Non-Married)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.010*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.016*** (0.006)	0.019 (0.014)	0.013*** (0.003)
After DACA	-0.090*** (0.003)	0.189*** (0.008)	-0.415*** (0.005)
Observations	360,874	199,792	161,082
R-squared	0.013	0.014	0.026
Mean of dep. var.	0.106	0.151	0.049
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.307	0.358	0.216

Notes - *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.14: DACA & Ethnic Enclaves – Residual Method (Both Sexes)

	(1) Same House	(2) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(3) Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.484*** (0.082)	-0.016** (0.006)
DACA-Eligible	0.113*** (0.007)	0.423*** (0.119)	0.019*** (0.004)
After DACA	-0.095*** (0.006)	-0.047 (0.107)	-0.020* (0.011)
Observations	717,239	717,239	717,239
R-squared	0.088	0.305	0.186
Mean of dep. var.	0.691	4.935	0.488
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.462	6.302	0.500

Notes - *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further controls for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.15: DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance – Residual Method (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-53.89*** (18.20)	-0.028*** (0.009)	0.094*** (0.023)	-0.018 (0.012)	-5.921*** (1.659)	-0.183*** (0.033)
DACA-Eligible	36.54*** (5.474)	0.022*** (0.006)	-0.067* (0.034)	0.081*** (0.010)	2.102 (1.299)	0.105** (0.040)
After DACA	640.5*** (27.78)	0.584*** (0.019)	-0.380*** (0.030)	-0.182*** (0.006)	18.10*** (5.092)	-0.408*** (0.106)
Observations	180,440	180,440	180,440	253,080	69,344	69,344
R-squared	0.485	0.487	0.138	0.182	0.194	0.281
Mean of dep. var.	1,218	6.990	3.695	0.274	67.75	3.580
Std. dev. of dep. var.	619.4	0.484	1.554	0.446	67.96	1.544

Notes - *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.16: DACA & Living Arrangements – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.029*** (0.005)	-0.011*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)
DACA-Eligible	0.084*** (0.006)	0.119*** (0.007)	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.084*** (0.007)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.001)
After DACA (2013 Onwards)	0.027*** (0.007)	0.076*** (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.042*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.001)
Observations	786,420	786,420	741,718	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.220	0.270	0.056	0.284	0.571	0.112
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.129	0.082	0.210	0.432	0.024
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.335	0.274	0.407	0.495	0.153

Notes - *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.17: DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Both Sexes)

	(1) Married	(2) Cohabiting	(3) Divorced	(4) US Citizen Spouse	(5) Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.057*** (0.004)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.002)	0.089*** (0.005)
After DACA (2013 Onwards)	0.035*** (0.004)	-0.040*** (0.001)	-0.098*** (0.001)	0.010* (0.006)	0.029*** (0.006)
Observations	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420
R-squared	0.226	0.012	0.024	0.067	0.174
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.467	0.0339	0.0288	0.213	0.348
std. dev.	0.499	0.181	0.167	0.410	0.476

Notes - *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.18: DACA & Fertility – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Women)

	(1) Child Last Year	(2) Child Last Year (Married)	(3) Child Last Year (Non-Married)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.009*** (0.003)
DACA-Eligible	0.015*** (0.005)	0.023* (0.012)	0.009*** (0.003)
After DACA	-0.099*** (0.003)	0.163*** (0.007)	-0.378*** (0.006)
Observations	394,226	209,632	184,594
R-squared	0.013	0.014	0.024
Mean of dep. var.	0.105	0.152	0.051
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.306	0.359	0.219

Notes - *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.19: DACA & Ethnic Enclaves – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Both Sexes)

	(1) Same House	(2) PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share	(3) Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share
DACA-Eligible * After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.471*** (0.069)	-0.017*** (0.006)
DACA-Eligible	0.129*** (0.005)	0.292* (0.155)	0.019*** (0.004)
After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-0.090*** (0.006)	-0.076 (0.109)	-0.014 (0.010)
Observations	785,846	785,846	785,846
R-squared	0.086	0.294	0.182
Mean of dep. var.	0.699	5.181	0.487
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.459	6.597	0.500

Notes - *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further controls for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.20: DACA & Monthly Rent, Home Ownership, and Property Insurance – Post Period 2013 Onwards (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA (2013 Onwards)	-48.40*** (17.56)	-0.023*** (0.008)	0.109*** (0.025)	-0.021* (0.011)	-6.891*** (1.719)	-0.199*** (0.028)
DACA-Eligible	30.45*** (7.865)	0.021** (0.008)	-0.078*** (0.024)	0.080*** (0.009)	3.264** (1.379)	0.122*** (0.036)
After DACA (2013 Onwards)	638.6*** (28.00)	0.582*** (0.020)	-0.406*** (0.030)	-0.185*** (0.006)	20.73*** (4.889)	-0.352*** (0.114)
Observations	191,831	191,831	191,831	270,044	74,648	74,648
R-squared	0.480	0.477	0.138	0.182	0.198	0.279
Mean of dep. var.	1,215	6.986	3.715	0.276	68.34	3.587
Std. dev. of dep. var.	617.6	0.486	1.560	0.447	68.54	1.545

Notes - *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen householders ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). The rental sample further excludes those living in owner-occupied units as well as those paying exactly \$0 for rent. Conversely, the sample of homeowners excludes those living in rented units. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), housing unit characteristics (# of bedrooms, type of dwelling, etc.), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.21: Testing Parallel Pre-Trends Assumption

	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
F-statistic (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009+2010=0)	2.527	1.196	1.716	3.359	0.015	0.411
Two-sided p-value	0.118	0.279	0.196	0.073	0.296	0.525
	Married	Cohabiting	Divorced	US Citizen Spouse	Same Country Immig.	Spouse
F-statistic (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009+2010=0)	0.996	1.840	2.119	0.116	0.039	
Two-sided p-value	0.323	0.552	0.375	0.282	0.000	
	Child Last Year	Child Last Year (Married)	Child Last Year (Non-Married)	Same House	PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Sh.	Above 50p Immig. Sh. in PUMA
Joint F statistic (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009+2010=0)	2.118	0.204	2.277	2.422	1.810	0.440
Two-sided p-value	0.152	0.654	0.312	0.126	0.185	0.165
	Gross Monthly Rent	Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)	# of Rooms	Homeowner	Monthly Prop. Ins.	Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)
Joint F statistic (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009+2010=0)	0.276	0.389	0.128	0.180	0.117	0.001
Two-sided p-value	0.602	0.253	0.746	0.673	0.353	0.978

Notes - The tests were obtained from the estimation of Eq. (1) with the variable $Eligi_{i,t}$ interacted with a binary variable for each year (2011 is the omitted interaction). The dependent variables: *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is born in the same country as the individual; *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *PUMA Origin-Specific Immigrant Share* – the origin-specific share of immigrants in individual's PUMA of residence; *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year); *Gross Monthly Rent* – gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *Ln (Gross Monthly Rent)* – natural log of gross monthly rent individual pays for the rented unit; *# of Rooms* – total number of rooms in the rented unit; *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in; *Monthly Prop. Ins.* – total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in; *Ln (Monthly Prop. Ins.)* – natural log of total amount of monthly property insurance paid for the unit individual owns and lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample is further limited to 2005–2011. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005–2011). Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics, DACA eligibility criteria dummies, housing characteristics (where applicable), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table A.22: DACA & Living Arrangements – Probit Estimation (Both Sexes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Extended Family Arr.	Living with Parents	Living in 3-Gen. Hh	Non-Family Arr.	Simple Arr. Hh	Single-Parent Hh
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004 (0.006)	0.000 (0.000)
DACA-Eligible	0.061*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.000)
After DACA	0.054*** (0.006)	0.096*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	-0.031*** (0.005)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Observations	786,420	786,420	741,718	785,120	786,420	786,369
Mean of dep. var.	0.266	0.129	0.082	0.210	0.432	0.024
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.442	0.335	0.274	0.408	0.495	0.153

Notes - Probit estimations; average marginal effects reported. *Extended Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in an extended family arrangement household; *Living with Parents* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living with one or both parents; *Living in a 3-Gen. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a 3-generational household; *Non-Family Arr.* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a non-family arrangement household; *Simple Arr. Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a simple arrangement household; *Single-Parent Hh* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently living in a single-parent household. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.23: DACA & Marital Status, Intermarriage, and Endogamy – Probit Estimation (Both Sexes)

	(1) Married	(2) Cohabiting	(3) Divorced	(4) US Citizen Spouse	(5) Same Country Immig. Spouse
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.0037*** (0.001)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.005)
DACA-Eligible	0.071*** (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.003)	0.083*** (0.007)
After DACA	0.022*** (0.005)	-0.027*** (0.001)	-0.052*** (0.001)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
Observations	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420	786,420
Mean of dep. var.	0.467	0.034	0.029	0.213	0.348
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.499	0.181	0.167	0.410	0.476

Notes - Probit estimations; average marginal effects reported. *Married* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently married; *Cohabiting* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently cohabiting; *Divorced* – binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently divorced; *US Citizen Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse is a US citizen; *Same Country Immig. Spouse* – binary var. equal 1 if individual's spouse a born in the same country as the individual. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.24: DACA & Fertility – Probit Estimation (Women)

	(1) Child Last Year	(2) Child Last Year (Married)	(3) Child Last Year (Non-Married)
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.008*** (0.002)
DACA-Eligible	0.022*** (0.005)	0.026** (0.012)	0.010*** (0.003)
After DACA	-0.086*** (0.003)	0.174*** (0.007)	-0.359*** (0.006)
Observations	394,226	209,632	184,494
Mean of dep. var	0.105	0.152	0.051
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.306	0.359	0.219

Notes - Probit estimations; average marginal effects reported. *Child Last Year* – binary var. equal 1 if individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if married individual had a child during the previous 12 months; *Child Last Year (Non-Married)* – binary var. equal 1 if non-married individual had a child during the previous 12 months. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizen women ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further control for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.25: DACA & Ethnic Enclaves, Home Ownership – Probit Estimation (Both Sexes)

	(1) Same House	(2) Above 50th Perc. Immig. Share	(3) Homeowner
DACA-Eligible * After DACA	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.007)	-0.023* (0.013)
DACA-Eligible	0.120*** (0.007)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.109*** (0.007)
After DACA	-0.094*** (0.007)	-0.202*** (0.008)	-0.242*** (0.007)
Observations	773,967	771,235	270,041
Mean of dep. var.	0.699	0.490	0.276
Std. dev. of dep. var.	0.459	0.500	0.447

Notes - Probit estimations; average marginal effects reported. *Same House* – binary var. equal 1 if individual lived in the same house 12 months ago (i.e. non-mover); *Above 50p Perc. Immig. Share* – binary var. equal 1 if individual resides in PUMA with above 50p origin-specific share of immigrants (in a given year); *Homeowner* – binary var. equal 1 if individual owns the residential unit (s)he lives in. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18–38 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Sample in col. (2) is further restricted to include on householders. Data are drawn from the American Community Survey (2005-2019). Regressions further controls for demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, number of children), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.