

# **The Dutch invasion of colonial Chile**

**and early Chilean exceptionalism:**

**A critical juncture and counterfactuals approach**

David E. Hojman

University of Liverpool Management School

Chatham Building, Chatham Street, Liverpool L69 7ZH, UK.

Email: JL33@liv.ac.uk

## **Abstract**

The 1600 Dutch invasion of Chiloe Island in southern Chile eventually strengthened Spanish colonial rule on the Island. But surprisingly, and despite Chiloe's strategic role as the Spanish empire's key to the Pacific Ocean, the Inquisition was almost completely absent from Chiloe. A critical juncture, path dependence and counterfactuals approach is used to study possible reasons for this unusual fact, an expression of early Chilean exceptionalism. Cross-case analysis compares Chiloe with the contemporaneous Carvajal experience in Nuevo Leon, in Mexico's northern frontier. New methodological and substantive insights may apply to other case studies.

## **Keywords**

Exceptionalism, Religious fundamentalism, Critical junctures, Counterfactuals, Colonial Spanish America, Chiloe

## 1 Introduction

The 1600 Dutch invasion of Chiloe Island in southern Chile eventually made the Spanish grip on that distant colony firmer. But the resulting pattern of Spanish colonial rule in Chiloe was different from elsewhere in the New World. Chiloe was almost entirely free from intervention by the Inquisition. This is an expression of early Chilean exceptionalism. This paper uses a critical juncture, path dependence and counterfactuals approach to address several questions. First, was the 1600 Dutch invasion of Chiloe a critical juncture? Were events and behaviours in 1639 and 1643 the result of path dependence? Second, was Spanish colonial rule in Chiloe Island after 1600 unavoidable, despite Indian long-term success in eradicating it from the mainland, just three kilometres away? Third, did the special characteristics of Spanish colonial rule in Chiloe, possibly unique in the Spanish colonies in the New World, emerge as a consequence of the 1600 Dutch invasion? Were the Dutch invasion and its aftermath influential in the eventual development of this early Chilean exceptionalism? Fourth, could the same or a similar conceptual framework be used to explain differences between contemporaneous developments in Chiloe, at the southern end of the Spanish empire in the Americas, as compared with Nuevo Leon, at its northern end? What can we learn from comparing the two cases? These questions are addressed using, first, a within-case or intra-case analysis, which includes a longitudinal perspective, and then a cross-case analysis (Lebow, 2000; Mahoney, 2007).

The philosophical or ideological backbone of Spanish colonial rule was one of intolerance and religious fanaticism. Spanish imperialism and the Roman Catholic Counter-Reformation needed and supported each other. A central expression of this symbiosis was the Spanish Inquisition. However, post-1600 Spanish colonial rule in

Chiloe Island was different from elsewhere in the Spanish colonies, and possibly unique, in that, whereas fear of the Inquisition was everywhere, including Chiloe, the Inquisition itself was in practice almost completely absent from Chiloe (Guarda, 2002; Hojman, 2007). Colonial Chiloe after 1600 was also exceptional, or unique, among the Spanish colonies in the New World, in that it seems to have been free from the late medieval and early modern Spanish cleavage between Old Christians (who believed or pretended to believe themselves without Jewish or Moor ancestors) and the rest (Caro Baroja, 1978; Marquez Villanueva, 2006). There is no evidence of anyone in colonial Chiloe ever having been accused of being New Christian (a secret descendant of converted Jews) or a crypto-Jew by his or her enemies.

In some respects, both Chiloe Island and mainland Chile were always different from other Spanish colonies. For example, already in the early colonial period, before 1600, Spanish emigration to Chile was substantially different from that to the rest of the Spanish New World, with proportionally fewer women and merchants, and proportionally more Basques and non-Spaniards (Boyd-Bowman, 1976a, b). As compared with other colonies, Chile was poor and dangerous. This paper asks the question: could the 1600 Dutch invasion of Chiloe Island have contributed to the special nature of Spanish colonial rule on the Island (almost fully Inquisition-free in practice, despite widespread fear of the Inquisition)?

For comparative purposes, the paper engages in cross-case analysis, using the contemporaneous experience of the Carvajal family in Nuevo Leon. Luis de Carvajal was the first governor of the new kingdom of Nuevo Leon, in Mexico's northern frontier. Carvajal was a Portuguese Catholic of converted Spanish Jewish ancestry (a New Christian, or '*converso*' descendant). Many among his extended family and close associates were practicing Jews (Greenleaf, 1981; Temkin, 2008).

There is no evidence of anyone secretly practicing Judaism among the Spanish *Conquistadores* and first colonists in Chiloe. However, it is possible that there could have been some crypto-Jews among Chiloe's early settlers, who, differently from Nuevo Leon, always kept their true religion secret. After all, thousands of Spaniards and Portuguese with secret Jewish ancestors emigrated to practically everywhere in the New World (Bernardini and Fiering, 2001; Diaz Blanco, 2010; Friede, 1951; Green, 2007; Kagan and Morgan, 2009; Medina, 1952; Saban, 1992; Simms, 2007; Wachtel, 2007). For example, genetic research suggests that about 14 percent of the population of Antioquia in Colombia could have secret Spanish Jewish ancestry (Carvajal-Carmona et al, 2000). If the same happened in Chiloe, why were behaviours in Chiloe and Nuevo Leon different? Could events in Chiloe have evolved similarly to the way they did in Nuevo Leon? What would have been the conditions needed for this to happen? What made Chiloe and Nuevo Leon different?

The next section introduces some theory and definitions. Section 3 presents the historical evidence, that is, what exactly, according to most historians, happened in Chiloe in 1600. Events during the immediate aftermath of the Dutch invasion are described in Section 4. Section 5 offers and discusses several counterfactuals: what would have happened if one of the key actors had done something differently. Section 6 moves on to the next generation or the one after, by focusing on the reactions by the Spanish settlers in Chiloe to the Lima 'auto de fe' of 1639, and to a second Dutch invasion of Castro in 1643 (and the different ways Indians and the Dutch themselves saw it). Cross-case material is provided by the contemporaneous Carvajal experience in Nuevo Leon, which is explained in Section 7. Some respective counterfactuals are explored in Section 8. Section 9 completes the comparison between Chiloe and Nuevo Leon and Section 10 concludes.

## 2 Critical junctures, path dependence, and counterfactuals

The concept of 'critical junctures' has been applied in several academic disciplines and subdisciplines, including political science, economic history, institutional economics, sociology and history. In the field of Latin American political history, relevant studies include Collier and Collier (2002) and Mahoney (2001). However, there have been no applications of critical junctures to the study of Spanish colonial rule, religious fundamentalism, national cultures, or Chilean or Chiloe (or other) early exceptionalism. Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, p. 348) define critical junctures as '*relatively* short periods of time during which there is a *substantially* heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest' (their italics). According to Collier and Collier (2002, p. 29) a critical juncture is 'a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or other units of analysis) and which is hypothesised to produce distinct legacies'. Mahoney's (2001, pp. 6-7) definition is a 'choice point ... when a particular option (is adopted) among two or more alternatives ... (O)nce an option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available'. The final part of Mahoney's definition is describing path dependence. The critical juncture and the path dependence processes that both precede and follow it are inseparable aspects of the same conceptual framework (Bennett and Elman, 2006; Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 1999). However, the Collier and Collier definition ('significant change') and the Capoccia and Kelemen one (heightened impact of agents' choices) are slightly different. For example, the critical juncture, in the Capoccia and Kelemen sense, may be present, but the key actor, the most influential, powerful or strategic agent may decide in favour of no

change. This is known as a 'near miss' (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Lebow, 2000).

The distinction between critical junctures and path dependent processes is related to the difference between structure and agency (Sewell, 1992), and to that between 'settled' and 'unsettled lives' (Swidler, 1986). During settled times (which is most of the time), historical events follow path dependent trajectories, that is, they are largely determined by structure. But during some special or unsettled periods (critical junctures), agency may play a much larger role (Lamberg and Pajunen, 2010). During unsettled times it is possible for key agents to select an option among a wider range of choices, and the consequences of that particular choice become more substantial. For some scholars, critical junctures are associated with the emergence of new ideas and enhanced roles for imagination (Cruz, 2005; Hogan and Doyle, 2007; Tucker, 1999). On the other hand, a much more materialistic view has been proposed by Gundlach and Paldam (2009), for whom the concept of critical junctures may not be really necessary, at least in some cases. Their approach is marginalist, in that for them small changes in the independent variable along a continuous range will inevitably be followed by gradual changes in the dependent variable, also along a continuous range. Both ideational and material factors played important roles in the 1600 Dutch invasion, its immediate aftermath, and subsequent events.

The most effective way of studying critical junctures may be by using counterfactuals (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Tucker, 1999). They are answers to 'what if' questions (Gould, 1969). Counterfactuals are used so often that, according to some authors, the only alternative to not using counterfactuals explicitly is using them implicitly (Bunzl, 2004; Fearon, 1991; Gilbert and Lambert, 2010). In the

definition by Durand and Vaara (2009, pp. 1249-1250), counterfactuals are 'conditional statements that probe the direction and stability of a relationship between an event and its consequence'. Tucker (1999, p. 273) recommends using them 'to find out how sensitive particular historical outcomes were to initial conditions'. According to Lebow (2000, pp. 557-558), counterfactuals 'can combat the deeply rooted human propensity to see the future as more contingent than the past'. Exhaustive sets of rules for the scientific use of counterfactuals have been proposed by Durand and Vaara (2009) and Lebow (2000), among others, and detailed discussions of specific requisites have been undertaken by all the authors mentioned in this paragraph.

### **3 What happened in Chiloe in 1600?**

Chiloe Island, with an area of about 900 square kilometres and about 1,200 kilometres south of Chile's capital, Santiago, was the most remote and isolated of Spain's colonial possessions in South America. Still, for something that did not happen such a long time ago, in historical terms, there is a surprisingly large amount of disagreement among authors about what happened in the 1600 Dutch invasion. We have consulted seven different sources. In approximate chronological order of their writing, they are Diego de Rosales, Diego Barros Arana, Carlos Valenzuela Solis de Ovando, Isidoro Vazquez de Acuna, Gabriel Guarda, Dante Montiel Vera, and Marcelo Mansilla (see References for full details). All seven are Spanish or Chilean. Apart from some largely unreliable internet blogs, there are no published English- or Spanish-language versions of the 1600 invasion or related events by Dutch authors.

There seems to be agreement that, early in 1600, a Dutch ship commanded by Baltasar de Cordes, a young and inexperienced officer, got separated from a larger fleet by storms. This was a particularly difficult period for the Spanish settlers in continental Chile, since the mainland Indians were engaged in a very successful general revolt. The top Spanish authority in Chile, the *Gobernador*, had been killed in battle in 1598 (Barros Arana, 1999). In fact, peace would not be signed for almost 300 years. On arrival to the Chiloe archipelago, Cordes befriended some Indians hostile to the Spanish, deceived the Spanish commander of Castro, Chiloe's only city, by pretending to be a friendly Catholic, and took control of the city. Possibly under pressure from his own men or Indian allies, Cordes had all the Spanish men in Castro killed, maybe as many as 60 (Barros Arana, 1999; Mansilla, 2009; Rosales, 1877; Valenzuela Solis de Ovando, 1975). The true number could be even higher, since no side was proud of its own participation in the episode, and for different reasons both sides were interested in minimising casualty numbers. This uncharacteristically brutal fact may have been at least partly a revenge for the atrocities committed by Spanish troops in the Netherlands during the Dutch Revolt, especially since the 1570s, which involved systematic killings of civilians and mass rapes. Dutch propaganda during the following decades was extremely successful at keeping Dutchmen aware of and angry at these events (Maltby, 1971; Perez, 2009; Pipkin, 2009; Schmidt, 1999). Following the Castro massacre, the Spanish women in Chiloe, including first- and second-generation Chiloe-born ones, in unknown numbers but possibly between at least about 30 and more than 60, were kept alive and sexually abused (Mansilla, 2009; Valenzuela Solis de Ovando, 1975). The Dutch intended to leave Chiloe after having collected sufficient food supplies and panned gold (then available locally in small quantities). They intended to take half

the Spanish women with them, and leave the other half to their Indian allies (Mansilla, 2009). However, after about two months of Dutch occupation (although Guarda, 2002, p. 30, makes the occupation last for two years, until 1602), a Spanish force under Francisco del Campo succeeded in recovering Castro from the Dutch (Barros Arana, 1999; Rosales, 1877; Vazquez de Acuna, 1990). Cordes managed to escape with a handful of his men. There were no Dutch prisoners, or Dutch wounded left behind. Two Spanish renegades who had collaborated with the Dutch (and whose significance will be discussed in following sections) were executed (Barros Arana, 1999; Mansilla, 2009).

Del Campo had the Indian chiefs ('caciques') who had actively helped the Dutch (either 18 or 30, depending on the source), locked up inside a wooden hut which was then set on fire (Barros Arana, 1999). Before these brutal executions, he gave a speech that, as reported by the Jesuit historian Diego de Rosales (1877, p. 346), sounded almost exactly the same as a religious sermon typically preached by Spanish Inquisition officials before burning their victims at the stake in an 'auto de fe' (Caneque, 1996; Caro Baroja, 1978; Green, 2007). Whether Del Campo gave indeed such speech, or Rosales has him doing it in order to further Rosales' own agenda, we do not know. In Spain, death by being burned at the stake was reserved for recalcitrant heretics. The closest to a similar punishment in Chiloe was administered to the Dutch's Indian allies. Either both Del Campo and Rosales, or at least Rosales on his own, chose to identify the Dutch's Indian allies (and possibly the Dutch themselves) as the 'other', the 'heretic' and long-term strategic enemy.

Del Campo also made some, or many, of his soldiers marry the women (Guarda, 2002; Montiel Vera, nd; Rosales, 1877). We do not know how many women got married. The authors call them 'widows', although some of them could

have been single. Among the Del Campo men, 44 stayed in Chiloe (out of about 150, Barros Arana, 1999; Mansilla, 2009; Montiel Vera, nd). Presumably most or all of the soldiers who got married stayed, at least in the short term (some couples left Chiloe after a few years). The weddings had taken place so hastily, that someone challenged their validity and a second priest had to be sent to Chiloe to perform the ceremonies again (Rosales, 1877). These mass weddings were extremely important. This was the first time ever, or at least since Spain's anti-semitic riots of 1391 (Caro Baroja, 1978; Hering Torres, 2003/4; Marquez Villanueva, 2006), in a Spanish community for a whole generation to rush to marry without paying careful consideration to the blood purity implications of such weddings. After the rushed mass weddings, practically no newly-wed knew who the ancestors of his or her new in-laws had been. Thus, it would have been very silly to accuse anyone of being New Christian or a crypto-Jew. If the Inquisition took the charge seriously and started an investigation, the accuser's own spouse could be among its first victims.

#### **4 Aftermath of the battle of Castro**

Several important changes followed the Dutch occupation of Castro and the eventual military defeat of Cordes by Del Campo. They concern the local organisation of economic activity and military defence, approaches to marriage selection and related family discourses, and cultural attitudes to minorities and power. The Spanish colonists decided that it was too dangerous to continue living in Castro. From then on they lived in rural areas, each extended family in their own *encomienda*, together with their respective Indians (Montiel Vera, nd). There was great fear of another Dutch invasion. Living among the Indians in the *encomienda* was also dangerous (the Indians in the *encomienda* were in practice quasi-slaves), but fear of the Indians was not as great as fear of the Dutch. Moving away from the

city also forced each Spanish *encomendero* to rely more on his own extended family, including mixed-race *mestizos*, and on friendly Indians and employees such as poor Spaniards. Thus, both economic production patterns and military defence practices were affected. An advantage of this new ruralisation was that from now on it would be easier for each family to be discreet about, for example, any women in the family who might have been made pregnant by the Dutch, or about any heterodox religious beliefs and practices in the family, to which the Catholic Church or the Inquisition could object. Babies fathered by the Dutch would not only be insulting to the typical Spanish male's pride and *machismo*. Also, according to the prevailing blood purity views, the blood of heretics contaminated these heretics' children and grandchildren, making them unable to apply to prestigious or well-paid positions (Caro Baroja, 1978; Green, 2007; Hering Torres, 2003/4; Menendez Pelayo, 1945).

Rushing the wedding celebrations between the Del Campo soldiers and Spanish women was convenient in order not to interrupt the administration of *encomiendas* any longer. It would also aid the pretence that the fathers of any babies were Spanish soldiers and not Dutch invaders. All these weddings were urgent, but not all of them seem to have been forced. Under the circumstances, none of them can be described as a 'match made in heaven', but, in terms of match quality, the spectrum was possibly wide. However, the careful marriage selection patterns observed in Chiloe from the first generation of Spanish arrivals, in 1567, inspired by blood purity concerns or fear of the Inquisition (endogamy, or marrying into a family your own family had known for a long time, Hojman, 2007), could not be applied. This was not only very unusual considering the generalised concerns with blood purity, but possibly unique in the New World Spanish colonies. Guarda (2002) reports about thirteen such post-Dutch-invasion rushed marriages (possibly many

more took place). In one of the couples, both bride and groom had Basque surnames. Three couples in which all three women were close relatives had, between the six individuals, all the key surnames of the '*humanistas*', '*erasmistas*' or '*luterans*' punished by the Inquisition in Seville in 1559 (Menendez Pelayo, 1945; Pastore, 2010). One woman was so popular that she married not one, but two of the Del Campo soldiers (not at the same time). But it seems unlikely that other couples would have come together in more normal circumstances. Still, even for those couples for whom match quality seemed comparatively low, the decision to marry was possibly rational (Kiser and Hechter, 1998). This applies to any woman who knew that she was, or suspected that she could be, pregnant. It also applies to the men, who were presented with an extraordinary opportunity to marry a Spanish woman (Spanish women were in desperately short supply, Boyd-Bowman, 1976a, b). Many of these women were either *encomenderas* themselves, or at least entitled to some of the privileges of the *encomendero* class.

Individual Chiloe families responded to the new, post-1600 conditions in family-specific ways (Guarda, 2002; Hojman, 2007; Mansilla, 2009). Many of the family sources, church records and applications to official positions consulted by Guarda (2002) are from the mid XVIII century, about 150 years after the Dutch invasion. Since the allocation of rents and prestige depended at least partly on the merits of your ancestors, families faced a dilemma. The best allocations would go to the oldest families. But if you claimed that your family's founder was among the first Spanish arrivals (in 1567), you were also implicitly admitting that a generation of women in your family could have been victims of sexual crimes committed by the Dutch, and that maybe you had some Dutch (heretics') blood yourself. Maybe sometimes you just had to swallow your pride. But on other occasions maybe you

could get away with some form of clever equivocating (see Kuran, 1995, and Zagorin, 1996, for other historical cases). For example, Family A, as reported by Guarda (2002), has its founder arriving in Chiloe in 1630, but Rosales (1877) mentions someone of the same names, both first name and surname, fighting the Dutch in Chiloe in 1600. Family B literally and unceremoniously scribbled out two ancestors' names, husband and wife, from their family tree (Guarda, 2002). Family C made two generations disappear, presenting a great-grandmother and her great-granddaughter as mother and daughter. In some families, the names of the women in the respective generation were not recorded, and were therefore eventually forgotten. Some heroines of the anti-Dutch resistance were ignored, or their roles downplayed, by their own descendants. A particular heroine is mentioned by only one of our seven sources. In a period in which to some extent people could freely choose their own or their children's surnames from a larger pool of surnames formed by the surnames of all their ancestors, some surnames disappeared, including another heroine's surname (Guarda, 2002; Hojman, 2007; Mansilla, 2009; Vazquez de Acuna, 1990).

The mass weddings rushed by Del Campo took place with less concern for blood purity than usual. Some (or many) people married partners they would not in more normal circumstances. That was the price to pay in order to minimise the danger that some babies born to Spanish women could be identified as half-Dutch (rightly or wrongly), with potentially catastrophic consequences. Moreover, if the Inquisitors started asking questions, they might also want to know whether any Spanish women had been happy to collaborate with the Dutch enemy during their occupation of Castro. All these factors made the Spanish in Chiloe after 1600 less keen on, or supportive of, the Inquisition (and more careful) than Spaniards

elsewhere in the New World. Guarda (2002) is able to mention only a handful of people who listed, or their descendants listed, having worked for the Inquisition among their merits, out of several thousand Spanish colonists. Some of them had worked for the Inquisition, not in Chiloe, but in continental Chile. The most powerful local families discreetly distanced themselves from the Inquisition. Differently from elsewhere, previous work experience in the Inquisition did not guarantee a brilliant career in Chiloe. The granddaughter, born in the mid XVII century, of an Inquisition official chose to take (or her parents chose for her) as her own surnames, not the Inquisition official's surnames, but those of other ancestors (Guarda, 2002, p. 423). Some local Inquisition officials married into families with the same surnames as those which had been adopted by Jewish converts in Spain ('New Christian' surnames, Bonnin, 2001), or some of these officials' own ancestors had the same surnames (namesakes were not always relatives). Portuguese arrivals, who elsewhere were suspected as secret Jews, agents of enemy countries, or unfair competition (Bradley, 2002; Cross, 1978; Liebman, 1971; Millar Carvacho, 1998; Saguier, 1985; Silverblatt, 2004), had no problems in Chiloe. The Chiloe branch of a proud, traditional Catholic family, with close relatives with important jobs in the Lima Inquisition tribunal, chose to call themselves by the name of the village they had come from in Spain (toponymic), despite the fact that their relatives in Lima used their ancient family surnames (Medina, 1952; Guarda, 2002; Barrientos Grandon, 2007). In more than two and a half centuries of Spanish rule (interrupted only, and briefly, by the Dutch in 1600 and 1643), there is no evidence of anyone ever been sent from Chiloe to Lima to face the Inquisition tribunal there. Either it never happened, or the evidence has been lost.

After the 1600 Dutch invasion and mass weddings, Chiloe became unattractive as a destination for new Spanish settlers. It had always been cold, rainy, bad for farming and mostly good as a military fortress. Now hostile Indians controlled the mainland and the Del Campo soldiers had got, not only the Spanish women (possibly all of them), but also any remaining land and Indians which had not been allocated before. There were no new lands left to be colonised or new Indian groups to be recruited into forced labour. As a consequence, there were no new immigrant cohorts (who would have been free of the mass rapes and mass weddings connection).

## **5 Chiloe: some plausible counterfactuals**

All the evidence so far suggests that the 1600 Dutch invasion of Chiloe and its aftermath were a critical juncture. This will be confirmed in this section by the examination of counterfactuals. In critical junctures, 'the range of plausible choices offered to powerful political actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions ... are potentially much more momentous' (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p. 343). If we know or suspect that a particular point in history is or may be a critical juncture, it makes sense to study it using counterfactuals. According to the same authors, '... because heightened contingency is a core characteristic of critical junctures, counterfactual analysis ... (is) particularly important and must be explicitly employed ... the role of counterfactual analysis is enhanced in the critical juncture framework. The institutional fluidity during critical junctures expands the range of possible decisions for key actors and increases their potential impact, thus making counterfactual scenarios both more plausible empirically and more important heuristically' (p. 343). In this case there were three key actors: Dutch commander

Baltasar de Cordes, Spanish commander Francisco del Campo, and Spanish historian Diego de Rosales.

For purposes of within-case analysis (Mahoney, 2007, pp. 131-133), Tables 1 to 7 present seven counterfactuals. They include Cordes stopping his men from killing the Spanish soldiers, or from raping the Spanish women; Cordes leaving Chiloe before the Spanish reinforcements from the mainland arrive; or Cordes preparing his men and Indian allies much more carefully, as they wait for the Spanish attack. As to Del Campo, his counterfactuals consist of laying siege to Dutch-occupied Castro, instead of attacking the city immediately by surprise; deciding against mass weddings of his soldiers and the 'widows'; or deciding against burning the caciques alive. The final counterfactual has historian Rosales deviating from the agreed script by identifying the Spanish renegades who helped the Dutch (and who escaped or were dead) as secret Jews or protestants. Similar scapegoats were identified by some Spanish authors after the fall of northeast Brazil to the Dutch a couple of decades later (Schwartz, 1991; Simms, 2007). The three key actors, Cordes, Del Campo and Rosales, are assumed to act rationally (Bunzl, 2004; Fearon, 1991; Kiser and Hechter, 1998), but random episodes of emotion, passion, and obsession with glory and honour are also possible (Elster, 2000). Both the antecedents of each counterfactual, and the ways the respective consequents follow, are plausible, cotenable, and historically and theoretically consistent. All these counterfactuals obey the rule of 'minimal-rewrite' of history. The consequents of all counterfactuals in the respective tables avoid exploring anything beyond the short term (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Durand and Vaara, 2009; Gould, 1969; Lebow, 2000).

This analysis reveals that the eventual taking back of Castro by the Spanish was practically inevitable. With only one possible exception, all the relevant counterfactuals point in the same direction. The Spanish authorities considered Chiloe of immense strategic importance as the key for access to the Pacific Ocean (Urbina Carrasco, 2009). The Dutch in Castro were unable to obtain new supplies of food, ammunition, horses or soldiers. Given the resources and technology available to them, and their incredibly long supply lines, going back all the way to Holland, material constraints (Gundlach and Paldam, 2009) made the Dutch position unsustainable. The best that Cordes could have done (but he did not) was represented by Counterfactual 2, namely leave Chiloe before the Spanish reinforcements arrived, go back to Holland with a large number of Spanish female prisoners, and use the prestige and experience gained in order to prepare future Dutch expeditions. In any case, it is extremely unlikely that the original Dutch intention in 1600 was to create a permanent settlement in Chiloe (Sluiter, 1942). The fact that practically all the counterfactuals are pointing in the same direction is a good example of equilibrium (Thelen, 1999), or in Mahoney's (2007, p. 135) words, equifinality, multiple causation, or multiple paths to the same outcome. Ben-Menahem (1997, p. 100) uses the expression 'historical necessity': '... the same type of final outcome results from a variety of different causal chains'. Differently from what was happening in continental Chile south of the Bio-Bio river at the same time, where the Indians simply could not be defeated militarily, Spanish colonial rule in Chiloe was never really at risk. The Indians in Chiloe were different from the Indians in the mainland, they had no access to the same resources and battle tactics, and could not replicate the latter's military successes (De Armond, 1954; Padden, 1957; Urbina Carrasco, 2009). The mainland Indians did not have the technology or

motivation to move large numbers of men, horses and equipment rapidly between the mainland and the Island, let alone do it by surprise (Vazquez de Acuna, 1990).

In contrast, there was another outcome which was not inevitable. It could easily have been avoided. Cordes could have chosen to spare the lives of the Spanish men, thus failing to create any more Spanish widows than strictly necessary (Counterfactual 1). Or, if all the Spanish men had indeed been killed and their wives had become widows, Del Campo could have decided against rushing mass weddings between his soldiers and the widows (Counterfactual 5). In either eventuality (or 'counterfactuality'), the Spanish population of Chiloe after 1600 would have been substantially less homogeneous in social, cultural, political, and possibly religious and ethnic terms. Or, had Rosales chosen to deliver an explicit message against possible secret Jews or protestants among the Spanish, accusing them of being traitors or potential traitors (Counterfactual 7), homogeneity among the Spanish in Chiloe could also have been damaged (or further damaged).

In the longer term, any serious threat to the survival of Spanish colonial rule in Chiloe after 1600 may have hinged upon a Cordes decision (Counterfactual 2). However, the killings of Spanish men, the sexual abuse, the mass weddings, and choosing who is a friend and who is an enemy resulted from decisions by all three key actors, Cordes, Del Campo and Rosales. Thus, all three key actors were behind the ensuing increase in homogeneity, in the perception of the need for unity against external threats (including the Lima Inquisition), and in tolerance or at least openness to compromise and accommodation among the Spanish settlers. The restoration of Spanish colonial rule and the change in the settlers' cultural attitudes are different and separate developments. However, the latter could not have

happened without the former. They happened at almost the same time and resulted from decisions and actions by the same key actors.

## **6 Path dependence: The Lima Inquisition (1639) and the Dutch again (1643)**

For the next stage of the analysis, we must look at the children and grandchildren of the actors of the Chiloe events in 1600. This longitudinal comparison suggests that what happened in 1639 and 1643 were the results of path dependence following the 1600 critical juncture. Interesting years as they are, 1639 and 1643 are not critical junctures. In both years there was change (some of it eventually reversed), but not the enhanced roles for contingency, agency and meaningful choice, leading to developments from which it is increasingly difficult to go back, all of which we would expect during and after a critical juncture.

In 1639, the Lima Inquisition tribunal (in Peru, but with authority over both mainland Chile and Chiloe Island) arranged its largest ever 'auto de fe', in which a number of Portuguese crypto-Jews or alleged crypto-Jews were punished. The 'auto de fe' had been preceded by an eruption of anti-Portuguese hysteria in Lima, partly related to the rapid expansion of the Portuguese empire worldwide, but also caused by the fact that the Portuguese merchants and shopkeepers in Lima were more successful than the Spanish competition (Bradley, 2002; Cross, 1978; Liebman, 1971; Silverblatt, 2004).

In Chiloe the situation was very different. In particular, there was no cleavage between Portuguese and anti-Portuguese factions. Some Portuguese had already arrived in Chiloe with the first colonists in 1567. Other Portuguese who arrived as soldiers in the Del Campo force were among those who rushed to marry the 'widows' after the Dutch defeat, and stayed. The Portuguese in Chiloe seemed to have

become fully integrated. They married into a wide range of Spanish families and some started their own large and successful families in Chiloe (Castano, 1997; Guarda, 2002; Menendez Pelayo, 1945; Montiel Vera, nd; Munoz Correa, 2008; Sanchez Saus, 1998). Not all the Portuguese in the New World were New Christians, let alone secret Jews themselves (Costa, 2004; Smith, 1974). Still, many Spanish officials in both Spain and the New World believed that the Portuguese, whatever their religion or ancestry, were long-term enemies of Spain or strategic allies of the Dutch (Caro Baroja, 1978; Liebman, 1971). However, reactions differed from colony to colony, from disarming and pushing them inland in Buenos Aires (Saban, 1992; Saguier, 1985), to burning some at the stake in Lima, to marrying them in Chiloe.

It would be wrong to conclude that Chiloe was completely safe from Inquisition curiosity, or that people in Chiloe mistakenly felt that way. People in Chiloe had good reasons to be more careful (such as the danger of half-Dutch babies and the rushed mass weddings), and they were, which helped to keep the Inquisition away. Just as it had happened immediately after the 1600 Dutch occupation, after 1639 other surnames disappeared, especially surnames which were the same as those of Inquisition victims in the 1639 Lima 'auto de fe' (Alpert, 2008; Hojman, 2007; Medina, 1952; Millar Carvacho, 1998; Silverblatt, 2004; Uchmany, 1992). Even if a Lima Inquisition victim and a Chiloe settler who shared the same surname were not relatives (in fact there is no evidence of any relatives), the Chiloe settler was not completely safe. No one knew where an inquiry by the Lima Inquisition could lead to, or what a person could admit to under torture. It was never a good idea to awake the Inquisition's curiosity (Greenleaf, 1981), even if you were 'innocent'. It was important to show that your loyalty to the Catholic Church

knew no limits. For example, in 1650 the Spanish in Chiloe organised an expedition to liberate the Jesuit priest Agustin de Villaza from Indian captivity. There may be doubts as to how difficult this mission really was, but there is no doubt about the names of the seven officers in charge, which were duly recorded for the history books. Six of them had New Christian surnames (that is, surnames also used by converted Jews in Spain, Bonnin, 2001), and the seventh, an Old Christian surname himself but New Christian surname ancestors (Guarda, 2002; Moreno Jeria, 2007; Urbina Carrasco, 2009). Again, these are all examples of rational behaviour (Kiser and Hechter, 1998). The Portuguese arrivals or their children were now not only family, relatives of the other settlers, but also an essential military asset. On the other hand, local Inquisition officials and their unofficial helpers had to be kept satisfied, or at least they had to keep their superiors in Lima satisfied, that they had everything under control. This is path dependence in action. The Spanish in Chiloe had to act the way they did, as a consequence of the 1600 Dutch invasion, systematic rapes, killings of Spanish men, and ensuing mass weddings.

A second instance of path dependence may be seen in 1643, when another Dutch fleet entered the Chiloe archipelago. The official diary of this expedition has survived (Adao, 2006; Schmidt, 1999; Sluiter, 1942). This time their mission explicitly contemplated only harassing the Spanish enemy in the Pacific Ocean, and establishing military alliances and trading links with local Indians hostile to the Spanish. The Dutch had learned that maritime or land victories over the Spanish could not be converted into permanent settlements in the area, except at an extremely high cost that they were not prepared to pay. Again, this is a materialist argument (Gundlach and Paldam, 2009), related to resources, technology, and impossibly long supply lines. Castro was invaded again, but this time there were no

Spanish men or women in the city. The Castro archives were burnt again. The Dutch liberated almost 500 Chiloe Indians, by transporting them and their possessions to the mainland. However, the Indians were unable to read a formal offer of alliance from the Dutch government and refused to sign the respective document. The Indians had learned that military alliances with the Dutch were only useful, if at all, in the very short term, for as long as the Dutch were around. Once the Dutch had left, it was back to the original military balance (although the Indians could now be better armed). As to trade, the Indians wanted iron weapons, leather body protection and muskets from the Dutch, but they had no gold to pay and were not prepared to become gold miners (something else they had learned was that few conditions were worse than mining gold or silver for the Spanish). The Indians could pay with food, but only if they knew in advance that a larger harvest would be required.

## **7 Cross-case analysis: Luis de Carvajal in Nuevo Leon, Mexico**

The sources on Luis de Carvajal and the new kingdom of Nuevo Leon are better than those for Chiloe in 1600. The complete contract or *capitulacion* between King Philip II of Spain and Carvajal, dated 1579, and Carvajal's complete Inquisition process are both available (Temkin, 2007; Toro, 1993). We also consulted Cavazos Garza (1994), Del Hoyo (1972), Goldmann (1946), Green (2007), Greenleaf (1981), Huerga (1984) and Temkin (2008), and, for other members of Carvajal's extended family or close associates, Hordes (1991), Mott (2001) and Uchmany (1992).

Carvajal was born in Portugal but travelled extensively from an early age. He learned about business in the Cape Verde slave trade. He was a Catholic, but his ancestry was New Christian and many relatives in his large family practiced Judaism

secretly. By the time Carvajal went to Mexico for the first time, in 1567 (the same year the first Spanish *Conquistadores* and colonists arrived in Chiloe), he was already in the process of becoming a respected businessman, competent soldier and brilliant political operator. Once in Mexico he led successful campaigns against rebel Indians and English pirates, made important geographical discoveries, became a farmer, and made powerful friends and enemies. When he thought that he had accumulated sufficient merits, he went to Spain to see the King, who appointed him the first governor of a new kingdom, Nuevo Leon, covering at least about 700,000 square kilometres (the borders were not precisely defined) in the far north of Mexico. King Philip also allowed Carvajal to recruit and take with him from Spain settlers and soldiers with their families. Several groups were not allowed to migrate to the New World, including the descendants of Jews and Moors and others condemned by the Inquisition (a rule that was sometimes ignored or bent, Friede, 1951). The task of controlling that his settlers fulfilled all the required conditions was left to Carvajal himself, who embarked most of his extended family and many other New Christians and crypto-Jews, largely recruited from the same regions. Conveniently, the King's officials were looking the other way.

Despite a successful career in Nuevo Leon and elsewhere in Mexico (or maybe precisely because of that), Carvajal was arrested in 1589 on several charges, including failing to respect the borders of neighbouring kingdoms. The following year he was convicted by the Mexican Inquisition for bringing New Christians to Mexico and for not reporting crypto-Jewish practices in his own family, but he was cleared of secretly practicing Judaism himself. He was condemned to six years of exile, but died shortly after his trial. Several members of his extended family and close associates were burned at the stake, and many others received minor sentences. In

less than twenty years, Carvajal and his followers had gone from amazing victories to complete disaster.

## **8 Some Carvajal and Nuevo Leon counterfactuals**

Could anything have saved the Carvajal project? Maybe, had it been saved, Nuevo Leon and Chiloe would have evolved along similar lines? Table 8 presents five counterfactuals. All of them refer to religious questions and to Carvajal's personal project. The Table 8 counterfactuals include Carvajal leaving his family in Spain instead of bringing it to Mexico; Carvajal reporting his crypto-Jewish relatives to the Mexican Inquisition himself; Carvajal dealing, discreetly but firmly, with the family crypto-Jews himself; Carvajal trying much harder not to make personal enemies; and King Philip of Spain refusing to make Carvajal governor of Nuevo Leon. Most of these counterfactuals, which may be plausible on paper, may have been out of reach for Carvajal. He was a complex man, full of personal ambition and in many ways ruthless, but also with a strong sense of family duty and family loyalty (Green, 2007; Huerga, 1984). For different reasons, leaving his family in Spain, betraying them to the Mexican Inquisition, or making fewer enemies were all very difficult for Carvajal, if not impossible.

Counterfactual 10 (dealing discreetly but effectively with the family crypto-Jews himself) deserves a separate discussion. Had Carvajal attempted it, and succeeded, maybe that would have been the end of the threat posed by the Inquisition to his family and project. But maybe this solution was not acceptable to some of the religious fundamentalists in his family. Maybe some, or many of them, were not prepared to get rid of the Inquisition threat, if the price was, as they saw it, to stop being Jewish. Maybe some of them preferred to become martyrs. The fact is

that, for whatever reason, Carvajal did not attempt Counterfactual 10. It could have been a failure of leadership, or maybe there was nothing that Carvajal could do. Maybe homogeneity among the Carvajal people derived precisely from their long-established group identity as crypto-Jews. This very early or initial homogeneity was an exogenous datum, defined in advance in Spain, long before emigration to Mexico, and an uncontested part of their culture (Swidler, 1986). In the Swidler approach such exogenous, uncontested group identity and homogeneity would make the period of their migration and initial colonisation of Nuevo Leon 'settled times' for them, which is precisely the opposite of critical junctures. In 'settled lives', what was once 'ideology' has become 'common sense'. The Carvajal family in Nuevo Leon would not allow their leader Luis de Carvajal to destroy something that many generations of ancestors had carefully and lovingly built. In their view it was not the time to destroy, but the time to preserve. Carvajal was unable or unwilling to use his power against such determination.

These five counterfactuals are all suggesting the same outcome. Carvajal had exceptional qualities as a businessman, soldier and political entrepreneur. But a new kingdom of Nuevo Leon under his leadership was impossible, because what his own people wanted, and what the King's and Church representatives in Mexico, including the Inquisition, wanted, were incompatible. There is again equilibrium here (Thelen, 1999). Again, we have equifinality, multiple causation, or multiple paths to the same outcome (Mahoney, 2007, p. 135). It may also be described as historical necessity: 'what happened had to happen' (Ben-Menahem, 1997, p. 100). The equilibrium, perfectly illuminated by the Table 8 counterfactuals, is that open or half-open Jewish religious practices would not be tolerated in Nuevo Leon. If stopping this challenge to Catholic orthodoxy and the Spanish crown's authority meant having

to destroy such a valuable asset as Carvajal, Carvajal would be destroyed. Our analysis suggests that, if Counterfactual 10 could not be attempted, or if attempted it would have failed, Carvajal was inevitably bound to be crushed by the clash between these two religious fundamentalisms.

If Counterfactual 10 was impossible, the Carvajal episode was not a critical juncture or a near miss (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Lebow, 2000). There was not a wider than usual range of options for the key actors, leading to enhanced impacts of the respective consequences. On the other hand, even if the Carvajal episode had been a critical juncture or a near miss, it would have been that, only in terms of survival and success of the Carvajal personal project, but not in terms of a more general outcome of longer-run religious tolerance (or at least muted coexistence), accommodation and compromise. There could be no replication in Nuevo Leon of the post-1600 Chiloe experience, which depended on the Dutch occupation, systematic rapes, killings of Spanish men, danger of alleged or true half-Dutch babies, and rushed mass weddings among people who otherwise would not have married each other. Nothing of this was present in Nuevo Leon.

## **9 Cross-case comparative analysis: summarising key differences between Chiloe and Nuevo Leon**

So, what made the late XVI and early XVII centuries' evolutions of Chiloe and Nuevo Leon so different? Between 1567 and 1600, Chiloe had the typical tensions of other Spanish frontier colonies in the New World. To call them 'cleavages', which is the Collier and Collier (2002) term for divisions building up to a critical juncture, would be alarmist. There would have been no critical juncture in Chiloe in 1600 without the Dutch invasion. Before 1600, a first tension had to do with class,

between *encomenderos* and poor Spaniards. A second tension subtly divided Old Christians (those who believed themselves of clean blood, uncontaminated by Jewish or Moorish ancestors), and the rest. This tension was largely or fully silent, since in theory no one of impure blood was allowed to migrate to the Americas. Everybody claimed to be Old Christian, even if some had New Christian surnames (surnames that their ancestors had shared with converted Jews in Spain). A third tension was between Spaniards and Indians. None of these tensions was serious enough to cause concern.

After the 1600 Dutch invasion, the Del Campo victory and the mass weddings, the situation had become completely different. Chiloe had become a melting pot. Weddings were rushed among an amazingly diverse group of people. Moreover, possibly at least some of these people had a positive interest in not being transparent about their ancestry. There were the Portuguese, and people with the same surnames as the 'luteran' victims of the Inquisition in Seville in 1559 (Pastore, 2010). Possibly there were so-called '*proto-conversos*', descendants of Jews who had converted two centuries before, or even earlier (or people with the same surnames as the *proto-conversos*, Castano, 1997; Menendez Pelayo, 1945; Munoz Correa, 2008; Sanchez Saus, 1998). Hypothetically, there were several different types of people with New Christian surnames. Some of them may have had secret Jewish ancestors, but others did not. Among those with secret Jewish ancestry, in some cases not even the descendants themselves knew it. Even for those who hypothetically both had secret Jewish ancestors, and were aware of it, it does not follow that their true religion was Judaism. Some of them could have been sincere Catholics (Bonnin, 2001; Caro Baroja, 1978; Guarda, 2002). Then, there were true Old Christians, and possibly others of secret Jewish ancestry who had never been

identified as such, and therefore their surnames were seen as Old Christian (Barrientos Grandon, 2007). In some cases, individuals could not be sure of who their own ancestors had been. In most cases, people did not know who the other Spanish families were. Immediately after the Dutch defeat, most or all the women had rushed to marry the Del Campo soldiers, without paying much attention to these differences. What happened in following generations was different from family to family (Hojman, 2007). However, as compared with the generation before 1600, a much smaller proportion of individuals in latter, Chiloe-born generations could claim with absolute certainty that they had no heretics among their ancestors. Many people simply did not know. It would be wrong to say that everyone had married everyone else, without paying any attention to blood purity concerns, but nowhere else in the Spanish New World got closer. And, differently from Nuevo Leon, in Chiloe no family or group of families was strong or determined enough to try to impose their own ideology. What was happening in Chiloe was precisely the opposite from the clash between two religious fundamentalisms which had destroyed Carvajal. As compared with Nuevo Leon, and possibly with everywhere else in the Spanish colonies, the Spanish in Chiloe were becoming more cautious, tolerant, democratic, and prepared to compromise and accommodate. Maybe they had no alternative but to become all that, which would make this another good example of path dependence.

It is important to emphasise that this outcome does not depend on the true number of half-Dutch babies, or the true number of secret Jews or protestants among the Spanish settlers. No one knew what the true numbers were. But, even if there had been no half-Dutch babies at all, and no settlers with secret forbidden ancestors at all, still the same result applies. Once the Spanish women had been

sexually abused by the Dutch, and their husbands had been killed, and the mass weddings had been rushed, everything else just had to follow, including the new threat represented by the Lima Inquisition, and the need to do something about that threat.

## **10 Conclusions**

Paradoxically, the 1600 Dutch invasion of Chiloe contributed to make the Spanish grip on the Island eventually firmer, thus reinforcing differences between colonial Chiloe and the mainland. The mass weddings also raised the stakes in terms of potential negative effects of hypothetical investigations by the Lima Inquisition. This made the Spanish settlers discreetly less supportive of the Inquisition and substantially more cautious, attitudes which eventually contributed to make Spanish colonial rule in Chiloe remarkably Inquisition-free. This paper examined the invasion and its aftermath and confirmed them as a critical juncture. We discussed developments in 1639 and 1643 and confirmed them as path dependent, and used the Carvajal experience in Nuevo Leon for purposes of cross-case analysis.

In Chiloe in 1600, Dutch commander Baltasar de Cordes took three important decisions. First, he chose to have all the Spanish men killed. Second, he chose to allow the Spanish women to be sexually abused. Third, he failed to leave Chiloe and sail back to Holland with a large cargo of Spanish female prisoners, before Spanish reinforcements arrived. Cordes' decisions opened the way for Francisco del Campo to rush the mass weddings between his men and the 'widows'. This (a fourth decision) diminished the danger of babies being identified as half-Dutch, but only at the cost of couples getting married with not enough attention being paid to blood

purity concerns (possible secret Jewish or protestant ancestry). A fifth choice by historian Diego de Rosales implicitly told any Spaniards with secret forbidden ancestors who might be listening, that they were not the enemy. What he meant was, we are all in this together. The enemies are the Dutch and their Indian allies. Possibly the key actors, Cordes, Del Campo and Rosales, did not know it, but they were generating conditions for Spanish colonial rule in Chiloe in the future to be different from Spanish colonial rule practically everywhere else. For example, there would be more tolerance and willingness to compromise and accommodate.

In terms of religious persecution, Chiloe and Nuevo Leon could not be more different. The Carvajal project was destroyed, and Carvajal's relatives and close associates killed, by the Mexican Inquisition. In contrast, in Chiloe the Inquisition was deeply feared, but in practice it was inactive. At least partly the merit for this corresponds to the Spanish settlers in Chiloe, for whom events had developed in such a way that they knew they could not afford to do anything which would arouse the Inquisition's curiosity. It is perfectly possible that there were no secret descendants of 'the forbidden', at all, among the Chiloe settlers. But no one knew this, either among the settlers themselves or in the Lima Inquisition, and no one could be certain without a thorough investigation. Given that level of uncertainty (which also applied to other Spanish colonies in the New World), together with the Chiloe-specific invasion-related developments (the possibility of half-Dutch babies and the rushed mass marriages) extreme caution about the Inquisition was advisable.

Without diminishing the qualities and merits of Francisco del Campo or Diego de Rosales, neither was so successful, at so many different things, as Luis de Carvajal. Possibly, had Carvajal chosen to go to Chile instead of Mexico (a 'miracle'

counterfactual, Bunzl, 2004; Gilbert and Lambert, 2010; Lebow, 2000), the Indian rebellion in mainland Chile might have ended sooner, and maybe the Dutch would have been prevented from occupying Castro. But then, maybe also there would have been no early Chilean exceptionalism, or less of it. On the other hand, and back in the real world, maybe some family heads in colonial Chiloe were much better than Carvajal in terms of Counterfactual 10. Maybe they succeeded where Carvajal had failed. That is, maybe they dealt, discreetly but effectively, with any religious fundamentalists, secret Jewish or protestant, in their respective families, who wished to become martyrs. The history books do not record their names, and we know nothing of their achievements, precisely because they were completely successful.

The restoration of Spanish colonial rule in Chiloe and the change in cultural attitudes among the Spanish settlers (less enthusiastic and more careful about the Inquisition, more tolerant and willing to compromise) are different but related. The latter could not have happened without the former. That brand of early Chilean exceptionalism which was born, not in the mainland, but in Chiloe Island in 1600 had three fathers, Cordes, Del Campo and Rosales, and many nameless mothers.

## References

Adao, Clicie Nunes (2006), Chile holandes o Flandes indiano en la vision de Gaspar Barleu, in Santos Perez, Jose M. and Cabral de Souza, George F., eds., *El Desafio Holandes al Dominio Iberico en Brasil en el Siglo XVII*, Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca, pp. 237-254.

Alpert, Michael (2008), *Secret Judaism and the Spanish Inquisition*, Nottingham, Five Leaves.

Barrientos Grandon, Javier (2007), Melchor Bravo de Sarabia (1512-1577), primer miembro del Colegio de San Clemente de Bolonia en la historia, y su familia de togados, *Revista de Estudios Historico-Juridicos*, 29, pp. 423-436.

Barros Arana, Diego (1999), *Historia General de Chile, Volume 3*, Santiago, Universitaria.

Ben-Menahem, Yemima (1997), Historical contingency, *Ratio*, 10, 2, September, pp. 99-107.

Bennett, Andrew and Elman, Colin (2006), Complex causal relations and case study methods: The example of path dependence, *Political Analysis*, 14, pp. 250-267.

Bernardini, Paolo and Fiering, Norman, eds. (2001), *The Jews and the Expansion of Europe to the West 1450-1800*, New York, Berghahn.

Bonnin, Pere (2001), *Sangre Judia*, Third Edition, Barcelona, Flor del Viento.

Boyd-Bowman, Peter (1976a), Patterns of Spanish emigration to the Indies 1579-1600, *The Americas*, 33, 1, July, pp. 78-95.

- Boyd-Bowman, Peter (1976b), Patterns of Spanish emigration to the Indies until 1600, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 56, 4, November, pp. 580-604.
- Bradley, Peter T. (2002), The Portuguese peril in Peru, *Bulletin of Spanish Studies*, 79, 5, September, pp. 591-613.
- Bunzl, Martin (2004), Counterfactual history: A user's guide, *American Historical Review*, June, pp. 845-858.
- Caneque, Alejandro (1996), Theatre of power, *The Americas*, 52, 3, January, pp. 321-343.
- Capoccia, Giovanni and Kelemen, R. Daniel (2007), The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism, *World Politics*, 59, April, pp. 341-369.
- Caro Baroja, Julio (1978), *Los Judios en la Espana Moderna y Contemporanea*, Madrid, Istmo.
- Carvajal-Carmona, Luis G. et al (2000), Strong Amerind / white sex bias and a possible Sephardic contribution among the founders of a population in Northwest Colombia, *American Journal of Human Genetics*, 67, 5, November, pp. 1287-1295.
- Castano, Javier (1997), Social networks in a Castilian Jewish aljama and the court Jews in the fifteenth century: A preliminary survey (Madrid 1440-1475), *En la Espana Medieval*, 20, pp. 379-392.
- Cavazos Garza, Israel (1994), *Breve Historia de Nuevo Leon*, Mexico, FCE.
- Collier, Ruth B. And Collier, David (2002), *Shaping the Political Arena*, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.

Costa, Leonor Freire (2004), Merchant groups in the 17<sup>th</sup>-century Brazilian sugar trade: Reappraising old topics with new research insights, *e-JPH*, 2, 1, Summer, pp. 1-11.

Cross, Harry E. (1978), Commerce and orthodoxy: A Spanish response to Portuguese commercial penetration in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1580-1640, *The Americas*, 35, 2, October, pp. 151-167.

Cruz, Consuelo (2005), *Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World-Making in the Tropics*, New York, Cambridge University Press.

De Armond, Louis (1954), Frontier warfare in colonial Chile, *Pacific Historical Review*, 23, 2, May, pp. 125-132.

Del Hoyo, Eugenio (1972), *Historia de Nuevo Leon*, Monterrey, ITM.

Diaz Blanco, Jose Manuel (2010), *Razon de Estado y Buen Gobierno*, Seville, Universidad de Sevilla.

Durand, Rodolphe and Vaara, Eero (2009), Causation, counterfactuals, and competitive advantage, *Strategic Management Journal*, 30, pp. 1245-1264.

Elster, Jon (2000), Rational choice history: A case of excessive ambition, *American Political Science Review*, 94, 3, September, pp. 685-695.

Fearon, James D. (1991), Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science, *World Politics*, 43, January, pp. 169-195.

Friede, Juan (1951), The *Catalogo de Pasajeros* and Spanish emigration to America to 1550, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 31, 2, May, pp. 333-348.

Gilbert, David and Lambert, David (2010), Counterfactual geographies: Worlds that might have been, *Journal of Historical Geography*, 36, pp. 245-252.

Gilman, Stephen (1979), The case of Diego Alonso: Hypocrisy and the Spanish Inquisition, *Daedalus*, 108, 3, Summer, pp. 135-144.

Goldmann, Jack B. (1946), The Tragic Square of Don Luis de Carbajal y de la Cueva, *The Historian*, 9, 1, September, pp. 69-82.

Gould, J.D. (1969), Hypothetical history, *Economic History Review*, 22, 2, August, pp. 195-207.

Green, Toby (2007), *Inquisition: The Reign of Fear*, London, Pan Books.

Greenleaf, Richard E. (1981), *La Inquisicion en Nueva Espana: Siglo XVI*, Mexico, FCE.

Guarda, Gabriel (2002), *Los Encomenderos de Chiloe*, Santiago, Universidad Catolica.

Gundlach, Erich and Paldam, Martin (2009), A farewell to critical junctures: Sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy, *European Journal of Political Economy*, 25, pp. 340-354.

Hering Torres, Max Sebastian (2003/4), 'Limpieza de sangre': Racismo en la edad moderna?, *Tiempos Modernos*, 9, pp. 1-16.

Hogan, John and Doyle, David (2007), The importance of ideas: An a priori critical juncture framework, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 40, 4, December, pp. 883-910.

Hojman, David E. (2007), Who is afraid of the Spanish Inquisition? Endogamy and culture development among Chiloe *encomenderos* and Catholic namesakes of persecution victims, *Journal of Family History*, 32, 3, July, pp. 215-233.

Hordes, Stanley M. (1991), The Inquisition and the crypto-Jewish community in colonial New Spain and New Mexico, in Perry, Mary Elizabeth and Cruz, Anne J., eds., *Cultural Encounters*, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 207-215.

Hurga, Alvaro (1984), El tribunal de Mexico en la epoca de Felipe II, in Perez Villanueva, Joaquin and Escandell Bonet, Bartolome, eds., *Historia de la Inquisicion en Espana y America, Volume I*, Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, pp. 937-969.

Kagan, Richard L. and Morgan, Philip D., eds. (2009), *Atlantic Diasporas*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.

Kiser, Edgar and Hechter, Michael (1998), The debate on historical sociology: Rational choice theory and its critics, *American Journal of Sociology*, 104, 3, November, pp. 785-816.

Kuran, Timur (1995), *Private Truths, Public Lies*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Lamberg, Juha-Antti and Pajunen, Kalle (2010), Agency, institutional change, and continuity: The case of the Finnish civil war, *Journal of Management Studies*, 47, 5, July, pp. 814-836.

Lebow, Richard Ned (2000), What's so different about a counterfactual?, *World Politics*, 52, July, pp. 550-585.

Liebman, Seymour B. (1971), The Great Conspiracy in Peru, *The Americas*, 28, 2, October, pp. 176-190.

Mahoney, James (2001), *The Legacies of Liberalism*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.

Mahoney, James (2007), Qualitative methodology and comparative politics, *Comparative Political Studies*, 40, 2, February, pp. 122-144.

Maltby, William S. (1971), *The Black Legend in England*, Durham, Duke University Press.

Mansilla, Marcelo (2009), Historia de chilenos: Ines de Bazan, [http://historiadechilenos.blogspot.com/2009\\_03\\_01\\_archive.html](http://historiadechilenos.blogspot.com/2009_03_01_archive.html).

Marquez Villanueva, Francisco (2006), *De la Espana Judeoconversa: Doce Estudios*, Barcelona, Bellaterra.

Medina, Jose Toribio (1952), *Historia del Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisicion en Chile*, Santiago, [www.cervantesvirtual.com](http://www.cervantesvirtual.com).

Menendez Pelayo, Marcelino (1945), *Historia de los Heterodoxos Espanoles*, Buenos Aires, GLEM.

Millar Carvacho, Rene (1998), *Inquisicion y Sociedad en el Virreinato Peruano*, Santiago, Universidad Catolica.

Montiel Vera, Dante (nd), Historia de Chiloe: 1540-1600, <http://membres.lycos.fr/chiloe/historia3.htm>.

Moreno Jeria, Rodrigo (2007), *Misiones en Chile Austral: Los Jesuitas en Chiloe 1608-1768*, Seville, CSIC / Universidad de Sevilla.

Mott, Margaret (2001), Leonor de Caceres and the Mexican Inquisition, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, pp. 81-98.

Munoz Correa, Juan Guillermo (2008), La concesion de mercedes de tierra en la doctrina de Malloa (Colchagua, siglos XVI y XVII), *Espacio Regional*, 1, 5, pp. 69-95.

Padden, Robert Charles (1957), Cultural change and military resistance in Araucanian Chile, 1550-1730, *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 13, 1, Spring, pp. 103-121.

Pastore, Stefania (2010), *Una Herejia Espanola: Conversos, Alumbrados e Inquisicion (1449-1559)*, Madrid, Marcial Pons.

Perez, Joseph (2009), *La Leyenda Negra*, Madrid, Gadir.

Pierson, Paul (2000), Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics, *American Political Science Review*, 94, 2, June, pp. 251-267.

Pipkin, Amanda (2009), 'They are not humans, but devils in human bodies': Depictions of sexual violence and Spanish tyranny as a means of fostering identity in the Dutch Republic, *Journal of Early Modern History*, 13, pp. 229-264.

Rosales, Diego de (1877, 1989), *Historia General del Reino de Chile: Flandes Indiano*, Santiago, Andres Bello.

Saban, Mario Javier (1992), *Judios Conversos*, Buenos Aires, Distal.

Saguier, Eduardo R. (1985), The social impact of a middleman minority in a divided host society: The case of the Portuguese in early seventeenth-century Buenos Aires, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 65, 3, pp. 467-491.

Sanchez Saus, R. (1998), Sevillian medieval nobility: Creation, development and character, *Journal of Medieval History*, 24, 4, pp. 367-380.

Schmidt, Benjamin (1999), Exotic allies: The Dutch-Chilean encounter and the (failed) conquest of America, *Renaissance Quarterly*, 52, pp. 440-473.

Schwartz, Stuart B. (1991), The voyage of the vassals: Royal power, noble obligations, and merchant capital before the Portuguese restoration of independence, 1624-1640, *American Historical Review*, 96, 3, June, pp. 735-762.

Sewell Jr., William H. (1992), A theory of structure: Duality, agency and transformation, *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 1, July, pp. 1-29.

Silverblatt, Irene (2004), *Modern Inquisitions*, Durham, Duke University Press.

Simms, Norman (2007), Being crypto-Jewish in colonial Brazil (1500-1822): Brushing history against the grain, *Journal of Religious History*, 31, 4, December, pp. 421-450.

Sluiter, Engel (1942), Dutch maritime power and the colonial status quo, 1585-1641, *Pacific Historical Review*, 11, 1, March, pp. 29-41.

Smith, David Grant (1974), Old Christian merchants and the foundation of the Brazil Company, 1649, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 54, 2, May, pp. 233-259.

Swidler, Ann (1986), Culture in action: Symbols and strategies, *American Sociological Review*, 51, April, pp. 273-286.

Temkin, Samuel (2007), La capitulacion de Luis de Carvajal, *Revista de Humanidades*, 023, pp. 105-140.

Temkin, Samuel (2008), Luis de Carvajal and his people, *AJS Review*, 32, 1, pp. 79-100.

Thelen, Kathleen (1999), Historical institutionalism in comparative politics, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, pp. 369-404.

Toro, Alfonso, ed. (1993), *Los Judios en la Nueva Espana en el Siglo XVI*, Mexico, FCE.

Tucker, Aviezer (1999), Historiographical counterfactuals and historical contingency, *History and Theory*, 38, 2, May, pp. 264-276.

Uchmany, Eva Alexandra (1992), *La Vida entre el Judaismo y el Cristianismo en la Nueva Espana 1580-1606*, Mexico, FCE.

Urbina Carrasco, Maria Ximena (2009), *La Frontera de Arriba en Chile Colonial*, Valparaiso, Pontificia Universidad Catolica.

Valenzuela Solis de Ovando, Carlos (1975), *Tradiciones Coloniales*, Santiago, Nascimento, <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/>.

Vazquez de Acuna, Isidoro (1990), Cruce historico del Canal de Chacao durante el siglo XVI, <http://www.revistamarina.cl>.

Wachtel, Nathan (2007), *La Fe del Recuerdo: Laberintos Marranos*, Buenos Aires, FCE.

Zagorin, Perez (1996), The historical significance of lying and dissimulation, *Social Research*, 63, 3, pp. 863-912.

**Table 1**

**Chiloe 1600: Counterfactual 1**

The counterfactual antecedent	Most likely consequences
<p>Baltasar de Cordes decides that the Spanish men will not be killed, and the Spanish women will not be raped. Unable to offer a credible guarantee of the latter to the Spanish enemy, he releases the women</p>	<p>Since no Spanish women need to be freed by force (or dead men avenged), this gives Cordes more time. But eventually, and inevitably, the Spanish will attempt to take Castro back. After that no urgent mass weddings will be possible or required, and there will be no Spanish women and no <i>encomiendas</i> for Del Campo's soldiers. Sparing the lives of Spanish men also conveys the message to any possible dissenters among the Spanish (secret Jews or protestants) that they would be well received by the Dutch, should they wish to change sides in the future. But this is not enough to stop the Spanish from recovering Castro now, or soon</p>

**Table 2**

**Chiloe 1600: Counterfactual 2**

The counterfactual antecedent	Most likely consequences
-------------------------------	--------------------------

<p>Baltasar de Cordes decides to leave Chiloe earlier, before the Spanish attack. This means having to leave with significantly less food supplies and panned gold. But still the Dutch take half the Spanish women with them</p>	<p>The Spanish under Del Campo take Castro back without a fight. The Indian allies of the Dutch are punished. But, if Cordes returns safely to Holland, his expedition can be presented as a victory. His and his men's 'successful' experiences may become important assets in the planning and organising of future Dutch expeditions to Chiloe.</p> <p>There would be no urgent mass weddings, or, if the women left by the Dutch to the Indians are freed, only half the number of marriages would take place</p>

**Table 3**

**Chiloe 1600: Counterfactual 3**

The counterfactual antecedent	Most likely consequences
<p>Baltasar de Cordes organises his men much more carefully, in preparation for the imminent Spanish attack on the Dutch occupying Castro. When the 'surprise' attack finally comes, it fails. It is a bad failure, but not so</p>	<p>This gives the Dutch some extra time. But eventually the Spanish will come back. The Dutch cannot receive reinforcements (or even ask for them), or replenish food and ammunition stocks. Eventually they will have to either leave Castro and Chiloe (a version of Counterfactual 2, but much more difficult to accomplish if the</p>

bad that the Spanish will never try again	Spanish are already on the Island), or surrender.  In the end the Spanish will take Castro back
---	---

**Table 4**

**Chiloe 1600: Counterfactual 4**

The counterfactual antecedent	Most likely consequences
Francisco del Campo decides to wait, instead of attacking the Dutch in Castro by surprise immediately. He lays siege to the occupied city	Eventually the Dutch will run out of supplies, and they will have to surrender or be defeated in battle. Their last weapon is the fact that they control what will happen to their prisoners. If the Dutch suspect or know that on surrender they will be killed, they may choose to kill the Spanish women. Whatever happens to the women, the Spanish eventually take Castro back. If the women have been killed there cannot be rushed mass weddings

**Table 5**

**Chiloe 1600: Counterfactual 5**

The	Most likely consequences

counterfactual antecedent	
After defeating the Dutch, Francisco del Campo decides against rushing mass weddings between his men and the Spanish women	<p>The women, some of them possibly pregnant by the Dutch, take care of the <i>encomiendas</i> by themselves. The Del Campo soldiers have no incentive to stay in Chiloe, as compared to returning to the mainland (this is different from Counterfactual 1, in that in Counterfactual 5 the Del Campo men have fought and some have died to release the women). If some soldiers stay, with little or no rewards, antagonisms will develop between them and the female <i>encomenderas</i>. These class divisions (some old, some new) among the Spanish, in addition to any old secret ethnic or religious divisions, and to the stigma attached to half-Dutch children and their mothers, will damage the effectiveness of preparations against possible Dutch invasions in the future.</p> <p>The Spanish in Chiloe in the future will be more aware of and more alert to cultural, philosophical, ideological and possible secret religious differences among them. There will be less tolerance, less compromise, and less willingness to accommodate differences</p>

**Table 6**

**Chiloe 1600: Counterfactual 6**

The	Most likely consequences
-----	--------------------------

counterfactual antecedent	
After defeating the Dutch, Francisco del Campo decides against burning the caciques alive	<p>Depending on other factors (for example, the harshness of the <i>encomienda</i> regime in the future), the caciques and their respective Indians may take either a more favourable view of Spanish rule, or precisely the opposite. If the latter, the fact that the caciques were forgiven and eventually released will increase the numbers of future enemy Indians.</p> <p>Since there is no burning, historians cannot present it as an ‘auto de fe’, which makes it easier for some Catholic fundamentalists and Inquisition supporters to identify someone else as the ‘other’, and to argue that ‘autos de fe’ are actually needed, not against Indians but against these ‘others’</p>

**Table 7**

**Chiloe 1600: Counterfactual 7**

The counterfactual antecedent	Most likely consequences
Diego de Rosales, the historian, chooses to present a different version of events.	If this is believed, it would introduce a new cleavage, or re-awake an old cleavage (brought with them from Spain, Caro Baroja, 1978), among the Spanish

<p>He omits showing the burning alive of Indian chiefs as akin to an 'auto de fe' against Dutch heretics and their Indian allies. Instead, he suggests that the Spanish renegades who helped the Dutch may have been secret Jews or protestants. Similar slurs were put forward, or accepted, by some Spaniards or the Inquisition itself, elsewhere (Gilman, 1979; Schwartz, 1991)</p>	<p>colonists in Chiloe. This cleavage is present practically everywhere in the Spanish colonies in the New World (the possible absence of the cleavage would make Chiloe the exception to the rule). If the slur is believed, it is already too late for some of the couples who were rushed into marriage by Del Campo. In the long term, there would be a negative effect on trust and morale for generations to come, poisoning relations among the Spanish colonists and damaging the effort against enemy Indians and future invaders from Europe. Such damage may not be fatal in terms of defence. The impact would be important, but it would be largely cultural rather than military</p>
---	--

**Table 8**

**Some Carvajal and Nuevo Leon counterfactuals**

<p><b>Counterfactual antecedents</b></p>	<p><b>Most likely consequences</b></p>
<p><b>Counterfactual 8:</b> At a huge personal cost, Carvajal chooses to</p>	<p>Self-defeating. It clashes with some of his most important objectives. It makes him safer in Mexico, since his crypto-Jewish relatives cannot be used to bring him</p>

<p>leave his family in Spain</p>	<p>down. But he is left without emotional support and without competent and reliable allies and partners</p>
<p><b>Counterfactual 9:</b> At a huge personal cost, Carvajal reports the crypto-Jews in his family to the Mexican Inquisition himself</p>	<p>Self-defeating. Despite his contradictions, Carvajal is a family man (or his family's man). He sees reporting as a betrayal. The relatives themselves would have been safer, had they stayed in Spain. And there is no guarantee that reporting them will make him safer</p>
<p><b>Counterfactual 10:</b> Carvajal decides to act, quietly but firmly, against the crypto-Jews in the family himself. He becomes a milder, gentler and loving private version of the Inquisition</p>	<p>If success is ever achieved, this will be difficult and costly. Relatives and close associates will turn against him. But at least this confrontation will happen privately and discreetly. No one wants to involve the Inquisition. On the other hand, success in controlling the religious fundamentalists in the family is not enough to guarantee complete safety. His enemies may still bring him down by pointing to crypto-Jewish practices that happened a long time ago</p>
<p><b>Counterfactual 11:</b> Carvajal is much more careful about not making powerful enemies</p>	<p>Easier said than done. Possibly powerful enemies are practically inevitable, because of his success, ruthlessness, Portuguese background, Jewish ancestry, or other characteristics of his personal style</p>

<p><b>Counterfactual 12:</b></p> <p>The King refuses to make Carvajal governor of Nuevo Leon, or to allow him to recruit settlers and soldiers in Spain</p>	<p>Carvajal returns to Mexico on his own, but gradually brings to Mexico small numbers of relatives and friends (all successful <i>Conquistadores</i> did this). Some of the new arrivals are crypto-Jews. Whether the Inquisition finally intervenes or not depends on how successful Carvajal is, how powerful his enemies are, and how high the crypto-Jewish profile of his family and associates is.</p> <p>If the Inquisition intervenes, that is the end of the Carvajal project. If it does not, it is possibly because Carvajal has tried and succeeded at implementing a smaller scale version of Counterfactual 10</p>
---	---