

**The Institute of Irish Studies,
University of Liverpool**

**Northern Ireland
Attitudinal Survey
December 2025**



THE INSTITUTE
OF **IRISH STUDIES**

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The current survey is based on a sample of 1534 Northern Ireland electors aged 18+. The survey was conducted using an online panel methodology with the data weighted (i.e. gender, age, SEG, local government district and religion) to be representative of Northern Ireland/North's population. The survey has a margin of error of +/- 2.5% at the 95% Confidence Level. Fieldwork was undertaken between 1 and 14 November 2025. The survey was undertaken by Social Market Research¹.

General Findings and Comments

Surveys are part of the process of measuring change, attitudes and opinions. They are also important as they capture in-time attitudes that are critical in a place such as Northern Ireland in which the processes related to demographic change, cost of living issues and movement away from traditional identities and voting patterns can be both captured and analysed. Much of what forms commentary and political discourse in Northern Ireland is wedded to traditional thinking around identity, demography and the inevitability or otherwise of a border poll. This and other **University of Liverpool surveys** show that Northern Ireland is not a place of fossilised identities or one without in-depth consideration of policies and issues and the meaning and importance of each. Surveys are an antidote to repetitive stereotyping of communities, the simplicity of sectarian head-counting and the notion that all generations hold the same opinions based on their faith or constitutional position. In this version of the survey we examine:

- Voting intentions,
- Collapsing Stormont,
- The constitutional question (examined per those who are supportive or opposed to constitutional change and those who have no opinion),
- The place and role of migrants in society,
- Assembly reform.

Electoral Fortunes

- Since 1998 the pro-union **vote has declined** but that decline appears to have stopped². Part of that decline is due to the movement of both socially deprived and/or secular and socially liberal pro-union voters to non-constitutional parties combined with levels of alienation and non-voting among those who would vote to remain in the UK.
- Within this survey pro-unity parties have maintained their vote share **but has again failed to grow**³ since 1998. Pro-unity parties have not achieved anything close to satisfying the condition that would mean the likelihood of a border poll being won in favour of Irish unity.
- Within this survey SF, SDLP and PBP have a predicted vote share of 37.1% that is 2.1% lower than Westminster 2024 due in part to a 3.7% decline in votes for SF.

- The DUP, TUV and UUP have grown their vote share slightly to 41.6% or by 1.5% since last year despite a decline in support for the DUP.
- The non-constitutional Alliance and Greens have increased their vote share from 15.4% to 17.7% due to an impressive rise in the vote share for the Greens.
- All of this is set within a margin or error of +/- 2.5%.

Collapsing Stormont

- Sixty percent agreed that **they would not vote for a party** that collapsed the Assembly before the election in 2027. A mere 12% stated that they would.
- Among party voters 51.9% of SF, 78.4% of SDLP, 55.5% of UUP, 70.5% of Alliance voters and 32.8% of DUP voters stated they would **not vote for a party** that collapsed the Assembly before the election in 2027.

Border Poll

- University of Liverpool survey since 2017⁴ have evidenced a 5.6% rise in support for a united Ireland tomorrow.
- Between 2024⁵ and 2025 there has been a small decline in support for Irish unity by 1.2%
- Support is highest among the younger age group of **18–34-year-olds (47.3%)** compared to the age groups 35-59 (34.7%) and **60+ (17%)**.
- Those who wish to remain in the UK include most Protestants and the plurality of those who are neither unionist nor nationalist or of no-faith.
- A fundamental problem is that the pro-unity parties need to gain a very significant growth in their vote share to take them towards 50+1% of voters.
- Regarding the 2022 Assembly election there were 862703 votes. Nationalism/republicanism would have required 431,352 votes to gain 50+1%.
- In 2027, with c20% of those intending to vote for non-constitutional parties, that would mean needing to gain 62.5% of the constitutional vote.
- As the Secretary of State explained on the 4th December ‘... **there is one criterion there are not criteria and what the Good Friday Agreement said is that if in the view of the Secretary of State that in the event of a poll the majority of people in Northern Ireland would vote for constitutional change then he or she shall hold oneit’s a long way off because no one who is calling for a border poll can actually argue that the condition is currently met in Northern Ireland. There is nothing you can point to that says the majority of people in Northern Ireland are in favour of constitutional change**’.
- Among those who express an opinion, within this survey, **59.4% v 40.6%** favour remaining within the UK. When including the 20% who are undecided/do not know how they would vote in a border poll **47.3% wish to remain in the UK compared to 33.2% who wish to leave.**

- More respondents who would either vote for a united Ireland tomorrow or in 15-20 years' time **or** who are undecided/do not know how they would vote are more likely to consider remaining in Northern Ireland if certain conditions were met compared to the share who would vote to remain in the UK if similar conditions were met in the Republic.

Demography is Destiny?

- A significant part of the debate regarding constitutional change relates to demographic shifts in religion. That debate is rarely linked to an appreciation of the significant decline in births since the mid-1960s.
- Between 1983 and 1992 the numbers who reached the age of eighteen and who joined the electorate was around 316339⁶. By 2033-2042 that will have decreased to 219743 or by 30.5%⁷.
- In effect the electoral weight of those joining the electorate is declining.
- The trend since the mid-1960s began with the decline in Protestant births accompanied more recently by Catholic birth decline. Demographic growth is among those of no-faith⁸, other faiths or births to mothers born outside the UK and Ireland.
- The Protestant faith **will not** reach majority status again and **it is unlikely** the Catholic population will.
- If the trend in declining births continues the numbers entering the electorate in 18 to 20 years' time **will have nearly halved compared** to the late 1980s and early 1990s.
- There are still age groups that are majority Protestant within the older age groups but the decline in that faith group has **not been paralleled** by any age group that is majority Catholic.
- Catholics form a plurality in younger age groups **but not a majority**.
- In effect we entered a process, 20-30 years ago which means there will **be no majority group by faith** in Northern Ireland/North in either the short or medium term.
- These demographic changes have been clear but rarely been discussed accurately in public discourse concerning border polls and constitutional change.
- In the primary school sector c35% of pupils in the controlled sector are of no faith, compared to c6% in the Catholic sector. People of no-faith are plurality pro-union.
- These demographic changes are rarely factored into the constitutional debate despite forming an evidential base to argue that the traditional political discourse of sectarian head counting appears increasingly less relevant and/or less precise as a predictor of constitutional change.
- Northern Ireland/North has shifted into a new demography from largely two groups – Catholic and Protestant – to four. Two that are or will decline (Catholic and Protestant), and two that are growing (no-faith and other faiths).

Voting Intentions

In overall term the two largest parties (SF/DUP) are down on their vote share Assembly 2022. Overall compared to 2022.

- SF are down from 29% to 25.3%.
- DUP are down from 21.3% to 19.2%.
- Alliance is down marginally from 13.5% to 12.6%.
- The SDLP and UUP remain relatively static.
- The Green Party has gained significantly **from 1.9% to 5.1%**.
- People Before Profit have also grown from 1.9% to 2.6%.

Table 1: Assembly Vote Share 2022 and Predicted Vote Share Tomorrow⁹

	Assembly 2022	Vote Tomorrow
Sinn Fein	29.0	25.3
DUP	21.3	19.2
Alliance	13.5	12.6
UUP	11.2	12.0
SDLP	9.1	9.2
TUV	7.6	10.4
Green Party	1.9	5.1
People Before Profit (PBP)	1.1	2.6
Other	5.4	3.6

Pro-Unity Parties

Although SF will keep most of their previous voters (96%) there is some leakage to the SDLP and non-constitutional parties. The SDLP remain close to their 2022 vote share. There is growth for PBP (1.1% to 2.6%).

We find no growth overall, as has been the case since 1998, in the pro-unity vote share.

This is peculiar given the plurality of those joining the electorate since the mid-1990s have come from the traditional voter base of Catholics.

That does not mean that SF, SDLP and PBP could not grow as there are evident supporters for Irish unity who either do not vote or who vote non-constitutionally. But without gaining those voters it seems very unlikely, at this stage, that we will enter border poll territory in 2027. In overall terms when compared to how respondents voted in Westminster 2024.

- Sinn Fein's vote is down but they maintain 96% of their Westminster 2024 vote. Movement to other parties is small and constitutes 1.7% going to SDLP and 1% each to Greens and Alliance. Their vote maintenance is impressive but there may be fewer new voters than was the case in previous elections.

- SDLP enjoy neither growth nor decline. It will maintain 81.1% of their Westminster 2024 vote but loses 4.5% to SF, 3.6% to Greens and 2.7% each to UUP, DUP, and Alliance.
- PBP keep 78.6 % but gain 7.1% from Alliance, 14.3% Greens and the rest evenly split between DUP, TUV and SDLP.
- To advance Irish unity the pro-unity parties also need to grow support among Protestants, those of no or other faiths and/or those who do not consider themselves to be unionist nor nationalist.

Problematics: Pro-Unity Parties

- **1 in 5 pro-unity supporters** who voted in 2024 do not vote for pro-unity parties¹⁰. This finding continues a trend across University of Liverpool surveys.
- It is also evident that the pro-unity vote has failed to grow post 1998 despite demographic change.
- It is **now 30 years since** those joining the electorate were majority Protestant. Although a Catholic majority of new voters did not materialise there has been a notable plurality of electoral entrants from that community for nearly 3 decades.
- **Why that growth has not resulted in electoral growth** is due to several factors:
 - a) pro-unity voters increasingly voting non-constitutionally
 - b) the slowdown in the Catholic birthrate
 - c) younger Catholics not voting with a growing sense that the republican/nationalist political offer is not as relevant to them as it was/is to their parents and/or grandparents.
- Pro-unity parties do not appear to have **a plan to enhance** electoral fortunes. There has been an over-reliance upon traditional voters and an expectation that a younger generation would follow traditional voting allegiances.
- Sense among younger and what would have been considered traditional pro-unity party voters that both SF and SDLP **offer little** regarding issues such as delayed adulthood, cost of living solutions, rents and house prices resolutions and a 'fixation' up the past such a legacy¹¹.
- Perpetual cultural wars with unionism does not embolden electoral growth and among younger pro-unity voters is less motivating in terms of voting SF/SDLP than is the case for older voters.
- A high share of pro-unity voters who would withdraw support if the party they support collapsed the Assembly. This suggests previous collapses may have harmed SF growth.
- Given SF voters are more likely to be deprived than other party supporters the reliance of those voters upon public services may influence their desire for the Assembly to function/remain unsuspended.
- Those **who are neither unionist nor nationalist** find SF electorally unattractive.
- The failure to raise the share of the electorate in both Northern Ireland and the Republic who rank the constitutional issues as a priority.

Pro-Union Parties

In overall terms the pro-union parties are holding their recent vote share but there is more flux within compared to the pro-unity parties. The TUV continue to grow with modest growth for the UUP.

The DUP's attempts to stop the flow to the TUV has not been as effective as they would have hoped.

TUV maintain 100% of their 2024 vote compared to 77% for DUP and 87.5% for UUP. If the overall performance, for pro-union parties, is as predicted, that would **also suggest** Assembly 2027 would not be an election evidencing a referendum favouring Irish unity. In overall terms.

- DUP are down on their Westminster vote share and maintain 77% of that vote. There is significant leakage at 15.2% to TUV and 5.5% to UUP.
- UUP are up slightly and maintain 87.5% of their 2024 Westminster vote. They would potentially lose 8.1% to TUV and 1.5% to DUP, however leakage to Alliance seems to have stopped.
- TUV are up and maintain 100% of their Westminster vote with gains primarily coming from the DUP and to a lesser extent UUP.

Problematics Pro-Unity Parties

- As has been the case for several elections a significant share of pro-union voters, **in this case 27.6%, vote beyond unionism**. There seems to be no strategic vision to capture/re-capture these voters who tend to be a mix of socially deprived as well as educated, suburban, and socially liberal.
- It is commonly found among sections of the pro-union community that unionism is toxic and lacks a vocabulary for a new Northern Ireland.
- The 3-way split between the unionist parties can and will continue to affect outcomes in terms of seats won.
- Those who would vote to remain in the UK **are less likely** than those who would vote otherwise to know positive facts concerning what the Assembly has and does achieve.
- Again, **there is no unionist strategy** to promote a more positive mood that would encourage a growth in voters, little to nothing regarding the case for the Union and no vision of a future for Northern Ireland.
- **Younger pro-union voters find political party unionism detached** from issues related to delayed adulthood, educational attainment and are seen as overly fixated upon traditional values and the past.
- The voting profile of **pro-union voters is aging**. Unionist parties are increasingly unattractive to younger people and as with the pro-unity group they appear more concerned with **keeping traditional voters 'on-board'** as opposed to developing the voter base.
- The decline in seats held by unionists also **reduces social capital**, resources needed to fight elections and contact with the electorate.

- Those **who are neither unionist nor nationalist** find the DUP electorally unattractive.
- **Interneccine machinations over the Irish sea border**, suspending the Assembly and perpetual cultural wars with SF does not embolden electoral growth.
- The failure to engage in the constitutional debate leaves many unionist voters feeling that unionism's **non-response permits** nationalist and republican commentators to dominate the media narrative regarding constitutional change.

Non-Constitutional Parties

The rise of the non-constitutional parties **since 1998 is noteworthy**. In 1998 the Greens (0.9%) and Alliance (6.5%) shared 7.4% of the vote. By 2022 this had risen to 15.4% (Greens (1.9%)) and Alliance (13.5%)). They are now predicted **to rise to 17.7% largely due to the growth in support for the Greens**. Overall.

- Alliance down slightly but maintain 83.2% of their Westminster vote – losing 1.8% each to TUV and SF, 6.6% to the Greens and 7.1% to PBP.
- **Greens are up to 5.1%** up but only maintain 68.4% from Westminster 2024. They are set to gain the following - 15.8% PBP, 6.6% Alliance and 2.6% each DUP and SDLP.
- The Green Party (NI) has **gained a significant number of new members** since Zack Polanski became leader of the party in England and Wales.

Problematics non-constitutional

- Gaining electoral support West of the Bann and beyond the Belfast Urban Area.
- Having a voter base that includes significant numbers who are pro-union, pro-unity and agnostic regarding the constitutional issue. As these parties capture more pro-unity voters this could cause internal tensions within and lead to challenge by both pro-union and increasingly pro-unity parties.
- The Greens foray into an electoral pact with the SDLP affected their recent electoral fortunes and pushed away pro-union voters.
- Both parties have to be able to manage their diverse electoral bases and also develop their position and meaning of and for non-constitutional politics. Both need to spell out what non-constitutional politics means and what their vision is around jobs, housing and healthcare.

2nd Preference Voting

In terms of second preference voting among those parties who would gain over 10% of transfers.

- Greens gain 11% transfers with the following shares by political parties - 29.7% SF, 16.1% SDLP, 11.0% UUP and 28.7% PBP.
- DUP would gain 13.3% with the following shares by political parties - 30.1% UUP and 46.2% TUV.

- SDLP would gain 18.2% with the following shares by political parties - 60.8% SF and 18.6% Alliance.
- UUP would gain 15.5% with the following shares by political parties - 70.7% DUP and 10.3% TUV.
- Alliance would gain 14.1% with the following shares by political parties - 28.9% SF, 21.1% SDLP, 13.8% UUP and 22.4% Greens.

Table 2: Second preference vote share¹²

Party	2 nd preference vote share
PBP	4.3
SF	4.6
TUV	7.1
Greens	11.0
DUP	13.3
Alliance	14.1
UUP	16.5
SDLP	18.2

Collapsing Stormont

Regarding any potential collapse of Stormont.

- 60% agreed that they would not vote for a party that collapsed the Assembly before election 2027. A mere 12% stated that they would.
- The majority or plurality of party-political voters agreed that they would not vote for a party that brought down the Assembly.
- The highest shares **who would not vote** for a party that brought down the Assembly were Alliance, SDLP, UUP and Sinn Féin voters.

Table 3: Would you vote for a party that brought down the Assembly before 2027 by party vote tomorrow?¹³

	DUP	SF	SDLP	UUP	Alliance
Agree	32.8	51.9	78.4	55.5	70.5
Neither Agree/Disagree	33.6	28.2	16.2	27.4	19.5
Disagree	19.8	15.9	27.4	8.9	4.5
Do Not Know	13.8	3.9	19.5	8.2	6.5

Priorities and Changing Realities

There are evident issues with an Assembly that has political parties rowing in opposite directions regarding constitutional issues. SF and the SDLP seem unwilling to praise and/or highlight the positive changes within Northern Ireland/North post 1998 which is understandable given their narrative that the place is a sectarian construct that cannot change.

Unionism's failure to point to significant real wage growth, growths in employment especially among professional workers, the role Northern Ireland plays in UK food and geopolitical security, specialisms in cybersecurity, fintech and zero emission technology and the affordability of housing and rents compared to the Republic is somewhat bewildering. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that.

- 70% were unaware that waiting lists reduced by 100,000 between April and October 2025.
- 60.6% were unaware that unemployment declined significantly post-1998.
- 34.2% v 41.1% believed such improvements proved that the Assembly could deliver.

Table 4: Did you know that between April and October 2025, around 100,000 cases were treated and removed from NHS waiting lists?

	% share
Yes	30.8%
No	69.2%

Table 5: Did you know that unemployment in Northern Ireland has reduced significantly since the Good Friday Agreement?

	% share
Yes	39.4%
No	60.6%

Table 6: Do the improvements in NHS waiting lists and reduced unemployment prove the Assembly can deliver?

	% share
Yes	34.2%
No	42.1%
Don't know	23.7%


It is obvious that the electorate is conversant with problematic issues in Northern Ireland such as cultural wars, economic inactivity, housing and hospital waiting lists, but it is also evident that they are less conversant with achievements especially around a more

growth-oriented economy, reduced sectarian violence and rising wages. Without the promotion of positives of devolution, the following.

- Increasing shares of the electorate will identify the political class as inept and not serving societal interests.
- SF will not undermine their political opponents in the Republic who claim that they are 'inept' at running departments and ministries.
- SF will not persuade sceptics regarding constitutional change in the Republic that Northern Ireland offers niche markets and sectors that would benefit the southern economy if there were constitutional change.
- Unionist will not persuade the electorate of the links between devolution, the Union and continuing economic growth and social prosperity.
- Unionists will not convince voters in GB that Northern Ireland is critical to the food and geopolitical security of the UK.
- Both unionism and nationalism/republicanism will remain electorally stagnant as they are unlinked to or not identified with **vision, delivery, and solution-seeking**.

Much, of what pertains regarding politics in Northern Ireland relates to cultural division over language and identity. Overall, **75.3% of nationalists** agreed that Irish was part of their cultural identity with a quarter (24.8%) also agreeing that Ulster-Scots was representative of their identity. Among unionists **fewer than ten percent (7.3%)** agreed that Irish was part of their culture with 38.8% agreeing that Ulster-Scots was. Somewhat peculiar findings given place names are commonly Irish and Ulster-Scots words are used by most daily. With 80.9% of unionists rejecting Irish as part of their culture and 48.3% of nationalists rejecting Ulster-Scots it is evident that the everyday relationship with Irish and Ulster-Scots is rejected not because of a lack of acquaintanceship or acceptance but by wider political and oppositional discourses over culture and recognition.

Figure 1: Irish and Ulster-Scots are part of my cultural identity (by identity)



Interestingly **30% of the electorate state that they have more interests in cultures beyond Irish and Ulster-Scots**. The younger age group has the **highest share who agree** with that proposition (33.8%) than disagree (26.5%). In older age groups more disagree than agree with the supposition.

As evidenced here and elsewhere many younger voters are **less concerned or interested in the aggressive and forceful politics of the conflict-generation**. Many view issues such as culture and legacy as less relevant and an evident **form of distraction politics**.

At times it appears that the main political parties expend short-term effort in maintaining voters or trying to recapture those who left them. It seems they have no medium to long-term policies to **capture younger voters** who are confronted by issues regarding increasing rent and house prices, delayed adulthood and are those most likely to be engaging in non-traditional cultural forms.

Table 7: More interest in cultures beyond Irish and Ulster-Scots¹⁴

Age	Strongly Agree/Agree	Neither Agree/Disagree	Strongly Disagree/Disagree
18-34	33.8	33.5	26.5
35-59	30.5	33.9	31.4
60+	27.5	33.3	34.1

When turning to political party supporters the highest share who disagree is found among SF voters (42.5%). Whereas for unionists and SDLP voters the share drops below the average regarding disagreeing that they have more interest in other cultures than Irish and Ulster-Scots.

Interestingly across voters there is a near even three-way split. Further evidence that conflicts over culture and identity are more media speculation or volume raising of the voice of those aggrieved by cultural matters with little to no regard for those who are less rooted in identity tropes and their reproduction despite them constituting a third of the electorate.

Table 8: More interest in cultures beyond Irish and Ulster-Scots

Vote Tomorrow	Strongly Agree/Agree	Neither Agree/Disagree	Strongly Disagree/Disagree
SF	26.6	28.9	42.5
Green	34.9	23.4	38.1
Alliance	34.7	29.2	36.8
<i>Average</i>	<i>32.1</i>	<i>32.2</i>	<i>32.8</i>
SDLP	34.5	32.7	32.1
TUV	27.0	37.3	30.9
DUP	34.2	34.2	26.5
UUP	40.1	23.4	20.1

Cost of Living

Among party voters SF (33.5%) and the Greens (27.0%) have highest share of supporters who have a problem paying at least one household bill 'all or most of the time'. All of the unionist parties, Alliance and SDLP have a majority of voters who rarely or never have a problem paying a household bill.

Table 9: Problem paying at least one household bill

Vote Tomorrow	All the Time/Most of the Time	Rarely/Never
SF	33.5	29.9
Green	27.0	30.2
<i>Average</i>	<i>22.8</i>	<i>47.3</i>
DUP	22.2	51.8
SDLP	22.1	58.4
UUP	20.6	51.3
Alliance	17.5	51
TUV	17.3	59

When examined by age, **a mere 9.0%** of those aged 60+ had a problem paying a household bill **compared to 36.0%** of those aged 18-34.

Table 10: Problem paying at least one household bill

	18-34	35-59	60+
All the Time/Most of the Time	36.0	30	9.0
Rarely/Never	30.4	35.4	70.8

Migrants

Recent events and the growth in racially motivated hate crime encouraged questions that captures attitudes towards migrants in Northern Ireland. The following was observed.

- There was majority agreement that migrants make an important contribution to the NHS and health care system with **53.3% agreeing compared to 23.4% who disagreed.**
- More believed that migrants have poorer qualifications (33.4%) than those born in Northern Ireland (26.5% disagreed). In fact, the ethnic other **has a higher share who hold qualifications** at 44% v 32% compared to the white population.
- A majority believed that migrants are more likely than those born here to live in social housing (54.6 agree v 14.4% who disagree). That again is factually incorrect **with over 85% of the ethnic other owning or renting properties.**
- **A plurality correctly identified that migrants** are more likely to be working than those born in Northern Ireland (**40.3% v 24.6%**). 63.1% of the ethnic other are in work compared to 55.3% born here.

- A small majority agreed that migrants were **critical to many industries** in Northern Ireland (**52.6% agreed v 18% who disagreed**).

Assembly and Executive Priorities

Regarding priorities the **same pertains across several University of Liverpool surveys**. Healthcare and the economy **achieve 52.5% of 1st priority preferences** with constitutional and legacy issues **receiving the lowest share at 2.3% and 0.7% respectively**. Party voters who had above average rankings regarding other issues.

- Climate Change – 5.5% SF and 14.3% Greens.
- Constitutional issues – 5.5% SF, 4.8% Greens and 5.6% TUV.
- Crime – 15% DUP.
- Legacy 1.6% SF.
- Housing 12.7% each SF and Greens.

Table 23: What should the Executive and Assembly's Priorities?

	1st priority of the NI Executive & Assembly	2nd priority of the NI Executive & Assembly
Healthcare Reform	38.3%	25.2%
Economy	24.2%	21.5%
Housing	9.5%	14.1%
Crime/Law & Order	8.4%	11.6%
Education	5.1%	13.5%
Reform of the Executive and Assembly	5.0%	4.2%
Other	3.4%	1.8%
Climate Change	3.0%	3.9%
Constitutional Issues	2.3%	3.5%
Legacy Issues	0.7%	0.7%

Border Poll

There has been a significant growth in media coverage of constitutional issues since Brexit. That event plus demographic change produced an increase in pro-unity sentiment that has now slowed somewhat since the return of the Assembly.

There is the problematic for unionism of failing to counter the short to medium-term growth in support for Irish unity. Why unionists are not countering pro-unity discourse is peculiar. For republicans and nationalists who claimed that 2030 would be the year of a border poll that is increasingly **unlikely**.

The constitutional issue and persuasion either way lies largely within unionist and nationalist/republican hands but **some of that does not**. Unionism requires the British

state to remain committed to Northern Ireland/North and there is potential that a Reform government could **destabilise that commitment**. Much of what the pro-unity camp wishes for is contingent upon standards of living within the Republic not being a disincentive (those conditions **appear to be worsening**). Moreover, the collapse in the Republic's economy in 2008 led to the lowest share of support for Irish unification. As shown below support to remain or leave the UK is contingent, for some respondents, upon cost-of-living conditions and costs. Essentially, constitutional positions are **neither organic nor unrelated to forces** beyond unionist or nationalist/republican control. In sum.

- In University of Liverpool polling since 2017 there has been a 5.6% rise in support for voting for a united Ireland tomorrow.
- Between 2024 and 2025 there has been a small decline in support for Irish unity by 1.2%.
- Support is highest among the younger age group (18-34), but that has to be placed **within the context that the electoral weight** of 18–34-year-olds has and will continue to decline.

Table 12: I would vote for a united Ireland tomorrow (Overall and by age group)

	2017	2023	2024	2025
Irish unity	35	38	41.8	40.6
Remain in the UK	65	62	58.2	59.4
Age	18-34	35-59	60+	
Vote Tomorrow Irish unity	47.3	34.7	17.0	

When examined by party political support and constitutional issues the following.

- **Party support remains as found before in more recent University of Liverpool surveys.** The exception is the Greens who have become more pro-unity, in terms of voters, than previous surveys.
- A significant share of SDLP voters remain undecided **or would vote to remain** in the UK (20.3%)
- Alliance maintains a plurality of voters who are pro-UK (**48% v 27.3%**).
- SF, Alliance Greens and SDLP have the highest shares **who are undecided** or do not know how they would vote tomorrow in a border poll (Figure 3).
- Unionist voters are more committed constitutionally¹⁵.

In term of identity **1 in 10 nationalists** would vote to remain in the UK compared to **8.4% of unionists** who would vote for Irish unity¹⁶.

Again, **we find that the plurality** of those who are neither unionist nor nationalist (**40.9% v 23.2%**) are pro-union.

The neither unionist nor nationalist group have around a third who are undecided compared to **12.8% of nationalists and 4.5% of unionists**¹⁷.

Figure 2: Constitutional Position by Voting Intention




Table 13: I would vote for a united Ireland tomorrow (Identity)


	Irish Unity	Undecided/Do Not Know	Remain UK
Unionist	8.4	4.5	87
Neither	24.2	35	40.9
Nationalist	77	12.8	10.8

Regarding faith and no and other faiths¹⁸.

- 15.4% of Catholics would vote tomorrow **to remain in the UK**
- Compared to 9.1% of Protestants **who would vote for Irish unity**.
- Those of no or other faiths are plurality pro-UK (**40.5% v 26%**).
- With **a third undecided**.

Regarding the issue of identity and voting it is evident that support for remaining in the UK includes a significant section who do not consider themselves as unionist or loyalists (on the 0-5 scale in which 0 equals a respondent either not considering themselves to be either unionist/loyalist or republican/nationalist).

Figure 3: Constitutional Position: Religion/No Religion



- **19.5% who are pro-UK** do not identify as unionist or loyalist.
- This compares to a half as many (**9.5% who are pro-unity** who do not declare as nationalist or republican).
- **69.2% who would vote to remain** within the UK versus **78.4% who would vote** for Irish unity scored three and above (**high identity value**).
- It is assumed that the decline in unionist voters and the secularisation of that community by faith and traditional identities was a weakness that would evolve towards pro-unity perspectives. Surveys since 2017 show no significant evidence **that this is the case**. It is the pro-unity case that has **not grown or grown marginally** among neither unionist nor nationalist or those who are non-religious.

Table 14: Constitutional position by identity


	0	1	2	3	4	5
Vote UK	19.5	2.8	8.4	21.5	16.8	30.9
Vote NI	9.5	5.8	6.1	25.3	22.1	31

Border Poll: Comparing each jurisdiction in a border poll

All respondents were asked what the issues were that would influence their decision-making in a border poll. These questions ranged across issues related to both jurisdictions. The scores obtained ran from 0 (not at all important) to 10 (the most critical issues). A score of ten was achieved as follows¹⁹.

- 46.5% healthcare
- 27.7% political corruption
- 27.1% living standards
- 18.3% public spending

Figure 4: Influence in a Border Poll: Comparing Each Jurisdiction



The following compares Northern Ireland and the Republic over the past twenty years to examine respondent's knowledge of each place and the accuracy of that opinion.

- **Over 40%** neither agreed/disagreed or did not know that rents were higher in Republic (40.1%). Rents in the Republic are significantly higher²⁰.
- Regarding the weekly shop being higher in Northern Ireland 41.3% **rightly identified** that this was incorrect and shopping was more expensive in the Republic.
- **Nearly half believed** new cars were more expensive in NI (44.8%) when in fact the cost is lower²¹.
- Regarding wages being higher in the Republic **44.8% correctly identified that this was the case**.
- Nearly half believed utility bills were higher Northern Ireland (48.4%) when in fact they **are lower**²².
- There was more accuracy regarding Northern Ireland being a place that **you are more likely** to become a homeowner (45.8%).
- 40.5% knew that in past 20 years there has been real wage growth in NI²³.
- 62.3% knew that the cost of living is lower in Northern Ireland.
- Most knew that **house prices are higher** in the Republic (56.3%) and that over past two decades there are now more professional jobs in NI (48.4%).

- **Interestingly 52% v 9.2%** agreed that both places have become increasingly worse at serving public interest.
- Regarding all questions **very significant shares** neither agree/disagree or did not know²⁴.

Table 15: Knowledge of each jurisdiction and change over past 20 years

	Strongly Agree/Agree	Neither/Do not know	Strongly Disagree/Disagree
More likely NI to be a 1 st time homeowner	45.8	30.5	13.7
Real wages have grown in NI	40.5	30.9	28.6
Lower Cost of Living NI	62.3	34.7	2.0
House prices higher in Republic	56.3	37.3	6.5
More professional jobs in NI	48.4	37.6	13
Both place worse at serving public interest	52	38.9	9.2
Rents higher Republic	51.3	40.1	8.6
Weekly shop higher in NI	28.6	41.3	30.2
New car more expensive in NI	28.3	44.8	26.9
Wages higher in Republic	42.7	44.8	12.5
Utility bills higher in NI	32.4	48.9	18.7

I would vote for a united Ireland tomorrow

The following table **only looks at those who would vote for a united Ireland** and asks what issues/changes may affect the consideration to remain in Northern Ireland²⁵.

- Nearly and above 60% stated that **they would consider remaining** in Northern Ireland if public services improved (**62.7%**) or the cost of living was lower in NI (**59%**).
- Between 53.3% and 56% agreed that they would consider remaining in NI if house prices were lower in NI, **if unionist politicians respected Irish culture** and if there was more social housing.

Table 16: Issues that may encourage pro-unity voters to remain in Northern Ireland

	Strongly Agree/Agree	Neither	Strongly Disagree/Disagree
Public Services improved NI	62.7	22.5	13.7
Cost of Living Lower NI	59.0	19.9	20.6
More Social Housing in NI	56.0	25.3	16.4
Unionist politicians respect Irish culture	55.5	24.6	18.6
House Prices Lower NI	53.3	27.8	16.6

Among those who would vote for Irish unity tomorrow or in 15-20 years' time.

- Fewer than 20% are prepared to pay £5k higher taxes if there was Irish unity. 60.7% would not.
- 20.9 and 26.7% would pay £3k higher taxes or higher rent and living costs compared to 53.7% and 48.3% who would not.
- Around 40% would pay £1k higher taxes or private healthcare.

Table 17: Pro-unity consideration of potential cost of Irish unity

	Strongly Agree/Agree	Neither	Strongly Disagree/Disagree²⁶
Prepared to pay 5k more in taxes	17.5	18.0	60.7
Prepared to pay 3k more in taxes	20.9	22.3	53.7
Higher rent and living costs	26.7	22.1	48.3
Prepared to pay 1k more in taxes	38.6	22.4	35.1
Pay Private healthcare	40.1	26.5	29.7

I would not vote for a united Ireland tomorrow or in 15-20 years' time

The following examines under what conditions those **who would not vote** for a united Ireland tomorrow would accept constitutional change.


- A third each would support or not support a united Ireland if public services improved in Republic.
- 28.7% would accept constitutional change if there was power sharing.
- 29.8% would accept constitutional change if it meant more respectful attitudes to British culture.
- 20.6%, 23.6% and 13.5% would accept constitutional change if it meant more social housing, lower cost of living and lower house prices. A plurality or majority disagreed.
- Again, a significant share neither agreed nor disagreed.

Table 18: Issues that may encourage pro-UK voters to accept constitutional change

	Strongly Agree/Agree ²⁷	Strongly Disagree/Disagree	Neither
Public Services improved Republic	32.3	33.8	33.9
Power-Sharing in Dail	28.7	35.1	36.2
Respectful of British Cultural Expression	29.8	37	38
More Social Housing in Republic	20.6	46	33.4
Cost of Living Lower Republic	23.6	50	26.6
House Prices Lower Republic ²⁸	13.5	51	35.4

Regarding paying to remain in the UK the following.

- £1k more in taxes 40% disagreed v 31% agreed that they would do so to remain in the UK
- £3k more taxes 57.3% disagree v 16.6% who agreed that they would do so to remain within the UK.
- £5k more in taxes 64.5% disagreed v 11.7% who agreed that they would do so to remain within the UK.
- The **majority stated that they would not pay higher rents and costs** to remain in the UK (52% v 19.8%).
- Regarding prescriptions 39.6% v 30.5% disagreed that they would do so to remain within the UK²⁹.

Figure 5: Prepared to Pay to Stay in UK (Pro-Union)

Neither agree/disagree or do not know how they would vote in a border poll tomorrow

Those who neither agree/disagree/do not know) how they would vote (**20% of sample**) in a border poll were asked to consider issues that would affect their decision in a border poll.

- **65.4% v 4.7%** stated that the growth in secure well-paid work in Northern Ireland would influence them.
- A functioning Assembly and parity of esteem and mutual respect led to a much higher share who stated this would be influential (**59.2% v 4.4%**).
- Better political and cultural relationships between Northern Ireland and the Republic was an important factor in future decision-making (**57.9% v 3.1%**) as was unionists respecting **other traditions (55.5% v 4.7%)**.
- Nearly 50% did not know or neither agreed/disagreed that higher wages, lower house prices, higher public spending **would persuade them in a referendum**.
- Interestingly, there was more positive attitudes to constructive changes in Northern Ireland as a motivator regarding decision-making than comparable changes and/or attitudes in the Republic.

Table19: What would influence in a Border Poll (Undecided or Do Not Know Vote in a Border Poll tomorrow)?

	Strongly Agree / Agree	Neither / Do not know	Strongly Disagree / Disagree
Growth Secure Well-Paid work NI	65.4	30	4.7
Functioning Assembly and parity of esteem and mutual respect	59.2	36.4	4.4
Better political and cultural relationships with the Republic	57.9	39	3.1
Unionist respect other traditions	55.5	39.8	4.7
Human Rights/Minority Protection	56.1	40	3.9
Lower Cost of Living Republic	35.2	45.0	29.9
Nationalist/Republicans respect other traditions	45.6	46.6	7.8
Higher wages republic	31.2	48.1	20.7
Lower house prices republic	57.2	48.1	3.7
Higher Public Spending Republic	40.5	52.8	6.7
Higher Public Spending NI	31.2	55	13.8

Assembly Reforms


Again, we find high levels of support regarding the reform of the Assembly. With regard to.

- If the Assembly collapses again and the largest parties fail to nominate a first minister & Deputy First Minister, another party should be able to nominate for these positions? **62.4% agreed compared to 26.8%** who disagreed.
- An independent review should be undertaken into how the Executive and Assembly can improve its delivery? **77% agreed compared to 19.3%** who disagreed.
- A Citizens Assembly, that is representative of the whole population, should be set up to look at how the Executive and Assembly can better deliver? **67% agreed to 24% who disagreed.**
- The titles First Minister and Deputy First Minister should be renamed 'Joint first Ministers'? **48.5% agreed and 30.8% disagreed.**
- The procedure for 'cross community' support which means Unionist and Nationalist votes carry more weight than the votes of Others, should be reformed so that all votes are treated equally? **66% agreed and 26.3% disagreed³⁰.**


ENDNOTES

¹ Technical summary available via email p.shirlow@liverpool.ac.uk.


² Vote share of pro-union candidates 1998-2024.



For unionism since 1998 the trend has been downward especially post 2017 – Brexit and suspension of Assembly have been factors.



³ Post 1998 the pro-unity candidates are gaining roughly the same vote share. Since 2017 the trend is generally downward.



Vote share comparison 1998-2024


	Pro-Union Parties	Pro-Unification Parties	Others
1998 NIA	50.8%	39.8%	9.2%
1999 EU	52.3%	45.4%	2.3%
2001 UK	53.0%	42.6%	4.3%
2001 LC	50.0%	41.3%	7.7%
2003 NIA	52.2%	40.1%	7.0%
2004 EU	48.6%	42.2%	9.1%
2005 UK	51.4%	41.6%	6.1%
2005 LC	50.6%	41.8%	7.2%
2007 NIA	48.6%	43.1%	8.3%
2009 EU	49.0%	42.2%	8.8%
2010 UK	50.6%	42.0%	7.0%
2011 NIA	48.0%	42.3%	9.5%
2011 LC	47.3%	43.0%	9.3%
2014 EU	52.6%	38.5%	8.8%
2014 LC	50.7%	40.4%	8.3%
2015 UK	50.2%	39.5%	10.0%
2016 NIA	49.4%	39.0%	11.5%
2017 NIA	45.7%	42.0%	12.4%
2017 UK	49.1%	41.8%	9.0%
2019 LC	44.3%	40.2%	15.6%
2019 EU	42.9%	35.9%	21.1%
2019 UK	43.1%	39.8%	17.2%
2022 NIA	42.0%	41.4%	16.1%
2023 LC	39.8%	43.8%	16.3%
2024 UK	43.3%	40.4%	16.3%


⁴ University of Liverpool General Election Survey 2017.

⁵ University of Liverpool General Election Survey 2024.

⁶ Based upon those born in 1965 etc without considering the potential impact of migration, non-registration and deaths.


⁷ Live births NI 1965-2024.





⁸ Those of no-religion, who were born in Northern Ireland, **are half as likely** as the overall population to state that they are Irish. It could be argued that they are secularising Protestants.

⁹ Expressed as a graph.




¹⁰ A common feature of electoral change since 1998 has been the growth in support for non-constitutional parties. There is evidence of a growing trend among those who wish for a united Ireland voting beyond pro-unity parties. That trend is long-established among pro-UK voters. Unionism suffers more profoundly in vote leakage at 30% compared to close to 20% for nationalist/republican parties.

Voters with a constitutional preference voting beyond nationalist/republican or unionist parties.

	Pro-Unity (vote beyond SF, SDLP, PBP)	Pro-Union (vote beyond DUP, UUP, TUV)
Vote share 2025	18.6	27.6

¹¹ On-going consultation for Civic Space 2 project.


¹² Expressed as a graph.



¹³ Would you vote for a party that brought down the Assembly before 2027 by identity?

	Unionist	Nationalist	Neither
Agree	40.7	58.9	53
Neither Agree/Disagree	29.4	23.8	28.3
Disagree	19.7	13.6	3.4
Do Not Know	10.3	3.8	15.2

¹⁴ As a graph




¹⁵ Table: Vote share constitutional question

	Irish Unity	Undecided/Do Not Know	Remain UK
TUV	4	5.6	90.4
UUP	8.2	8.5	83.5
DUP	11.5	8.1	80.4
Alliance	27.3	24.7	48
Greens	50	20.3	29.7
SDLP	54	25.6	20.3
SF	76.3	15.2	7.5

¹⁶ Identity scale

Those who <u>would not</u> vote for a United Ireland tomorrow	
0 – I do not consider myself to be Unionist/Loyalist	19.5%
1	2.8%
2	8.4%
3	21.5%
4	16.8%
5 – I consider myself to be strongly Unionist/Loyalist	30.9%

Those who <u>would</u> vote for a United Ireland tomorrow	
0 – I do not consider myself to be Nationalist/Republican	9.6%
1	5.8%
2	6.1%
3	25.3%
4	22.1%
5 – I consider myself to be strongly Nationalist/Republican	31.0%

¹⁷ As graph

¹⁸ Table: Constitutional question by faith/no faith

	Irish Unity	Undecided/Do Not Know	Remain UK
Catholic	57.4	27.2	15.4
None/Other	26	32.5	40.5
Protestant	9.1	11.9	79

¹⁹ All respondents comparing NI and Republic

To what extent would Living Standards in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?	
0 – Not at all important	7.6%
1	1.0%
2	1.9%
3	2.3%
4	3.1%
5	9.5%
6	6.3%
7	11.4%
8	17.1%
9	12.7%
10 – Most important matter of all	27.1%

To what extent would Environmental Standards in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?	
0 – Not at all important	9.5%
1	1.4%
2	3.1%
3	4.5%
4	7.2%
5	14.6%
6	10.4%
7	14.0%
8	12.7%
9	8.6%
10 – Most important matter of all	14.1%

To what extent would House Prices in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?	
0 – Not at all important	7.5%
1	1.2%
2	3.0%
3	2.1%
4	5.3%
5	12.5%
6	7.6%
7	12.6%
8	16.0%
9	12.1%
10 – Most important matter of all	20.2%

To what extent would levels of Public Spending in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?

0 – Not at all important	6.5%
1	1.0%
2	1.3%
3	2.9%
4	4.8%
5	13.1%
6	9.7%
7	13.1%
8	17.7%
9	11.6%
10 – Most important matter of all	18.3%

To what extent would respect for Human Rights in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?

0 – Not at all important	6.2%
1	1.0%
2	1.0%
3	2.3%
4	4.5%
5	10.0%
6	6.8%
7	9.7%
8	13.7%
9	13.6%
10 – Most important matter of all	31.1%

To what extent would respect for Minority Communities in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?

0 – Not at all important	7.4%
1	1.2%
2	2.5%
3	3.1%
4	4.7%
5	12.4%
6	8.6%
7	11.0%
8	13.4%
9	12.2
10 – Most important matter of all	23.5

To what extent would <u>Educational Standards</u> in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?	
0 – Not at all important	6.0%
1	0.5%
2	1.6%
3	2.7%
4	3.2%
5	8.8%
6	5.2%
7	10.4
8	16.2%
9	17.5%
10 – Most important matter of all	27.9%

To what extent would <u>Healthcare</u> in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?	
0 – Not at all important	5.2%
1	0.7%
2	0.4%
3	0.6%
4	2.6%
5	5.5%
6	3.1%
7	6.2%
8	10.9%
9	18.3%
10 – Most important matter of all	46.5%

To what extent would each state's relationship with the <u>European Union</u> influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?	
0 – Not at all important	9.7%
1	1.6%
2	2.6%
3	2.6%
4	4.3%
5	14.6%
6	8.4%
7	13.3%
8	15.1%
9	9.9%
10 – Most important matter of all	17.8%

To what extent would each state's relationship with the Rest of World influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?	
0 – Not at all important	7.7%
1	0.7%
2	1.4%
3	2.4%
4	4.4%
5	13.4%
6	10.0%
7	15.3%
8	16.9%
9	10.5%
10 – Most important matter of all	17.3%

To what extent would Social & Cultural Values in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?	
0 – Not at all important	6.8%
1	0.7%
2	1.9%
3	2.1%
4	4.5%
5	12.4%
6	8.6%
7	14.0%
8	18.3%
9	12.1%
10 – Most important matter of all	18.7%

To what extent would the level of Political Corruption in each state influence your decision in how you would vote in a border poll?	
0 – Not at all important	6.1%
1	0.3%
2	0.7%
3	2.1%
4	3.7%
5	10.2%
6	7.8%
7	10.9%
8	17.0%
9	13.5%
10 – Most important matter of all	27.7%

²⁰ The average rent for a 2 bed in Belfast is £11,292. In Dublin its £27,627 (<https://cy.ons.gov.uk/visualisations/housingpriceslocal/N09000003/> and 2025-Q3-rentalprice-daftreport.pdf).


²¹ A new Honda Civic 2.0 I-MMD E HEV costs £40738 in the Republic compared to £34000 in Northern Ireland (<https://www.donedeal.ie/cars/Honda/Civic/2025> and

https://www.arnoldclark.com/new-cars/honda/civic/2-0-ehev-advance-5dr-cvt/0/ref/blk_skhd97z7ky3mqfpl).


²² The average household gas bill in NI is £970. In the Republic it is £1363 (<https://powertoswitch.co.uk/average-costs-of-energy-bills-for-towns-in-northern-ireland-2024/> and <https://selectra.ie/energy/guides/billing/average-gas-electricity-bill>)

²³ Between 2002 and 2024 wages when adjusted for inflation rose higher in Northern Ireland than any UK region (<https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8456/>).


²⁴ As graph




25 As graph



26 As graph



²⁷ As graph



²⁸ All questions and responses.

I would be more likely to accept constitutional change if House Prices in the Republic of Ireland were lower. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 Years time.)

Strongly Agree/Agree	13.5%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	51%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	35.4%

I would be more likely to accept constitutional change if the Cost of Living in the Republic of Ireland was Lower. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	23.4%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	50%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	26.6%

I would be more likely to accept constitutional change if Southern Politicians were more respectful of British Cultural Expression. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	29.8%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	37%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	33%

I would be more likely to accept constitutional change if more Social Housing was available in the Republic of Ireland. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	20.6%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	46%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	33.4%

I would be more likely to accept constitutional change if Public Services in the Republic of Ireland improved. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	32.3%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	33.8%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	33.9%

I would be more likely to accept constitutional change if Unionists were part of a power-sharing administration in the Dail. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	28.7%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	35.1%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	36.2%

²⁹ All questions and responses constitutional costs.

I would be prepared to pay £1,000 in additional taxes for Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	31%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	40.3%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	28.6%

I would be prepared to pay £3,000 in additional taxes for Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	16.6%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	57.3%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	26.2%

I would be prepared to pay £5,000 in additional taxes for Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	11.7%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	64.5%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	23.8%

I would be prepared to pay Private Health Insurance for Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom. (You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	26%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	42.3%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	31%

I would be prepared to pay for Prescriptions for Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom.

(You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	30.5%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	39.6%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	30%

I would be prepared to pay Higher Rent and Living Costs for Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom.

(You stated you would not vote for a United Ireland, either tomorrow or in 15-20 years time)

Strongly Agree/Agree	19.8%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	52%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	28%

³⁰ Assembly reform findings

If the Assembly collapses again and the largest parties fail to nominate a first minister & Deputy First Minister, another party should be able to nominate for these positions?

Strongly Agree/Agree	62.4%
Strongly Agree/Disagree	10.7%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	26.8%

An independent review should be undertaken into how the Executive and Assembly can improve its delivery

Strongly Agree/Agree	77%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	3.8%
Neither agree nor disagree/Don't Know	19.3%

A Citizens Assembly, that is representative of the whole population, should be set up to look at how the Executive and Assembly can better deliver

Strongly Agree/Agree	67%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	9%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	24%

The British and Irish Governments should establish a 'Constitutional Convention' made up of civic society groups, businesses, charities and interested parties to look at how the Executive and Assembly can deliver better.

Strongly Agree/Agree	56.1%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	16.5%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	27.4%

If a party were to collapse the Assembly before the 2027 election, I would not vote for that party in the election.

Strongly Agree/Agree	48%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	11.8%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	40.1%

MLAs are required to identify as Unionist, Nationalist or Other. In certain 'cross community' decisions, the votes of Nationalist and Unionist MLAs are more powerful than the votes of Others. What is your view of this?

It is unfair and unnecessary	45%
It is unfair but necessary	34.6%
It is fair and necessary	20.5%

The titles First Minister and Deputy First Minister should be renamed 'Joint first Ministers.'

Strongly Agree/Agree	48.5%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	20.5%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	30.8

The requirement for MLAs to identify as Unionist, Nationalist or Other should be removed

Strongly Agree/Agree	49.8%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	20.3%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	30%

The procedure for 'cross community' support which means Unionist and Nationalist votes carry more weight than the votes of Others, should be reformed so that all votes are treated equally.

Strongly Agree/Agree	66%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	8.6%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	26.3%

If a policy is supported by the votes of 60% of all MLAs in the Assembly, that should be enough to demonstrate cross community support.

Strongly Agree/Agree	52.2%
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	16.5%
Neither Agree nor Disagree/Don't Know	31.5%