WORKSHOP: War and Identity in the Balkans and the Middle East

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Title: “KRVatska”, “Branitelji”, “Žrtve”: (Re-)framing Croatia’s politics of memory and identity

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“KRVatska”, “Branitelji”, “Žrtve”: (Re-)framing Croatia’s politics of memory and identity

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Abstract
This paper explores the development of Croatian memory politics and the construction of a new Croatian identity in the aftermath of the 1990s war for independence. Using the public “face” of memory – monuments, museums and commemorations – I contend that Croatia’s narrative of self and self-sacrifice (hence “KRVatska” – a portmanteau of “blood/krv” and “Croatia/Hrvatska”) is divided between praising “defenders”/“branitelji”, selectively remembering its victims/“žrtve”, and silencing the Serb minority. While this divide is partially dependent on geography and the various ways the Croatian War for Independence came to an end in Dalmatia and Slavonia, the “defender” narrative remains preeminent. As well, I discuss the division of Croatian civil society, particularly between veterans’ associations and regional minority bodies, which continues to disrupt amicable relations among the Yugoslav successor states and places Croatia in a generally undesired but unshakable space between “Europe” and the Balkans.
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<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>FRMNAT</td>
<td>Framing the Nation and Collective Identity in Croatia: Ritual Politics and the Cultural Memory of Twentieth Century Traumas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica/*Croatian Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>*Jugoslovenska narodna armija/*Yugoslav People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWIC</td>
<td>Key-word-in-context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDH</td>
<td>*Nezavisna država Hrvatska/*Independent State of Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSK</td>
<td>*Republika Srpska Krajina/*Republic of Serbian Krajina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>*Srpski demokratski forum/*Serb Democratic Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>*Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske/*Social Democratic Party of Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNV</td>
<td>*Srpsko narodno vijeće/*Serb National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDVDR</td>
<td>*Udruga dragovoljaca i veterana Domovinskog rata Republike Hrvatske/*Association of Patriotic War Volunteers and Veterans of the Republic of Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YIHR</td>
<td>Youth Initiative for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZVO</td>
<td>*Zajedničko vijeće općina/*Joint Council of Municipalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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I. Introduction
The aftermath of the Croatian War of Independence (known locally as the “Homeland War/Domovinski rat”) from 1991 to 1995 signalled a dramatic change in the state’s self-image from one of a suppressed nation in the crumbling Serbian-centric Yugoslav federation to one of an independent, democratic country that defended itself against “Serbian aggression” and a totalitarian communist regime. For all the destruction caused and suffering endured during four years of war, there is still a dearth of literature dealing with Croatia’s experiences during and after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, particularly with its post-war experiments in identity construction. In contrast, endless volumes have been written detailing the conflict in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, the chain of command leading to Slobodan Milošević’s rump Yugoslavia, and ongoing American and European interventions in the region, providing a wide range of perspectives from victims, perpetrators, bystanders and outsiders.

What, then, is brought to light when one investigates the Croatian side of the story? How has Croatian identity been shaped by the “Homeland War”, and is a blind eye being turned to elements of Croatia’s construction of its master commemorative narrative of the war that still provoke tensions across generations and ethnic boundaries? This paper attempts to address these questions using insights from several months of fieldwork between July 2017 and March 2018 investigating the culture and politics of remembrance in Croatia. I argue here that the Croatian state, even twenty-three years after the end of the Homeland War, is taking steps to rid itself whether through neglect or intentional destruction of its Yugoslav past while creating an idolising culture around those who participated in the war, referred to collectively as “defenders/branitelji”. In doing so, the Croatian state is also jeopardising the memories of victims, Serb and Croat, and silencing the voices of its minority populations despite long-standing institutional and legal guarantees of their various social and political rights. Below, I discuss three key elements of contemporary Croatian memory and identity construction through the lens of the Homeland War, namely sacrifice (KRVatska), defence and defenders (odbrana i branitelji) and suffering and victims (stradanja i žrtve)

II. The public face of Croatian memory – “KRVatska”
How Croatia remembers its violent struggle for independence varies across region, class, gender and nationality, among other factors. Though the reins of government have been passed back and forth between the conservative Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), founded by the first Croatian President Franjo Tuđman in 1989, and the liberal Social Democratic Party of Croatia (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP), a successor party of the League of Communists of Croatia, a general pattern of memorialisation, if not valorisation, of the Homeland War can be
observed. For many Croats, three key events in the timeline of the war stand out as key turning points and as points of memory, or in the words of Pierre Nora (1989), *lieux de mémoire*; these are namely the sieges of Vukovar in eastern Slavonia and of Dubrovnik in southern Dalmatia beginning in 1991 and Operation Storm (*Operacija Oluja*) in August 1995, which “liberated” much of the Croatian littoral, Dalmatia and Lika from the remnants of the breakaway Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK), an ethnic Serb statelet with its wartime capital in Knin affiliated with Milošević’s rump Yugoslavia.

Nora defines *lieux de mémoire* as “… turning point[s] where consciousness of a break with the past is bound up with the sense that memory has been torn – but torn in such a way as to pose the problem of the embodiment of memory in certain sites where a sense of historical continuity persists”; he continues, “There are *lieux de mémoire*, sites of memory, because there are no longer *milieux de mémoire*, real environments of memory” (1989, 7). In the context of Croatian cultures of remembrance, as there is no singular but at least a mainstream, and at that quite conservative, culture of remembrance, this implies that the events that took place in Vukovar, Dubrovnik and Knin serve as tectonic shifts in not only the trajectory of the Homeland War but also in the wider scheme of Croatia’s “thousand-year history”. Indeed, the traumatic events of November 1991 (the fall of Vukovar to Serb paramilitaries and the Yugoslav People’s Army and the massacre of some 260 civilians and fighters in the nearby Ovčara farm) and August 1995 (the defeat of the RSK and “liberation” of Lika and Dalmatia) are commemorated annually and attract upwards of 80,000 spectators – *branitelji*, families of fallen defenders and victims, and members of the Croatian diaspora – as in the case of the twentieth anniversary of Operation Storm in 2015 (Milekić 2015).

The bookmarking of the Maksimir riots between supporters of Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade fans in May 1990 and the end of the war with the signing of the Erdut Agreement in November 1995, which peaceably ended the conflict in Slavonia and established a transitional UN protectorate in eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem (Sirmum), signal respectively the beginning of the end of Croatia’s life as a Yugoslav republic and the ultimate restoration of Croatian independence. Croatian independence marks a perceived continuity with both the first Croatian monarchy under King Tomislav I Trpimirović in 925 CE, ending in union with Hungary in 1102, and the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna država Hrvatska*, NDH), a fascist puppet state of Hitler’s Third Reich which existed from 1941 until its defeat by Yugoslav Partisans under Josip Broz Tito in 1945 and the unconditional surrender of Germany to Allied forces. The pride in Croatia’s independence has permeated throughout both popular and political culture, as noted in the revival of fascist slogans – namely “ready for the homeland/za dom spremni” – in monuments (Milekić 2017a), football hooliganism (Brentin 2016), folk
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music (Senjković and Dukić 2005) and heavy metal (Baker 2009), as well as in Tuđman’s repeated claim of the “thousand-year-old dream/tisućgodišnji san” of Croatian independence throughout the 1990s. Some of the resistance to Croatia’s accession to the European Union in 2013 may also be attributed to its recent experience as a sub-unit of the larger Yugoslav federation and to Tuđman’s policy of “isolationist nationalism”, but as Jović argues, in Croatia, “Isolation from Europe [was] no longer seen as a viable option but as a road to decay” (2006, 86).

Traditional aspects of Croatian identity date from the origins of the Croat nation and include a keen awareness of independence (as noted above), Roman Catholicism, the Croatian language and pride in Croatian literary heritage. These elements are visible in a significant number of monuments and memorial placards scattered about the country. In my fieldwork driving upwards of 6,000 kilometers around Croatia (see Appendix 1) in various trips in August and November 2017 and March 2018, I noticed that almost every village from Dalmatia through Lika and Kordun and into Slavonia featured at least one crucifix at the edge and centre of town, and in many monuments to the Homeland War, the cross was a central element of the memorial design.

Figure 1: Sacrifice as an element of Croatian identity and memory: Pakrac, Maslenica, Široka Kula

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Blood, whether of Christ or the Croats, has been integrated into the sacrificial imagery of the fallen soldier in Yugoslav memorials and vicariously through the crucifixion of Jesus in Croatian war monuments. Discourses of victimhood in speeches made at commemorations for the Homeland War occasionally suggest that those who died in the conflict were not just victims, but victims for the cause of Croatian independence. Martyrdom, victimhood and sacrifice are implied in the term “fallen/palim”, which features on older Yugoslav memorial placards, as well. Perhaps the clearest example of the bloody imagination of the Homeland War is Boris Ljubičić’s “KRVatska” poster, a portmanteau of the words krv – blood – and Hrvatska – Croatia. This poster is prominently displayed in the Homeland War exhibition at the Fortress Imperijal in Dubrovnik, yet whose blood has been spilled remains unclear.

Figure 2: Boris Ljubičić’s “KRVatska”: Dubrovnik

Religious symbolism is also present in the engraved text of a handful of memorials across Croatia. Several monuments feature the unique Croatian Angular Glagolitic script, created by brothers Saints Cyril and Methodius in the ninth century CE, which democratised access to liturgical writing for the (selectively literate) common people. The memorial cross at the Vuka estuary in Vukovar, dedicated in October 1998, bears in Glagolitic the phrase “He who dies with honour lives forever/Navik on živi ki zgine pošteno”, attributed to Petar IV Zrinski, a seventeenth-century Ban (Duke/Viceroy) of Croatia executed in 1671 upon accusations of high treason against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Others may
bear the names of towns in Glagolitic script, particularly at memorial sites marked by religious symbols and insignia.

Modern elements of Croatian identity, in comparison, are defined by significant tensions between various political and social factions, including pro-Western, liberal non-governmental organisations like the Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR Hrvatksa) and more conservative associations, including In the Name of the Family/U ime obitelji and the Association of Patriotic War Volunteers and Veterans of the Republic of Croatia/Udruga dragovoljaca i veterana Domovinskog rata Republike Hrvatske (UDVDR). Many political divisions also stem from familial affiliations dating to the Second World War; it is generally perceived that those whose families sided with the NDH have a greater tendency to vote for the conservative HDZ, while former Partisans and their families tend to vote for the Social Democrats. Supporters of one or the other side of the political spectrum occasionally express their beliefs through street art, graffiti or vandalising public spaces. Erin Armi Kaipanen notes, “Unofficial mnemonic initiatives, and street art or graffiti more specifically, question the ‘naturalness’ and authority of dominant mnemonic initiatives”; these highlight “tension between the official and unofficial because of the plurality of public memory” (2007, 57). In Croatia, the “artifice” of the Yugoslav past has resulted in the defacement, neglect or destruction of various monuments dating from 1945 to the 1980s. Several monuments I documented throughout the country also featured the crossed “U” symbol of the Ustaša movement that controlled the NDH during the Second World War, signifying an intolerance of socialist histories and an undercurrent of fascist identity within the modern Croatian state. One-third of the Yugoslav monuments I documented by November 2017 (23 of 69) were destroyed or in “poor” or “okay” condition, while others, mostly smaller memorial placards/spomen-ploče were left alone but not necessarily maintained. Figure 1 above demonstrates the contrast between the gentle neglect of some Partisan monuments in Slavonia and those of the modern Croatian state, while Figure 3 below highlights the intentional destruction and vandalism of Yugoslav memorials in Lika and Dalmatia.

1 These are different concepts – not all street art is considered vandalism, nor is all vandalism of any artistic value. For more on the various definitions of street art and graffiti, see (Gómez 1993).
Figure 3: Erasing the Yugoslav past: Kom, Žažvić


The movement away from identifying with a common Yugoslav past to a unique Croatian state narrative is also embodied in the Croatian constitution. Article 142, Paragraph 2 (under Association and Dissociation) reads, “Any procedure for the association of the Republic of Croatia into alliances with other states, if such association leads, or may lead to, a renewal of a South Slavic state union or to any form of consolidated Balkan state is hereby prohibited” (Sabor 2010). Accession to the European Union on 1 July 2013 stands, too, as a lieu de mémoire, albeit a contested and yet unsettled one, marking Croatia’s shift toward a wider European and away from a Balkan identity, which it eschews. Fernández suggests a mixture of suspicion and ambivalence of Croats toward the European Union, claiming, “Participants were largely unimpressed by Croatia’s membership in the European Union. There was no excitement over the nation’s new status as [a] European member state, but there was no regret either” (2017, 185). Recent conservative governments have made attempts to remove references to Yugoslav history in street and place names, particularly in Zagreb, where an initiative headed by Assembly member Zlatko Hasanbegović, a controversial historian and briefly Minister of Culture in 2016, and approved by long-time mayor Milan Bandić led to the renaming of Marshall Tito Square/Trg maršala Tita to Republic of Croatia Square/Trg Republike Hrvatske (Milekić 2017b); similarly, the city of Korenica removed its prefix “Titova” shortly after the start of the Homeland War in 1991. Giorgio Comai recently published an interactive map showing streets across the former Yugoslavia still named after or referring to Josip Broz Tito; in Croatia, almost none remain in Slavonia and Dalmatia, the

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2 Own translation from Croatian original.
regions most affected by war, while the vast majority of streets still bearing Tito’s name lie in Istria, Zagreb and Hrvatsko Zagorje, which sustained little to no damage during the conflict (Comai 2017).

**Figure 4: Streets and squares dedicated to Tito (as of July 2017)**

![Map of streets and squares dedicated to Tito](https://giocomai.github.io/TitoOnTheMap/)


This map contrasts neatly with my own, which documents monuments across Croatia (except in Istria, which was not visited as part of my fieldwork due to its relatively limited significance in the course of the Homeland War). My work demonstrates a wide proliferation of monuments created during and after the war, particularly in Slavonia and Dalmatia, with thirty-six memorials or placards in Vukovar and Ovčara alone, and 160 in total across the parts of Croatia I was able to visit in the course of my field visits.
Figure 5: Monuments dedicated to the Homeland War and Croatian independence (as of March 2018)


This indicates at the very least an intentional replacement, if not total erasure, of a past no longer seen as Croatian with one that is uniquely Croatian. It is nevertheless important to remember that while Croatia was part of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, too, was part of Croatia. Following sections will detail more specifically who and what within the context of Croatian remembrance practices toward the Homeland War are being remembered and who or what, in addition to Yugoslavia, is being forgotten.

III. Remembering the defenders – “Branitelji”
The most striking element of the Croatian cultural memory of the Homeland War is the predominance of the narrative of self-defence against aggression by Serbia, Montenegro and the Yugoslav People’s Army. The annual commemoration on 5 August of the successful Operation Storm in Knin has been declared a national holiday as Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Day of Croatian Defenders/Dan pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti i Dan hrvatskih branitelja. On this date, politicians, members of civil society and the public gather at Trg Ante Starčevića in the town centre and observe a military parade leading up the winding path to the Knin fortress, from which one can view strategic routes leading toward Split and the Croatian littoral, Lika and Herzegovina, which lies just beyond
Dinara, the country’s tallest mountain. Throughout the town and at the fortress, crowds are greeted by hundreds of flags, whether state, military or paramilitary, and speeches are given in remembrance of the men (and in rare instances women) who “defended” and “liberated” Croatia from “Serbian aggression”. Knin is alive with song, dance and barbecue, with the occasional “Za dom spremni” salute (which until the recent election of a nonpartisan mayor was relatively tolerated behaviour) or folksong praising the NDH. Magnets are sold depicting President Franjo Tudman and the white-then-red chequerboard/šahovnica coat of arms (white-then-red represented the NDH, whereas red-then-white is more symbolic of the modern Croatian state), and T-shirts are widely available with various military insignia. Major newspapers feature separate inserts and posters depicting maps of military movements during Storm and new Croatian Army uniforms with integrated technologies developed and built in Croatia.

The vast majority of monuments across the country dedicated to the Homeland War, regardless of location, mention defenders/branitelji or remember individuals who fell in the course of the liberation of Croatia. The official Registry of Croatian Veterans documented as of 2015 503,122 individuals who participated in the defence of Croatia during the Homeland War, but not all officially qualify as branitelji (Ljubojević 2015), which I discuss below. Of 113 war monuments surveyed by November 2017, 47 were dedicated specifically to defenders (and only defenders), while eleven were dedicated to defender and civilian victims, and only ten to civilian victims. Preliminary analysis of data collected in March 2018 also points toward this trend of overemphasising the sacrifices of soldiers in comparison to civilian victims. The term branitelj appears to be a uniquely Croatian term used only in the context of the Homeland War; the Yugoslav Partisans who participated in the Second World War are commonly referred to in monuments as “fighters/borci”, whereas similar terms in the mutually intelligible Serbian and Bosnian languages might include branilac – defender - or vojnik - soldier. The origin of this term is somewhat obscure in relevant literature, but the first reference to branitelj in the monuments I have documented occurs in 1993 at the Fortress Imperijal on Srd, a mountain overlooking the Old Town/Stari grad of Dubrovnik.

The Law on Croatian Defenders of the Homeland War and Their Family Members/Zakon o hrvatskim braniteljima iz Domovinskog rata i članovima njihovih obitelji, first promulgated in 1994 and subsequently amended in 2017, defines “defender” as:

“(1) […] a person who participated in the organised defence of the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia as:

a) a member of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (National Guard, Croatian Army, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Croatian Defence Forces)

b) a member of the Armed Forces of National Defence who was directly engaged as a member of the combat sector for at least 100 days in the period from 30 July 1991 to 31 December 1991

c) a member of the Armed Forces of National Defence who did not have the obligation to participate in the reserve or did not have the obligation to serve a military term if he was directly engaged as a member of the combat sector for at least 30 days in the period from 30 July 1991 to 31 December 1991

d) a member of the Armed Forces of National Defence who was directly engaged as a member of the combat sector and who died during the period from 30 July 1991 to 31 December 1991
The Law further defines various other participants in the Homeland War, including volunteers, mortally wounded Croatian defenders, mortally wounded persons in defence of Croatian sovereignty, killed defenders, detainees, missing defenders, missing persons in defence of Croatian sovereignty, Croatian war invalids, participants (those without “defender” status) and victims or “suffered/stradalnici” of the Homeland War. It also details the many privileges and rights granted to these veterans and their families, among them medical care, social insurance, pensions and business grants, but says little about the rights of war victims; even twenty-three years after the end of the Homeland War, no such law on the rights of civilian victims has been agreed upon and enacted. Koska and Matan describe the close ties between veterans’ associations and the early modern Croatian state under Tuđman and refer to defenders as “deserving” citizens (2017, 135-136), whose social leverage was significantly increased through affiliations with the HDZ throughout the 1990s. This has in many ways resulted in an abrasive, masculine discourse around the war that provides little space for criticism, and despite shifts in civil society toward liberal, Western European norms in the period leading to Croatia’s eventual accession to the EU in 2013, since then, much of the popular discourse has regressed in a form of “conservative revolution” (Koska and Matan 2017, 121). As such, the gendered aspects of this narrative should be more thoroughly investigated in future research; from my field visits, no monuments appeared to bear the feminine form of “defender”, braniteljica, but a memorial placard at the Ovčara Memorial Centre outside Vukovar noted, “On this place in 1991, Croatian defenders, children, women and the elderly were captured, tortured and killed in Ovčara” [emphasis own]⁴. On the other hand, an exhibition in the Croatian House/Hrvatski dom in Glina did show images of women wearing combat fatigues, but this appears to be a rare exception to the otherwise male-dominant history of warfare. Some exceptions do exist, particularly in the more gender-neutral commemoration of the Yugoslav Partisan fighters, many of whom were women encouraged to participate in battle (Pantelić 2013).

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³Own translation from Croatian original.

⁴Own translation from Croatian original. Refer to point “Ovčara 2” on the “Republic of Croatia” monument filter on www.taylormcconnell.com/croatian-monuments.
The sanctity of the defender narrative is also embodied in the 2000 Declaration on the Homeland War, which describes the war as “just and legitimate, and not an aggressive war or war of conquest against anyone, in which it defended its territory from Greater Serbian aggression within internationally recognised borders”⁵ (Sabor 2000), and in the 2006 Declaration on Operation Storm, which claimed to correct and “[defend] the historical truth” of Oluja adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and to acknowledge the legitimacy of the military action undertaken against the RSK in August 1995 (Sabor 2006). Oluja had been coordinated in large part by Croatian General Ante Gotovina, who had been indicted by the ICTY in 2001 for crimes against humanity, among other charges, during the Operation; upon his subsequent arrest in the Canary Islands in 2005 and initial guilty verdict in 2011 and sentencing to twenty-four years in prison, Croatian veterans mobilised to clear his name and to venerate him as a saviour of the fledgeling Croatian state. When acquitted and released the following year, Gotovina received a hero’s welcome in Zagreb, not unlike the reception granted to radical Serbian politician Vojislav Šešelj upon his return to Belgrade on temporary medical release from the United Nations Detention Unit of Scheveningen prison in 2014. I still recall “Gotovina - Heroj” posters depicting the general in full military uniform while travelling along the Adriatic coast from Zadar to Split in May 2013.

⁵ Own translation from Croatian original.
Commemorations held in Knin and Vukovar since the war have varied in attendance and tone, but in general, the idolisation of Croatian veterans has been a consistent theme, particularly since Croatia’s accession to the EU in July 2013. In some ways, Croatia’s conservative retreat, following a pattern in recent years across Central and Eastern EU member states, has fostered an environment more amenable to commemorating the military victories of the Croatian defenders over the victims of their and their enemies’ actions. Using transcripts of speeches made by politicians, veterans and religious figures at these commemorations collated by the Framing the Nation and Collective Identity in Croatia (FRAMNAT) project at the University of Rijeka, clear patterns emerge in the content of these events. Key-word-in-context (KWIC) analysis indicates 493 references to “Croat(s)” or “Croatia” in speeches made in Knin between 2014 and 2017, 126 to the “homeland” or the “Homeland War”, 118 to “defenders” and 85 to the “state”. In comparison, only 27 references were made to “victims”, of which some reference was made to “victims for freedom” (not “martyrs”), “victims of Greater Serbian aggression”, “victims of the Homeland War” or “sacrificed [victims] in the dimension of Jesus’ cross”. Almost no reference was made to Serb victims of the war, which as noted above would call into question the honourable, venerated status of Croatian veterans, who in some instances have been referred to as “knights/vitezi”, indicating a narrative continuity with Croatia’s medieval past.

In what can only be described as an outwardly confusing circumstance, the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Vukovar/Dan sjećanja na žrtvu Vukovara, an unofficial holiday each 18 November, also elevates the defender narrative over that of (supposedly civilian) victims, to whom the date is dedicated. Though the speeches take a more religious than political tone in comparison to the Knin celebrations (indeed, almost all speeches made since 2014 are by local or national Catholic leaders), branitelji are mentioned more frequently – 38 times from 2014 to 2017 – than victims/žrtve – 29 times. Perhaps unsurprisingly, “Croat/s” and “Croatia” are the most frequent term used in these speeches – 99 times – closely followed by “Vukovar” – 93 times. When I first publicly questioned this juxtaposition of the defender narrative with a day of remembering victims on Twitter, I was accused of “talking to butchers” by a then-faceless user. I, however, am not alone in being attacked for pointing out contradictions in the Croatian commemorative process, as will be discussed in the following section.

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6 Three monuments in Split, Pakovo Selo and Bjelovar used the phrase “vitez” in reference to fallen Croatian defenders. Refer to points “Split 1”, “Pakovo Selo 1” and “Bjelovar 2” on the “Republic of Croatia” monument filter on www.taylormcconnell.com/croatian-monuments.

7 My original Tweet read: “I find it really interesting but also mildly confusing that in a lot of these commemorations that "branitelji" are mentioned before "žrtve". Narrative is key.” The user @Vugica responded first with “They were captured&tortured Croat.soldiers which is against Int.Law. War happens, is not declared!” and later with “@TMcConnell_SSPS Balkan is badly needing clever people. who talks to you anyways? butchers,
IV. Forgetting the victims – “Žrtve”

The absence of victim voices from the overall narrative of the Homeland War, as rightly stated by another faceless Twitter user, can be attributed to the fact that “most of the veterans are still alive and can make themselves heard, while the victims can be remembered but cannot speak for themselves”\(^8\). This perception, however, is challenged by the culture of remembrance that has emerged around the Holocaust, in which many ways has come to dominate the field of memory studies, indicating a sense that while the victims are indeed long dead, their voices can still be heard (David 2013; Gutwein 2009; Kucia 2016; MacDonald 2002). Holocaust museums carry mementos – diaries, photos, glasses, shoes, jewellery and hair – of victims and present their stories without their physical presence. Though no truly authoritative museum to the Homeland War yet exists, most exhibitions, such as that at the Utvrđa Imperijal in Dubrovnik, the Memorial Centre for the Homeland War in Vukovar or the Memorial House to Croatian Defenders on Trpinjska cesta in Borovo, show images of the physical destruction from Serbian, Montenegrin or Yugoslav shelling, but primarily they continue to elevate the defender narrative described above. The only exception to the dozens of museums I visited between July 2017 and March 2018 (see Appendix 2) is the Ovčara Memorial Centre, specifically dedicated to the 260+ victims taken from the Vukovar hospital and tortured and killed in an outlying farm. The images of each victim is illuminated as one walks around the room, with personal mementos placed under a glass case on the ground, which otherwise is paved with a mixture of concrete and bullet shells. In the centre of the room, small lights surround a black vortex, around which the names of victims swirl into the ground. Dante’s *Inferno* comes to mind when watching the names disappear below into memory and oblivion.

Sites of mass graves are commonly marked with large black marble slabs featuring a dove of peace carved through the top, from which lines depicting the Christian cross emanate. These sculptures, designed by artist Slavomir Drinković, are referred to as “cracked birds/napukle ptice” and appear more frequently in areas of heavy fighting during the Homeland War, particularly in eastern Slavonia and northern Dalmatia (Maxportal 2016). At the foot of the monument is inscribed, “In memory of the (number) (Croatian defenders and/or civilian victims) from (location), killed in the Greater Serbian aggression against the Republic of Croatia. (Location and date of massacre), The Croatian Nation, (date).”\(^9\)

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\(^8\) See [https://twitter.com/moncur96/status/931862842810146816](https://twitter.com/moncur96/status/931862842810146816).

\(^9\) Own translation from Croatian original.
In many instances, the distinction between victim and defender is blurred. In the course of the Homeland War, an estimated 4,508 civilians lost their lives, while 6,788 armed participants were killed (IWPR 2006). This does not take into account Serbs who died during the war, estimated by the Serbian NGO Veritas at 5,186 as of February 2014, of whom 1,300 were civilians (Veritas 2014). In Croatia, two layers of victimhood emerge – one general (“many fell during the war”) and one ethnic (“we were victims of Greater Serbian aggression” and “Serbs were victims of ethnic cleansing during Operation Storm”). The competing claims of victimhood between Serbs and Croats stems from massacres committed during the Second World War in Jasenovac by the NDH and in Bleiburg by the Partisans, among other places, and were a formative element of the ethnic tensions that were exacerbated by nationalist propaganda and politicians in the build-up to war in the 1990s.

Victims of either side of the Homeland War nevertheless face serious challenges to claiming benefits or reparations from the Croatian and Serbian governments. News outlets have reported that “civilian war victims are still on hold” (Bögđanić 2015) and are “waiting because there is no money” (Muškić 2014) to support their legal, medical and financial needs; the only legal recourse promulgated so far is the 1992 Act on Protection of Military and Civilian Invalids of War/Zakon o zaštiti vojnih i civilnih invalida rata, which provides for medical rehabilitation and personal disability allowances (Sabor 2013). Meanwhile, the expected 2018-2025 budget of the Republic of Croatia provides approximately 1.3 billion kuna, or €174.69 million, for the Ministry of War Veterans (Nezirović 2017). In her speech
at the 2017 commemoration of Operation Storm in Knin, Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović complained that “inspirers and instigators of the aggression against Croatia have never paid a kuna or dinar to rebuild everything that the Četniks [here referring to Serbs] and the so-called JNA destroyed in Croatia through four years of shelling, bombing, arson and robbery” (Stanković 2017). She did, however, call upon the crowd to remember “those who have fallen for the freedom and independence of Croatia during […] the Homeland War,” including “all those Serbs who have suffered” (Stanković 2017).  In practice, while rights of victims are yet undefined, the right to be remembered, if such a right exists, is not widely exercised. As indicate above, few monuments exist that are dedicated specifically to civilian victims of the war. Of all monuments documented, only one was dedicated to Serb victims in the village of Varivode, near Benkovac. Its installation in October 2010 invited wide controversy, particularly among war veterans, as it had replaced a wooden Orthodox cross with Cyrillic script destroyed through vandalism that April (Huljev 2010; Šimac 2010); the new monument features both Latin and Cyrillic inscriptions (see Figure 9). Beyond the monument in Varivode, little is done on behalf of the Croatian state to remember Serb victims of the war. A small annual commemoration is held by the Serb (SNV) National Council on 6 August in Uzdolje, the day after mass commemorations in nearby Knin (Milekić 2017c); in Serbia, however, larger-scale counter-commemorative events are held in Belgrade and in the Busije settlement outside the city centre built in response to the influx of Croatian Serb refugees throughout the Homeland War (Pantović 2016).

10 Own translation from Croatian original.
11 Own translation from Croatian original.
More widely, attempts by civil society organisations and social-democratic politicians to remember the war dead, including fallen Serbs, often have been met by protests in Zagreb. In October 2014, Assistant Minister of War Veterans Bojan Glavašević claimed that Serb victims of the war should be treated equally as other war victims, which, as described by Koska and Matan, was perceived by conservative groups (particularly veterans’ associations) as “blasphemy which inflicts damage to the very fiber of Croatian society” (2017, 142). Glavašević’s father, Siniša, was a renowned journalist who was murdered in Ovčara in November 1991, yet Bojan Glavašević, an SDP parliamentarian, maintains a reconciliatory approach to Serbs. This remark provoked a series of protests involving veterans camping outside Ministry offices for several months, who demanded the resignation or sacking of Glavašević, the Minister of War Veterans Predrag Matić and his deputy Vesna Nad. The protests ultimately ended in April 2016, eighteen months later, and eventually led to the creation of the 2017 Law on Croatian Veterans noted above; the SDP lost national elections in 2015, and Matić, Nad and Glavašević were replaced (Milekić 2016). The violence that marked various periods of the protests underscores the tense situation that exists in public discourse about “defenders” and their current status as well as the lack of support for war victims across Croatia.

Similarly, a 2016 campaign by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights/Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava (YIHR Hrvatska) that featured advertisements in billboards and on public buses and trams across
Zagreb asking forgiveness from victims for the suffering inflicted upon them during Operation Storm was met by reactionary voices from the Croatian right. The #ISPRIKA (“excuse”) posters stated, “National interest is a confession, not a lie/Nacionalni interes je priznanje, a ne laž” over an image of large columns of Serbs evacuating Croatia after Operation Storm and “National interest is acceptance, not hate/Nacionalni interes je prihvaćanje, a ne mržnja” over the rainbow flag, symbolising both peace and LGBT+ individuals, who are often mistreated in Croatia as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

Then-program coordinator Joco Glavaš claimed, “If the liberation of Knin is celebrated, there should also be a commemoration for the victims of Storm” (Slobodna Dalmacija 2016). HDZ politician and former Split city council member Hrvoje Marušić replied via a post on Facebook, “‘You Yugoslav-Communist bastards, you should be sentenced, shot… If we were a democratic state, you would be tried for grand treason and shot. And probably they will [shoot you], soon’” (Milekić 2017d).

Figure 10: YIHR apology campaign for victims of Operation Storm


The ambivalence, if not outright animosity, present in Croatian memory politics toward victims of the Homeland War is to an extent indicative of wider identity issues faced by the Croat majority (religiosity, European future or Balkan past, etc.) and various ethnic minorities, in particular by Serbs in the areas formerly occupied by the Republika Srpska Krajina, which will be discussed further below.
V. Silencing the Serb minority

Post-independence Croatian memory politics have done little to address national minority claims to remembering those killed or removed unjustly during the course of the war, and particularly in the latter phases of Operation Flash in Western Slavonia and Operation Storm in Dalmatia, Lika and Kordun. Despite legal guarantees to linguistic, religious, political and educational rights as manifested in the 2002 Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities/Ustavni zakon o pravima nacionalnih manjina, shifts in the post-independence citizenship regime meant that Serbs long settled in Croatia lost their legal residence claims almost overnight. Prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, citizenship at the republic level was only relevant in matters of the family, as all Yugoslavs still maintained federal citizenship; after the war, Serbs, Bosnians, Slovenes and other national minorities were expected to be granted citizenship in their kin states, some of which, however, did not yet have established citizenship regimes (Koska and Matan 2017, 126-128). Apart from the removal of their citizenship, the right to reclaim ownership of abandoned homes was severely limited in the aftermath of the Homeland War, and many Serbs chose to emigrate to Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or elsewhere in Europe to established diaspora communities. As such, the voices of the Serb minority in Croatia, no longer recognised as a constituent people of the Republic of Croatia, have been repressed or forgotten.

Nevertheless, certain legal guarantees provided since the end of the war do allow Serbs to engage in civil society and politics in the modern Croatian nation-state. The violence of Operation Storm in Dalmatia and Lika served as a warning against further military actions by the JNA in eastern Slavonia and accelerated the timeline for peace negotiations already underway in mid-1995. On 12 November 1995, the Erdut Agreement, formally the “Basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium”, was signed in Erdut, a small village near the Croatian-Serbian border, by Hrvoje Šarinić for the Republic of Croatia and Milan Milanović, representative of the RSK. The agreement, in stark contrast to the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, contained a brief, two-page statement of principles for the peaceful reintegration of parts of Eastern Slavonia that had been under the control of the RSK during the war over an extendable one-year period through a Transitional Administration established by the United Nations Security Council. This ultimately ran until 1998, when the United Nations handed back control of the area to the Republic of Croatia. The Agreement also secured the rights of return and property restitution for refugees and internally displaced persons – Serb and Croat alike – who had fled the area during the war, established a provisional police force and guaranteed international oversight of local elections. Most importantly, Article 13 of the Erdut Agreement provided the right for “the Serbian community to appoint a joint council of municipalities”, a significant organ for protecting civil rights in an area that no longer was predominately inhabited by ethnic Serbs (UNSC 1995, 4).
The Joint Council of Municipalities (Zajedničko vijeće općina/Заједничко веће општина - ZVO) in Eastern Slavonia consists of seven villages and towns that at the conclusion of the war in Croatia had retained a majority-Serb population, among them Erdut, where the Agreement was signed, and Borovo, where one of the first battles of the Croatian War of Independence began. Officially founded in 1997, the Council’s responsibilities include the representation of Serb communities in the Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Sirmium counties/županije and cooperation with the Croatian government and regional NGOs in the creation of policy affecting the lives of Serbs in Croatia. The ZVO continues to develop educational opportunities for young Serbs in these areas, promoting Serbian language, history and culture instruction for minority students in line with the national minority rights legislation. Among the rights guaranteed in Article 7 of the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities are “the use of [minorities’] language and script, private and public, as well as official use”, “education in their language and script”, “access to the media and public information services […] in their language and script” and “self-organisation and association in pursuance of their common interests” (Sabor 2002, 3).

These legal guarantees, however, have been continuously challenged by both state and civil society actors through today, presenting widespread discrimination toward the Serb minority in Croatia beyond the confines of Slavonia. Serb civic institutions have continued to develop despite these challenges and have grown in influence and acceptance amongst the political centre and left in Croatia; such institutions include the Joint Council of Municipalities, the Serb National Council (SNV) and the Serb Democratic Forum (SDF). The gradual silencing of Serb minority voices has resulted in part from actions taken by state and non-state actors against the community but also is a consequence of the relatively successful integration of Serbs in larger urban areas in Croatia, where they constitute a quite miniscule percentage of the population; while Serbs once constituted 15 percent of the Croatian population in the 1953 and 1961 Yugoslav censuses (peak population 626,789 in 1971), the 2011 census recorded a historic low of 186,633 Serbs, 4.36 percent of the total population (DZS 2011a). The areas where Serbs have retained their majority status, however, are more rural, have smaller populations and have not yet attained a development standard on par with other areas of Croatia (Vlada RH 2010, 1). In these areas, traditional elements of Serb identity are more explicitly pronounced. Škiljan (2014) claims Croatian Serbs’ traditional identity is founded primarily upon the use of the Cyrillic alphabet, Orthodox Christian faith and a celebration of the Serbs’ military traditions as soldiers in the former Habsburg “Military Frontier”. The modern facets of Serb identity Škiljan identifies contrast heavily with the exclusionary nationalist lens many authors on Balkan affairs employ when discussing ethnic minorities in the region. He argues that throughout the twentieth century, Serbs have adopted a quasi-assimilated civic identity partly
forced by historical expulsions from Croatia or conversions to Catholicism in the Second World War but to an extent driven by a sense of belonging to the state (2014, 124).

The high degree of intermarriage between Yugoslavia’s constituent peoples in urban areas also limited the regeneration of a stronger sense of national identity amongst Croatia’s Serb population. This has contributed to a more widespread, multiethnic identity amongst urban Serbs, who Škiljan describes as generally cooperative with the Croat majority and through the electoral system do have a high degree of engagement in politics and civil society (2014, 125-128). The perception of Serbs in Croatia by their Croat neighbours has nonetheless shifted dramatically since the Homeland War. Škiljan notes that, “because of the stigmatisation of Serbs, they [Serbs] hide their national affiliation, which is a consequence of the war in Croatia” (2014, 125). Particularly traditional elements of Serb identity in Croatia have been attacked in recent years. Large scale demonstrations against the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in Vukovar, the site of the largest atrocity committed by the JNA and Serb paramilitaries during the war, erupted in 2013 after bilingual signs had been installed following the 2011 census in accordance with the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities. The Law mandates the installation of bilingual signs in locales with an ethnic minority population greater than one-third the total population; by 2011, the Serb population of Vukovar was 34.87 percent the total (DZS 2011b). Protests in Slavonia and Zagreb were accompanied by anti-Serb chanting and graffiti, including a common motto, “Vukovar a ne Вуковар”, “Vukovar and not [Cyrillic] Vukovar”, with the “u” of “Vukovar” marked with a cross, a nationalist symbol of the Ustaša of the Second World War (see Figure 3). Public perceptions of Serbs in Croatia recorded in 2014 and 2015 reflect this resistance by Croats to the introduction of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar. Sokolić (2017) notes the following remarks from focus groups with Croat pensioners and veterans on the subject:

“To me it is absurd, not to mention so recently after the end of the war, in our hero city they are trying to force this. These are political games, but it is absurd”.

“They are pouring salt on people’s wounds. I do not know how someone even came up with the idea to put [the signs] right there.”

“This is a provocation! They are even waging war in peacetime.”
“If I were in power, I would put this Cyrillic on two signs, on at the front of [a group of Serbs], one at the back. And then send them over the Danube. Who knows how to swim, who does not” (808).

On a field visit to eastern Slavonia in August 2017, I noticed similar patterns of silencing the Serbian language in and near Serb-majority communities. In Dalj, near Erdut, most bilingual street signs had been sprayed with silver paint over the Cyrillic script, and in Biočić, a small village between Drniš and Knin in northern Dalmatia, and old Yugoslav-era monument written in Cyrillic had been toppled and destroyed. Serbian Orthodox churches are also seldom rebuilt to the standards of Catholic churches, and villages that had once been majority Serb were left in ruins, with poorly maintained roads and street signs.

Figure 11: Silencing the minority through neglect and destruction: Biočić, Islam Grčki, Islam Latinski


A clear example of this developmental prioritisation of Croat villages can be found in the towns of Islam Latinski and Islam Grčki – Latinski referring to the “Latin” religious tradition of Catholicism and Grčki (“Greek”) referring to Orthodox Christianity. Driving from Benkovac near the Dalmatian coast toward Zadar and the island of Pag, one passes through Smilčić and Donji Kašić before an abrupt change (or lack) of asphalt welcomes you to Islam Grčki. Prior to the 1990s war, Islam Grčki’s population was predominantly Serb; it was destroyed in Operation Maslenica in January 1993 and has hardly been rebuilt, despite its proximity to the sea. Collapsed houses and churches lie on either side of the road, overgrown with vegetation. Less than two kilometres down the road, the pavement suddenly improves
as one crosses into the municipal boundaries of Islam Latinski, a predominantly Croat village closer to the Maslenica Bridge and the Adriatic Road leading to Zadar. Most houses appear to have been recently reconstructed and repainted, with little to no signs of wartime damage. While the motives of the Croatian state to selectively rebuilt all but one of a string of villages along a 9-kilometre stretch of road is unclear, the history of the two Islams does indicate a reluctance of the state to invest in areas with a Serb-majority population. Towns in eastern Slavonia with similar pasts, though hundreds of kilometres away, also have seen only slow developmental progress since the end of the war, as discussed above.

The net result of this tolerance-with-intimidation is a muted Serb minority, unable to claim reparations for suffering inflicted upon it by the Croatian state and its supporters during the Homeland War, with little recourse to help from the kin state, which also struggles with both its own crimes committed in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo throughout the 1990s and its claim to victimhood in the 1999 NATO bombings of Milošević’s rump Yugoslavia. While civil society support for minorities exists across Croatia, it remains constrained by the ongoing “conservative revolution” led by the HDZ, veterans’ associations, Catholic NGOs and the radical right.

VI. Tentative conclusions

No single conclusion can be drawn from this analysis of the contemporary state of Croatian memory politics, as memory is an ever-adapting tool of the present using materials for the past to construct and re-construct national identities, histories and ambitions. The evidence provided above certainly points toward the development of a conservative self-image of the modern Croatian state, despite the instability of its many governments in recent years and external pressure exerted (quite half-heartedly) by European institutions. Croatia imagines itself through the lens of the Homeland War in one way as a victorious, independent, democratic state that has cleansed itself of its Balkan and Yugoslav past, but in a self-contradictory manner, despite proclaiming European values, the state has done little to protect the victims of this war, to whose sacrifices it is also indebted.

Future investigations of Croatian memory politics should first and foremost incorporate gendered aspects of the “defender” phenomenon and question its inherent masculinity (women suffered but their voices are not heard in the academic literature or political debates about the heritage of the Homeland War). The stories of other minority groups – Italians and Hungarians, among others, though not as contentious as those of the Serb community, would also provide an interesting counterpoint to existing literature on Croatia’s minority populations. As well, the growing relevance of Internet technologies
and social media as a transmitter and archive of memory presents interesting opportunities for digital sociologists, and the case study of the Croatian (or even Balkan) “Twitterverse” could open new avenues of exploration. The field of memory studies has now reached its early adolescence and will remain relevant for as long as we remember, and in the context of the former Yugoslavia, it seems that memories have no expiration date.
Appendix 1: Fieldwork routes in Croatia, August 2017 to March 2018

Field visits: Green and purple – August 2017; Orange – November 2017; Grey – March 2018.
Appendix 2: Museum visits, May 2017 to March 2018
1. Srđ Fortress, Dubrovnik, exhibit on Homeland War in Dubrovnik – May 2017
2. Memorial Centre for the Homeland War, Vukovar – July 2017
3. Croatian History Museum, Zagreb, exhibit on Homeland War in Dubrovnik (truncated version of display in Srđ Fortress) – July 2017
4. St. Michael’s Fortress, Šibenik – August 2017
5. Museum of Yugoslavia, Belgrade – August 2017
6. Vukovar City Museum – August 2017
7. Hrvatski dom Glina – August 2017
8. Sisak City Museum – August 2017
9. Karlovac City Museum – August 2017
10. Memorial Centre for the Rocket Attacks in Zagreb – August 2017
11. Zagreb City Museum – August 2017
12. Ovčara Memorial Centre – August 2017
13. Nikola Tesla Memorial Centre, Smiljan – August 2017
14. Mimara, Zagreb – November 2017
15. Croatian Museum of Contemporary Art, Zagreb – November 2017
16. Ethnographic Museum, Zagreb – November 2017
17. Museum of Slavonia, Osijek – November 2017
18. Nikola Tesla: Mind from the Future, Meštrović paviljon, Zagreb – March 2018
19. Ilok City Museum – March 2018
20. Muzej Staro Selo Kumrovec – March 2018
21. Birth House of Dr. Franjo Tudman, Veliko Trgovišće – March 2018
22. Collection of Weapons and Military Vehicles of the Homeland War (Future Museum of the Homeland War), Turanj/Karlovac – March 2018
Bibliography


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