Photo of Prof Dominique Demougin

Prof Dominique Demougin Ph.D. in Economics

Professor of Economics Economics

    Publications

    2017

    Choosing ADR or litigation (Journal article)

    Deffains, B., Demougin, D., & Desrieux, C. (2017). Choosing ADR or litigation. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 49, 33-40. doi:10.1016/j.irle.2016.11.002

    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2016.11.002

    Rising income inequality: An incentive contract explanation (Chapter)

    Demougin, D. (2017). Rising income inequality: An incentive contract explanation. In Monetary Policy, Financial Crises, and the Macroeconomy: Festschrift for Gerhard Illing (pp. 307-323). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-56261-2_15

    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-56261-2_15

    Toward a Theory of Motion Practice and Settlement (Journal article)

    Demougin, D. (2017). Toward a Theory of Motion Practice and Settlement. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 173(1), 163-167. doi:10.1628/093245616X14785139251747

    DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14785139251747

    2016

    Privatizing profits and socializing losses with smoothly operating capital markets (Journal article)

    Bental, B., & Demougin, D. (2016). Privatizing profits and socializing losses with smoothly operating capital markets. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 44, 179-194. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.06.004

    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.06.004

    2013

    Third-Party Financing of Litigation: Legal Approaches and a Formal Model (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Maultzsch, F. (2014). Third-Party Financing of Litigation: Legal Approaches and a Formal Model. CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES, 60(3), 525-553. doi:10.1093/cesifo/ift006

    DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ift006

    2012

    Class actions, compliance and moral (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Deffains, B. (2012). Class actions, compliance and moral. Review of Law and Economics, 7(2), 483-500.

    Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device (Journal article)

    Bental, B., Deffains, B., & Demougin, D. (2012). Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 21(1), 31-52. doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00327.x

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00327.x

    2011

    CESifo conference in law and economics Munich, May 2010 (Journal article)

    Deffains, B., & Demougin, D. (2011). CESifo conference in law and economics Munich, May 2010. Review of Law and Economics, 7(2), 253-354.

    Class Actions, Compliance and Moral Cost (Journal article)

    Deffains, B., & Demougin, D. (2011). Class Actions, Compliance and Moral Cost. Review of Law & Economics, 7(2). doi:10.2202/1555-5879.1540

    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1540

    Introduction: CESifo Conference in Law and Economics - Munich, May 2010 (Journal article)

    Deffains, B., & Demougin, D. (2011). Introduction: CESifo Conference in Law and Economics - Munich, May 2010. Review of Law & Economics, 7(2), 353-354.

    Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Helm, C. (2011). Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 55(7), 964-979. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.002

    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.002

    2010

    Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation (Journal article)

    Bental, B., & Demougin, D. (2010). Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation. JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS, 32(1), 443-456. doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2009.09.005

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2009.09.005

    Technology adoption under hidden information (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Schottner, A. (2010). Technology adoption under hidden information. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 100(1), 1-18. doi:10.1007/s00712-010-0128-1

    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-010-0128-1

    2009

    Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., Fabel, O., & Thomann, C. (2009). Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study.

    Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Helm, C. (2009). Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits.

    2008

    Customary versus technological advancement tests (Journal article)

    Deffains, B., & Demougin, D. (2008). Customary versus technological advancement tests. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 28(2), 106-112. doi:10.1016/j.irle.2008.02.006

    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2008.02.006

    Do factor shares reflect technology? (Journal article)

    Bental, B., & Demougin, D. (2008). Do factor shares reflect technology?. JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS, 30(3), 1329-1334. doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2007.09.006

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2007.09.006

    Incentive contracts and efficient unemployment benefits (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D. M., & Helm, C. (2008). Incentive contracts and efficient unemployment benefits.

    Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions (Journal article)

    Deffains, B., & Demougin, D. (2008). Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 24(3), 615-627. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.05.001

    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.05.001

    Rules of proof, courts, and incentives (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2008). Rules of proof, courts, and incentives. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 20-40. doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00002.x

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00002.x

    Rules of proof, courts, and incentives (Conference Paper)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2008). Rules of proof, courts, and incentives. In RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Vol. 39 (pp. 20-40). doi:10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00002.x

    DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00002.x

    The inquisitorial and the adversarial procedure in a criminal court setting (Journal article)

    Deffains, B., & Demougin, D. (2008). The inquisitorial and the adversarial procedure in a criminal court setting. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 164(1), 31-43. doi:10.1628/093245608783742246

    DOI: 10.1628/093245608783742246

    2007

    Economics of legal procedures (Journal article)

    Deffains, B., Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2007). Economics of legal procedures. Revue Economique, 58(6), 1265-1290. doi:10.3917/reco.586.1265

    DOI: 10.3917/reco.586.1265

    Entrepreneurship and the division of ownership in new ventures (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Fabel, O. (2007). Entrepreneurship and the division of ownership in new ventures. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 16(1), 111-128. Retrieved from http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/

    Économie des procédures judiciaires (Journal article)

    Deffains, B., Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2007). Économie des procédures judiciaires. Revue économique, 58(6), 1265. doi:10.3917/reco.586.1265

    DOI: 10.3917/reco.586.1265

    2006

    Autonomie der Universität und Professionalisierung ihrer Leitungstrukturen (Journal article)

    Demougin, D. M. (2006). Autonomie der Universität und Professionalisierung ihrer Leitungstrukturen. Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, 54, 172-191.

    Governance: who controls matters (Journal article)

    Demougin, D. (2006). Governance: who controls matters. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 5(1), 1-20.

    Incentive contracts and total factor productivity (Journal article)

    Bental, B., & Demougin, D. (2006). Incentive contracts and total factor productivity. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 47(3), 1033-1055. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00405.x

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00405.x

    Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Helm, C. (2006). Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power. German Economic Review, 7(4), 463-470. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0475.2006.00130.x

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2006.00130.x

    Output and wages with inequality averse agents (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., Fluet, C., & Helm, C. (2006). Output and wages with inequality averse agents. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE, 39(2), 399-413. doi:10.1111/j.0008-4085.2006.00352.x

    DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2006.00352.x

    Preponderance of evidence (Conference Paper)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2006). Preponderance of evidence. In EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Vol. 50 (pp. 963-976). doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.11.002

    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.11.002

    Preponderance of the evidence (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2006). Preponderance of the evidence. European Economic Review, 50(2), 963-976.

    Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2006). Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives.

    2005

    Deterrence versus judicial error: A comparative view of standards of proof (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2005). Deterrence versus judicial error: A comparative view of standards of proof. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 161(2), 193-206. doi:10.1628/0932456054193658

    DOI: 10.1628/0932456054193658

    2004

    Autonomy of the University and the Professionalisation of its Organisation of Control (Scholarly edition)

    Fabel, O., & Demougin, D. (2004). Autonomy of the University and the Professionalisation of its Organisation of Control.

    Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2004). Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof.

    Deterrence vs Judicial Error: a Comparative View of Standards of Proof (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2004). Deterrence vs Judicial Error: a Comparative View of Standards of Proof.

    Eliteuniversitäten: Stärkung des Forschungs- und Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland? (Journal article)

    Grözinger, G., Fabel, O., Demougin, D., & Kräkel, M. (2004). Eliteuniversitäten: Stärkung des Forschungs- und Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland?. ifo Schnelldienst, 57(16), 03-11.

    Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D. M., & Bental, B. (2004). Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity.

    Organizational form and information acquisition (Journal article)

    Demougin, D. (2004). Organizational form and information acquisition. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 160(1), 52-55. doi:10.1628/093245604773861096

    DOI: 10.1628/093245604773861096

    Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., Fluet, C., & Helm, C. (2004). Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents.

    The Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Employees (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D. M., & Fabel, O. (2004). The Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Employees.

    The Division of Ownership in New Ventures (Scholarly edition)

    Fabel, O., & Demougin, D. (2004). The Division of Ownership in New Ventures.

    Ärzte unterschiedlicher Sorgfaltswaltung, fehlerhafte Gerichte und der Fahrlässigkeitsstandard: Korreferat zum Beitrag von Anja Olbrich: "Der Einfluss von Haftungsunsicherheit auf den Sorgfaltsstandard" (Journal article)

    Demougin, D. (2004). Ärzte unterschiedlicher Sorgfaltswaltung, fehlerhafte Gerichte und der Fahrlässigkeitsstandard: Korreferat zum Beitrag von Anja Olbrich: "Der Einfluss von Haftungsunsicherheit auf den Sorgfaltsstandard". Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 73(4), 575-578.

    2003

    Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2003). Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious.

    Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2003). Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious.

    Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity (Scholarly edition)

    Bental, B., & Demougin, D. (2003). Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity.

    Inequity Aversion in Tournament (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2003). Inequity Aversion in Tournament.

    Inequity Aversion in Tournaments (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2003). Inequity Aversion in Tournaments.

    Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Schwager, R. (2003). Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 23(2), 217-225. doi:10.1016/S0144-8188(03)00028-0

    DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(03)00028-0

    Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones (Journal article)

    Pallage, S., & Demougin, D. (2003). Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 23(3), 309-321. doi:10.1016/j.irle.2003.09.005

    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2003.09.005

    Social insurance and redistribution - Comments (Conference Paper)

    Boadway, R., Leite-Monteiro, M., Marchand, M., Pestieau, P., & Demougin, D. (2003). Social insurance and redistribution - Comments. In PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE NEW CENTURY (pp. 333-363). Retrieved from http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/

    2002

    Preponderance of Evidence (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2002). Preponderance of Evidence.

    2001

    Monitoring versus incentives (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2001). Monitoring versus incentives. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 45(9), 1741-1764. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00051-9

    DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00051-9

    Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (2001). Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition. ECONOMIC THEORY, 17(2), 489-496. doi:10.1007/PL00004116

    DOI: 10.1007/PL00004116

    The government and market expectations - Comment (Journal article)

    Demougin, D. (2001). The government and market expectations - Comment. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 157(1), 130-132. doi:10.1628/0932456012974693

    DOI: 10.1628/0932456012974693

    2000

    Excess burden of criminality and redistribution (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Schwager, R. (2000). Excess burden of criminality and redistribution. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 20(3), 329-351. doi:10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00035-1

    DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00035-1

    1999

    A further justification for the negligence rule (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (1999). A further justification for the negligence rule. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 19(1), 33-45. doi:10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00031-3

    DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00031-3

    Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D. M., & Schwager, R. (1999). Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA.

    1998

    Mechanism sufficient statistic in the risk-neutral agency problem (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Fluet, C. (1998). Mechanism sufficient statistic in the risk-neutral agency problem. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 154(4), 622-639. Retrieved from http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/

    1996

    Managerial husbandry and the dynamics of ongoing hierarchies (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Siow, A. (1996). Managerial husbandry and the dynamics of ongoing hierarchies. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 40(7), 1483-1499. doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00041-0

    DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00041-0

    1994

    CAREERS IN ONGOING HIERARCHIES (Journal article)

    DEMOUGIN, D., & SIOW, A. (1994). CAREERS IN ONGOING HIERARCHIES. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 84(5), 1261-1277. Retrieved from http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/

    PRIVATIZATION, RISK-TAKING, AND THE COMMUNIST FIRM (Journal article)

    DEMOUGIN, D., & SINN, H. W. (1994). PRIVATIZATION, RISK-TAKING, AND THE COMMUNIST FIRM. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 55(2), 203-231. doi:10.1016/0047-2727(94)90052-3

    DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)90052-3

    Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm (Scholarly edition)

    Demougin, D., & Sinn, H. -W. (1994). Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm.

    1993

    COSTLESS REVELATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN A DUOPOLY (Journal article)

    DEMOUGIN, D., & TSCHERNIG, R. (1993). COSTLESS REVELATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN A DUOPOLY. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 149(2), 443-463. Retrieved from http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/

    PROPERTY-RIGHTS AND REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL-QUALITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION (Journal article)

    DEMOUGIN, D., & ILLING, G. (1993). PROPERTY-RIGHTS AND REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL-QUALITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. JAHRBUCHER FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE UND STATISTIK, 211(5-6), 385-402. Retrieved from http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/

    Property rights and regulation of environmental quality under asymmetric information (Journal article)

    Demougin, D. (1993). Property rights and regulation of environmental quality under asymmetric information. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik,, 221(5-6), 385-402.

    1991

    CONTRACTUAL DESIGN WITH CORRELATED INFORMATION UNDER LIMITED-LIABILITY (Journal article)

    DEMOUGIN, D. M., & GARVIE, D. A. (1991). CONTRACTUAL DESIGN WITH CORRELATED INFORMATION UNDER LIMITED-LIABILITY. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 22(4), 477-489. doi:10.2307/2600983

    DOI: 10.2307/2600983

    Efficient budget balancing cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (Journal article)

    Demougin, D., & Fishman, A. (1991). Efficient budget balancing cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring. Economic Theory, 1(4), 373-383. doi:10.1007/BF01229315

    DOI: 10.1007/BF01229315

    1989

    A RENEGOTIATION-PROOF MECHANISM FOR A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL WITH MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION (Journal article)

    DEMOUGIN, D. M. (1989). A RENEGOTIATION-PROOF MECHANISM FOR A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL WITH MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 20(2), 256-267. doi:10.2307/2555692

    DOI: 10.2307/2555692

    A SIGNALLING MODEL OF NOMINAL PRICE INERTIA. (Scholarly edition)

    DEMOUGIN, D., & FISHMAN, A. (1989). A SIGNALLING MODEL OF NOMINAL PRICE INERTIA..
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